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'''Europe first''', also known as '''Germany first''', was the key element of the [[grand strategy]] employed by the [[United States]] and the [[United Kingdom]] during [[World War II]]. According to this policy, the United States and the United Kingdom would use the preponderance of their resources to subdue [[Nazi Germany]] in [[Europe]] first. They would also fight a holding action against [[Empire of Japan|Japan]] in the [[Pacific Ocean|Pacific]], using fewer resources. After the defeat of Germany—considered the greatest threat to [[Great Britain]]<ref>Hornfischer p. 151-153, 383</ref>—all [[Allies of World War II|Allied]] forces could be concentrated against Japan. |
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<noinclude> |
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==Background== |
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{{Löschantragstext|tag=17|monat=August|jahr=2018|titel=Peter Jellitsch|text=Bitte prüfen, ob die Vienna Biennale ausreicht, ob der Künstler im Rahmen der Wikipedia eine ausreichende Relevanz hat. Die Publikationen beschreiben ihn und er ist als Herausgeber in der DNB hinterlegt. Die Publikationen habe ich überarbeitet und die Links auf den Eintrag des Verlages entfernt. [[Benutzer:Joel1272|Joel1272]] ([[Benutzer Diskussion:Joel1272|Diskussion]]) 17:59, 17. Aug. 2018 (CEST)}} |
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===Grand Strategy=== |
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----</noinclude> |
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Germany was the United Kingdom's primary threat, especially after the the [[Battle of France|Fall of France]] in 1940, which saw Germany overrun most of the countries of Western Europe, leaving the United Kingdom alone to combat Germany. Germany's planned invasion of the UK, [[Operation Sea Lion]], was averted by its failure to establish air superiority in the [[Battle of Britain]]. At the same time, war with Japan in East Asia seemed increasingly likely. Although the U.S. was not yet a war with either Germany or Japan, it met with the UK on several occasions to formulate joint strategies. In the March 29, 1941 report of the [[ABC-1]] conference, the Americans and British agreed that their strategic objectives were: (1) "The early defeat of Germany as the predominant member of the [[Axis]] with the principal military effort of the United States being exerted in the Atlantic and European area;" and (2) A strategic defensive in the Far East."<ref>Morton, Louis. ''Strategy and Command: The First Two Years. The United States Army in World War II.'' Washington: GPO, 1962, p. 88</ref> |
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'''Peter Jellitsch''' (* [[25. März]] [[1982]] in [[Villach]]) ist ein österreichischer [[Künstler]], der mit den Medien [[Zeichnung (Kunst)|Zeichnung]], [[Malerei]] und [[Installation (Kunst)|Installation]] arbeitet. Er lebt und arbeitet in [[Wien]]. |
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Thus, the Americans agreed with the British in the grand strategy of "Europe first" (or "Germany first") in carrying out military operations in World War II. The UK feared that, if the United States was diverted from its main focus in Europe to the Pacific (Japan), [[Adolf Hitler|Hitler]] might crush both the Soviet Union and Britain, and would then become an unconquerable fortress in Europe. The wound inflicted on the United States by Japan at [[Pearl Harbor]] on December 7, 1941 did not result in the change in the policy. Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]] hastened to Washington shortly after Pearl Harbor for the Acadia Conference to ensure that the Americans didn't have second thoughts about Europe First. The two countries agree that, "notwithstanding the entry of Japan into the War, our view remains that Germany is still the prime enemy. and her defeat is the key to victory. Germany is defeated the collapse of Italy and the defeat of Japan must follow."<ref>Morton, p. 158</ref> |
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Nach einer abgeschlossenen Lehre zum [[Tischler]] im Jahr 2001 absolvierte Jellitsch die [[Berufsreifeprüfung (Österreich)|Berufsreifeprüfung]]. Von 2003 bis 2010 studierte er [[Architektur]] an der [[Akademie der bildenden Künste Wien]]. Von 2005 bis 2006 absolvierte er ein Gastjahr an der [[Universität für angewandte Kunst Wien]]. Seit 2012 ist er [[Lektor (Universität)|Lektor]] an der Akademie der bildenden Künste. |
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==British forces in the Far East== |
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2015 war er Teilnehmer der ersten [[Vienna Biennale]] in der Gruppenausstellung ''24/7: the human condition''.<ref>{{Internetquelle |url=http://2015.viennabiennale.org/kuratorinnen-und-mitwirkende/ |hrsg=Vienna Biennale 2015 |titel=KuratorInnen und Mitwirkende - Vienna Biennale 2015: Ideas for Change |werk=viennabiennale.org |sprache=de |zugriff=2018-08-17}}</ref> |
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Most of the aircraft in Britain's [[colonialism|colonies]] were of obsolete types, as modern designs such as the [[Supermarine Spitfire]] were badly needed for home defense. As a result, the British lacked the resources to achieve air superiority in the Far East. The drive to tighten air defenses was dulled because the Allies' underestimated the performance of Japanese aircraft such as the [[A6M Zero]]. |
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== Ausstellungen == |
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First Sea Lord [[Dudley Pound|Sir Dudley Pound]] had originally decided that no [[capital ships]] could be spared to reinforce [[Singapore]], as too many of them would have to be deployed in the Far East to counter the Japanese Navy, leaving an insufficient number to deal with Europe. That shortfall would have to be made up by the US agreeing to deploy most of its battleships in the Atlantic. |
