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Normalization of deviance

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This is an old revision of this page, as edited by 24.194.236.161 (talk) at 00:20, 7 March 2023 (While the abstract is locked behind ProQuest, the example I removed fails to be a good example of the phenomena at work. The Challenger disaster is the quintessential example surrounding how elements of deviation within organizations or communities insidiously go unaccounted until disaster strikes. With this being the essence and definition surrounding the normalization of deviance, a better example would be: "an increase of anti-vaccine individuals by not vaccinating their children led to...). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

Normalization of deviance is a term used by the American sociologist Diane Vaughan to describe the process in which deviance from correct or proper behavior or rule becomes normalized in a government or corporate culture.[1]

Vaughan defines this as a process where a clearly unsafe practice comes to be considered normal if it does not immediately cause a catastrophe: "a long incubation period [before a final disaster] with early warning signs that were either misinterpreted, ignored or missed completely".[2][3]

The original example cited by Vaughan was the events leading to the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster in 1986, but the concept has also been applied to aviation safety,[4][5] clinical practice in medicine,[6] and exhibits itself in train control safety legislation.

Normalization of deviance can exist in conjunction with corporate omerta where deviation from rules is held up by a code of silence surrounding the deviations or an unspoken agreement on rhetoric within a group of executives.[7] Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 crashed because of normalization of deviance where there was a criticism of corporate omerta with a "culture of silence."[8]

See also

References

  1. ^ Wilcutt, Terry; Bell, Hal (November 3, 2014). "The Cost of Silence: Normalization of Deviance and Groupthink" (PDF). Retrieved 2020-02-07.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  2. ^ Banja, John (March 2010). "The normalization of deviance in healthcare delivery". Business Horizons. 53 (2): 139–148. doi:10.1016/j.bushor.2009.10.006. PMC 2821100. PMID 20161685.
  3. ^ Diane Vaughan (4 January 2016). The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA, Enlarged Edition. University of Chicago Press. pp. 30–1. ISBN 978-0-226-34696-0.
  4. ^ Rosenkrans, Wayne (June 8, 2015). "Normalization of Deviance". Flight Safety Foundation. Retrieved 2020-02-07.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  5. ^ Albright, James (January 2017). "Normalization of Deviance - SOPs are not a suggestion" (PDF). BSU Aviation.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  6. ^ Price, Mary R.; Williams, Teresa C. (March 2018). "When Doing Wrong Feels So Right: Normalization of Deviance". Journal of Patient Safety. 14 (1): 1–2. doi:10.1097/PTS.0000000000000157. ISSN 1549-8425. PMID 25742063.
  7. ^ Robison, P., Flying Blind, Doubleday, New York, 2021.
  8. ^ Robison, P., Flying Blind, Doubleday, New York, 2021.