Reflexive control
Reflexive control - influence on the decisions made by the opponent by shoving (imposing) him such assumptions on the basis of which he acts in the way desired by the manipulator[1][2][3].
Methods of reflexive control are widely used in a variety of fields: advertising, public relations, military art, etc.[4] An example of such a strategy could be a card shark deliberately losing the first games in the game, systematic diversionary attacks on an unimportant area of combat, etc..
Introduction
As defined by Soviet scholar V. Lefebvre reflexive control is a process in which one adversary hands over to the other the basis for decision-making.»[4]. In other words, there is a substitution of motivation factors of the enemy in order to encourage him to take disadvantageous decisions.[5].
Professor G. Smolyan believes that the key point of reflexive control is implicitly forcing a subject to choose a desired result. As an aphoristic example of reflexive manipulation we can recall an episode from "Uncle Remus's Tales" in which Brother Rabbit eludes Brother Fox by asking[2]:
Whatever you do don't throw me into the briar patch
— Brer Rabbit
The oldest of those literary heroes who specialized in reflexive control is considered to be the biblical serpent who provoked Eve to taste the forbidden fruit. The category of typical provocateurs can also include one of the famous characters of the Swedish writer Astrid Lindgren, who terrorized the housewife Freken Bock with a simple question. Lindgren, who terrorized the housewife Freken Bock with a simple question[2]:
Have you stopped drinking cognac in the morning? Yes or no?
Individual techniques of reflexive control called "stratagems" have occupied an important place in the history of military art since ancient times. For example, Sun Tzu put in the title of the first chapter of one of his treatises the statement "War is the way of deception," thus defining the craft of warfare as the art of deception.[2].
The preconditions for the actual emergence of the theory of reflexive control can be found in the Soviet military literature of the mid-20th century; four main stages are distinguished in the process of its improvement:[4]:
- from the early 1960s to the late 1970s: research,
- late 1970s to early 1990s: practice-oriented,
- from the beginning to the middle of the 1990s: psychological and pedagogical,
- since the late 1990s: psychosocial.
Among the most authoritative scientists who dealt with the tasks of reflexive control, in addition to V. Lefebvre, the works of D. Pospelov, V. Burkov, V. Lepsky, G. Shchedrovitsky and others are noted. In addition to them, the artistic aspects of the subject of reflexive control were reflected in the works of some major writers, for example, V. Pelevin.
Military application
General provisions
A formally approved terminology of reflexive control did not exist in the military art in the past; nevertheless, its tools were intuitively recognized and were actively used in attempts to calculate the actions of an adversary or to create an erroneous impression of him/herself[2][4].
According to some Russian military experts, applied aspects of reflexive control, having geopolitical significance, are an effective tool for conducting information warfare and can have significant advantages over traditional methods of using military means[6]. Exploiting moral stereotypes of behavior, psychological factors, personal information about the command personnel (biographical data, habits, etc.) reflexive control makes it possible to increase the chances of achieving victory[2], but it is noted that this tactic requires information about the enemy with a high degree of detail and quality[4].
Among the tools of reflexive control are also listed camouflage (at all levels), disinformation, provocation, blackmail, compromising, etc. [2], whose vector of action is aimed more at the hard to grasp and subjectively perceived elements of "military art" than at the more objective concepts of "military science"[2]. Modern computerization can make it difficult to use reflexive control methods because their application is easily revealed by mathematical modeling[4]. Nevertheless, one cannot dismiss the existence of a broad class of exceptions where machine intelligence may lack an intuitive understanding of real reality[4].
In reviewing Russian research on the use of the arsenal of reflexive control for military purposes, the American scholar T.L. Thomas singled out the work of Colonel S.A. Komov as the most productive military theorist in this area..In his publications, Komov made extensive use of developments from the field of reflexive management under the name of "intellectual methods of information warfare," highlighting the following main elements.[2][4]:
- отвлечение внимания через реальную или мнимую угрозу одной из ключевых позиций противника (на флангах, в тылу и т. д.) во время подготовки к военным действиям,
- перегрузку через подачу противнику больших объёмов самопротиворечащей информации,
- паралич, создавая иллюзию точечно направленных угроз жизненно важным интересам или наиболее уязвимым местам,
- истощение, принуждая противника расходовать ресурсы на выполнение малопродуктивной деятельности,
- обман, провоцируя противника к переброске сил на угрожаемое направление во время подготовки к военным действиям,
- раскол, заставляя противника действовать вопреки интересам его союзников,
- умиротворение, через снижение бдительности и создание иллюзии о проведении плановых тренировок, а не приготовлениях к наступательным действиям,
- устрашение, через создание видимости несокрушимого превосходства,
- провоцирование, через навязывание невыгодного сценария действий,
- предложение, через подачу информационного материала, который оказывает влияние юридически, морально, идеологически или в других сферах,
- давление, через подачу информационного материала, которые дискредитирует правительство в глазах населения.
Another domestic researcher who attracted interest abroad was Professor F. Chausov, who formulated the following principles of reflexive management[2][3][4]:
- принцип целеобусловленности — процесс должен быть ориентирован на цель, задействуя полный спектр необходимых мер рефлексивного управления,
- принцип актуализации — должна быть проведена «актуализация» планирования, обеспечивающая достаточно полное представление об интеллектуальном потенциале командно-штабного состава, особенно в ситуациях, связанных с глобальным информационным пространством,
- принцип соответствия — должна быть соблюдена взаимная согласованность целей, места, времени и методов рефлексивного управления,
- принцип моделируемости — нельзя забывать про прогнозирование и моделирование действий и состояний противоборствующей стороны во время выполнения процедур рефлексивного управления,
- принцип предвосхищения — текущие события должны упреждаться и предвосхищаться.
