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1976 Kennedy Expressway train collision

Background

Explain the creation of the Kennedy Expressway RT and the A/B system?

Collision

On January 9, 1976

at 8:07 am CST a train was stopped

"Collision jams up Kennedy", Chicago Tribune, Fact Sheet

• David Young and Clarence Page of the Chicago Tribune labeled the event "the worst accident in the six-year history of the Kennedy Expressway rapid transit line" at the time.
• 379 passengers were injured.
• The accident caused a traffic jam that lasted for hours; rescue equipment, cleanup operations, and rubbernecking were listed as contributing factors. Police cars were placed at entrances to the Kennedy Expressway to reroute traffic, some being placed near Lawrence Avenue. Edens Expressway suffered similar conditions.
• The most severe injuries occurred to passengers in the sixth and last car of the standing train at the Addison Street station and the first car of the approaching train that collided with it.
• Firemen and the police removed all injured passengers from the trains within 45 minutes of the collision.
• The standing train was a "A" schedule train; the approaching train was a "B" schedule train. The line was the Milwaukee line.
• The standing "A" train had at least seven cars.
• The approaching "B" train had four cars.
• Damaged cars were moved to the Jefferson Park station, which was the line's terminal at the time, and service to inbound trains resumed at 9:45 pm CST.
• The fire department was alerted at 8:08 am CST.
• The rescue mission involved 10 ambulances, a helicopter, two "flying squad" units with cutting tools, jacks, torches, and two snorkels.
• Injured passengers were taken to nine area hospitals.
• 100 additional passengers told CTA via phone that they would consult their own personal health professionals for examination and treatment.
• This incident was investigated by the NTSB and the FRA.
• McKinly Ross, the motorman who was driving the approaching train, told Hubert Jewell the lead investigator for NTSB and FRA's investigation:
  • he was given the permission from his supervisor to bypass the cab-signal safety system and operate the train manually.
  • his cab signal system emitted a steady beeping that indicated it was not working properly. He requested for it to be shut off.
  • he was "blinded by the sun and glare from snow".
  • he was approximately 300 feet away when he saw the standing train.
  • he immediately applied the emergency break. It was confirmed that all three breaking mechanisms were activated when the collision occurred.
  • he was going the CTA speed limit of 30-35 mph while (attempting) to go through Addison station.
• According to Jewell, Ross "followed the guidelines the CTA has to allow him to operate this train in bypass (manually)."
• Ross left the incident without major injuries.
• Ross was immediately suspended, pending the outcome of an investigation.
• The standing "A" train. was making an "A" stop at an "A" station.
• Ross passed his drug tests.
• This was one of many incidents with the opening of the Kennedy Expressway rapid transit.

During the morning rush hour on January 9, 1976, two trains collided at Addison on the Kennedy Extension, in what was the most serious "L" accident up to that time (though unfortunately surpassed just 13 months later). The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) summarized the accident and the probable cause thusly: On January 9, 1976, at 8:06 a.m., Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) train No. 315 struck the rear end of train No. 104 while it was standing at the Addison Street Station platform in Chicago, Illinois. The impact forces extensively damaged the lead car of the moving train and the rear car of the standing train, and slightly damaged the other cars in both trains. Damage to the equipment and track was estimated to be $267,000. Of the 381 passengers who were injured in the collision, 1 passenger died. A southbound 'B' train of 2200-series cars, Run 315, struck the rear of an 'A' train of 6000-series cars, Run 104, standing in the Addison station -- at the time, the Addison station was an 'A' station, and so Run 315 would have normally passed through without stopping. The cab signal (automatic train control, or ATC) system was having issues (which had been common on the Kennedy Extension at the time), and Run 315 had bypassed the cab signal system to allow the train to proceed down the line. In addition, some visibility factors existed: while the Addison station is reasonably visible approaching from the previous station (Irving Park) due to the presence of a down-slope between the two stations, just before a train gets to Addison station from Irving Park there is a significant curve. It was also a bright, sunny morning, and glare may have been a factor. The NTSB determined the probable cause: The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the motorman of train No. 315 to perceive standing train No. 104 at a sufficient distance to permit him to stop his train before striking No. 104. Contributing to the collision were the rule that permitted the operation of the train with the automatic train control and the cab signals inoperative, the lack of consistent enforcement of operating rules, the absence of flag protection against following trains, the failure of the train phone system to provide reliable communications, and the violation of the 25-mph speed limit required by Rule 178B. Car 2308, the lead car of the striking train, was seriously damaged and retired, its mate renumbered a paired with another car.

From <https://www.chicago-l.org/mishaps/addison-kennedy.html>