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* 2012 Field Conditions, [[San Francisco Museum of Modern Art]], US (Gruppenausstellung) |
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Against Admiralty planning, Churchill urged the reinforcement of Singapore after several British naval successes were achieved in 1941. These included the sinking of the [[German battleship Bismarck]], which ended the threat of heavy surface warships against Atlantic convoys, and the Battles of [[Battle of Taranto|Taranto]] and [[Battle of Cape Matapan|Cape Matapan]], which gave the Allies the upper hand over the Italian Navy in the [[Battle of the Mediterranean|Mediterranean Theater]]. A compromise was made to send two capital ships and an aircraft carrier, but [[Sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse|''Prince of Wales'' and ''Repulse'' were sunk]]. Strategists had known that the British [[flotilla]] on its own could not make much impact, and it was always assumed that they would be joined by ships of the US Pacific fleet which included eight battleships at [[Pearl Harbor]]. |
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*2013 Fokus Sammlung 04, [[Museum Moderner Kunst Kärnten]], AT (Gruppenausstellung) |
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*2014 Only Real, Public Works, Chicago, US |
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*2014 Dernières Nouvelles de l‘Ether, La Panacèe, Montpellier, FR (Gruppenausstellung) |
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*2014 Strabag Artaward International, [[Strabag]] Artlounge, Wien, AT (Gruppenausstellung) |
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*2014 Without You I’m Nothing, [[Strabag]] Artlounge, Wien, AT |
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*2015 It could be like this…, [[Museum Moderner Kunst Kärnten]], AT |
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*2015 24/7: the human condition, [[Museum für angewandte Kunst (Wien)|Museum für angewandte Kunst]], Wien, AT (Gruppenausstellung) |
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*2015 Figur/Struktur, Werke aus der [[Strabag]] Artcollection, RLB Kunstbrücke, Innsbruck, AT (Gruppenausstellung) |
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*2016 From Bits to Paper, Le Shadok, Strasbourg, FR (Gruppenausstellung) |
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*2016 Only the Memory, Galerie Crone, Wien, AT |
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*2016 The Campaign for Art, [[San Francisco Museum of Modern Art]], US (Gruppenausstellung) |
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*2016 Sequenced Perceptions, Galerie Clemens Gunzer, Zürich, CH (Gruppenausstellung) |
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*2017 Black is still the new black, Collectors Depot, Pörtschach, AT (Gruppenausstellung) |
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*2017 The House of Dust, Cneai, Paris, FR (Gruppenausstellung) |
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*2017 Patents and Palm Trees, Galerie Crone, Wien, AT |
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*2018 Filter Bubble, [[Kunstverein Kärnten]], AT (Gruppenausstellung) |
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*2018 Jetzt Für Immer, Birgit Lauda Art Foundation, Wien, AT |
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== Auszeichnungen == |
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===United States=== |
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When Japan attacked the United States, the United Kingdom had already been fighting in Europe for over two years, and had few resources to spare to protect far-flung [[colonialism|colonies]]. |
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* 2010 Carl Appel Preis |
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When [[Declaration of war by the United States#Formal declarations of war|Germany declared war]] on the United States on December 11, 1941, the United States faced a decision about how to allocate resources between these two separate theaters of war. |
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*[https://www.kleinezeitung.at/kaernten/villach/4209677/Herausragender-Preis-fuer-jungen-Architekten 2010 Outstanding Artist Award] |
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*2013 Margarete Schütte-Lihotzky Stipendium |
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*[https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20131218_OTS0232/kaerntner-landeskulturpreis-fuer-regisseur-martin-kusej 2013 Förderungspreis für Bildende Kunst des Landes Kärnten] |
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*[http://www.theodorkoernerfonds.at/2014/ausgezeichnete-arbeiten/ 2014 Theodor Körner Preis] |
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*[http://www.strabag-kunstforum.at/artaward/information/ 2014 Strabag Kunstpreis] |
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*[https://www.mak.at/das_mak/mak_schindler_stipendium/stipendiaten_rueckblick 2014 MAK Schindler Stipendium] |
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== Publikationen == |
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On the one hand, Japan had attacked the United States directly at Pearl Harbor, and the [[Imperial Japanese Navy|Japanese Navy]] threatened United States territory in a way that Germany, with a limited surface fleet, was not in a position to do. On the other hand, Germany was universally considered the stronger and more dangerous threat to Europe because only [[Great Britain]] and the [[Soviet Union]] remained un-occupied by [[Nazi Germany]], Germany's geographical proximity to the UK and the Soviet Union was therefore a greater threat to their survival<ref>Hornfischer p. 11-15, 130, 151-153, 382, 383</ref> |