In addition, when using reflexive management, Chausov gave an assessment of risk, the essence of which boils down to the danger of making a mistake if you misjudge the consequences[3]. With this approach, the maximum risk would be if the adversary unravels the plan himself[3].
One well-known example of the effective use of the theory of reflexive control was the disinformation work of the Soviet secret services to create an exaggerated impression on the American side of the shock potential of Soviet nuclear weapons. To this end, fake models of intercontinental ballistic missiles were developed for participation in Red Square parades, and their appearance was immediately reflected in the reports of foreign attachés to their superiors. The next stage was to provide indirect evidence of the real existence of these missile systems, which would then divert the resources of foreign developers to unsuccessful attempts to reproduce the allegedly "new" technology[4].
Similarly, British intelligence conducted disinformation support for the Allied landings in Sicily, codenamed Operation Mincemeat. For this purpose, a dead British serviceman was planted in the sight of the Reich's special services with a set of skilfully fabricated documents describing an alleged British landing operation in the Peloponnese and Sardinia[2]. Judging by these plans, the informational screen for this landing was to be demonstrative preparations for a fake attack on Sicily[2]. The German leadership carried out a set of works to strengthen the Greek coast, redeployed there a tank division, but quite unexpectedly for them the main blow was struck in Sicily[2].
Domestic researchers believe that another textbook example of reflexive control is the American Strategic Defense Initiative program, which forced the Soviet Union to spend significant resources to develop a similar space system.
According to a number of foreign researchers, manipulative methods from the field of reflexive control form the basis of Russia's new concept of military action in the 21st century, which in the West has been called the "[[{{{1}}}]].»[7][8][9]. At the same time, some publications have been critical of the applied aspects of this theory, and it has even been called pseudoscientific[9].
References
- ^ Рефлексивное управление // Энциклопедия кибернетики. — Киев: Главная редакция УСЭ, 1974. — Т. 2. — С. 296.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m http://www.isa.ru/proceedings/images/documents/2013-63-2/t-2-13_54-61
- ^ a b c d Чаусов Ф. Основы рефлексивного управления противником (рус.) // Морской сборник : журнал. — 1996. — Сентябрь (т. 1834, № 09). — С. 11—15. — ISSN 0134-9236.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j http://www.intelros.ru/pdf/stratagemi/Tomas.pdf
- ^ Раскин А. В. (2015). "Рефлексивное управление в социальных сетях" (PDF) (журнал) (in русский). 35 (3) (Информационные войны ed.): 18–22. ISSN 1996-4544.
{{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires|journal=(help)CS1 maint: date and year (link) CS1 maint: unrecognized language (link) - ^ Прохожев А.А., Турко Н.И. (1996). Основы информационной войны.
{{cite book}}:|work=ignored (help) - ^ "Архивированная копия". Archived from the original on 2018-10-18. Retrieved 2017-04-02.
- ^ Sinclair N. (май-июнь 2016). "Old Generation Warfare: The Evolution — Not Revolution — of the Russian Way of Warfare" (in английский) (Military Review ed.): 8–15.
{{cite journal}}: Check date values in:|date=(help); Cite journal requires|journal=(help)CS1 maint: date and year (link) CS1 maint: unrecognized language (link) - ^ a b Gorka S. (сентябрь-октябрь 2016). "How America Will be Attacked. Irregular Warfare, the Islamic State, Russia, and China" (in английский) (Military Review ed.): 30–40.
{{cite journal}}: Check date values in:|date=(help); Cite journal requires|journal=(help)CS1 maint: date and year (link) CS1 maint: unrecognized language (link)
Bibliography
- Денисов А. А., Денисова Е. В. Краткий очерк основ теории управляемой конфронтации (рус.) // Информационные войны : журнал. — 2014. — Т. 29, № 1. — С. 24—33. — ISSN 1996-4544.
- Лепский В. Е. Технологии управления в информационных войнах (от классики к постнеклассике). — Москва: Когито-Центр, 2016. — С. 160. — ISBN 978-5-89353-499-3.
- Нургалеева Л. В. Проблема рефлексивного управления как аспект современной коммуникативной культуры (рус.) // Вестник Томского государственного университета : журнал. — 2013. — Т. 10, № 2.
- Раскин А. В., Тарасов И. В. Рефлексивное управление как технология информационного воздействия (рус.) // Информационные войны : журнал. — 2014. — Т. 29, № 2. — С. 15—17. — ISSN 1996-4544.
- Чепиницкая П. Р. Технологии социальной регуляции в рефлексивном управлении российской зарубежной диаспорой (рус.) // Теория и практика общественного развития : журнал. — 2011. — № 3.
- Jainter M., Kantola H. Reflexive Control in Cyber Space (англ.) // Academic Conferences International Limited. — 2016. — Июль. — С. 155—162.
- Kasapoglu C. Russia's Renewed Military Thinking: Non-Linear Warfare and Reflexive Control (англ.) // Research Division, NATO Defence College : Research Paper. — 2015. — Ноябрь (№ 121). — С. 1—12. — ISSN 2076-0949.
- Thomas T. Psycho Viruses and Reflexive Control: Russian Theories of Information-Psychological War // Information at War: From China's Three Warfares to NATO's Narratives. — London: Legatum Institute, 2015. — Vol. September. — P. 16—21. — (Beyond Propaganda). — ISBN 978-1-907409-93-6.