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*{{Literatur |Autor=Joseph Becker, Sandra Petrasevic |Titel=Peter Jellitsch : Automatic Writing & Everything Else |Hrsg=Peter Jellitsch, Birgit Lauda Art Foundation |Sammelwerk= |Band= |Nummer= |Auflage= |Verlag=Verlag für Moderne Kunst |Ort=Wien |Datum=2018 |ISBN=978-3-903228-81-8 |Seiten=}} |
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*{{Literatur |Autor=Sébastian Pluot, Marlies Wirth |Titel=Peter Jellitsch : The way you moved through me |Hrsg=Peter Jellitsch |Sammelwerk= |Band= |Nummer= |Auflage= |Verlag=Verlag für Moderne Kunst |Ort=Wien |Datum=2016 |ISBN=978-3-903131-73-6 |Seiten=}} |
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== Weblinks == |
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Prior to the [[attack on Pearl Harbor]], American planners foresaw the possibility of a two-front war. [[Chief of Naval Operations]] [[Harold Rainsford Stark]] authored the [[Plan Dog memo]], which advocated concentrating on victory in Europe while staying on the defensive in the Pacific. This memo laid the basis for the "Europe first" policy. |
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* [http://www.peterjellitsch.com/ Website Peter Jellitsch] |
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==Agreement== |
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Soon after the declaration of war, the United States and the United Kingdom agreed at the [[Arcadia Conference]] on the "Europe first" strategy, and the United States committed to sending its army and air force to fight Germany in Europe and Africa as soon as those forces were ready. The campaign against Japan would be focused on halting Japanese expansion until the war on Germany was complete, at which time the full power of the United Kingdom, the United States, and eventually the [[Soviet Union]] could be turned against Japan. This strategy would concentrate on what was perceived as the strongest of the Axis Powers, and would prevent a German victory that might knock the United Kingdom or the Soviets out of the war. |
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== Einzelnachweise == |
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===Opposition=== |
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<references /> |
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The "Europe First" strategy did not go along well with factions of the US military, driving a wedge between the Navy and the Army. While USN Fleet Admiral [[Ernest King]] was a strong believer in "Europe First", contrary to British perceptions, his natural aggression did not permit him to leave resources idle in the Atlantic that could be utilized in the Pacific, especially when "it was doubtful when — if ever — the British would consent to a cross-Channel operation".<ref name=Morison1957_pp13-14>{{Cite book |first=Samuel Eliot |last=Morison |title=History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. XI: Invasion of France & Germany: 1944–1945 |pages=13–14 |publisher= [[Little, Brown and Company]] |year=1957 |isbn=0-316-58311-1}}</ref> King once complained that the Pacific deserved 30% of Allied resources but was getting only 15%. In spite of (or perhaps partly because of) the fact that the two men did not get along,<ref>{{cite web |accessdate=2007-12-30 |
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|url=http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWkingE.htm |
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|title=Ernest King |
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|author=Simkin, John |
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|publisher=Spartacus Educational |
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}}</ref> the combined influence of King and General [[Douglas MacArthur]] increased the allocation of resources to the Pacific War.<ref name=Gray>{{cite book |
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|accessdate=2007-12-30 |
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|url=http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/BigL/BigL-6.html |
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|chapter=Chapter 6: Joint Logistics in the Pacific Theater |
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|author=Gray, Anthony W., Jr. |
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|title=The Big 'L' — American Logistics in World War II |
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|editor=Alan Gropman |
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|year=1997 |
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|publisher=National Defense University Press |
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|location=Washington, D.C. |
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}}</ref> |
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{{Normdaten|TYP=p|GND=1082446963|LCCN=no/2017/153217|VIAF=177145542416796640103}} |
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General [[Hastings Ismay]], chief of staff to [[Winston Churchill]], described King as: |
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<blockquote>tough as nails and carried himself as stiffly as a poker. He was blunt and stand-offish, almost to the point of rudeness. At the start, he was intolerant and suspicious of all things British, especially the [[Royal Navy]]; but he was almost equally intolerant and suspicious of the [[United States Army|American Army]]. War against Japan was the problem to which he had devoted the study of a lifetime, and he resented the idea of American resources being used for any other purpose than to destroy Japanese. He mistrusted Churchill's powers of advocacy, and was apprehensive that he would wheedle President Roosevelt into neglecting the war in the Pacific.</blockquote> |
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{{SORTIERUNG:Jellitsch, Peter}} |
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At the [[Casablanca Conference]], King was accused by Field Marshal Sir [[Alan Brooke, 1st Viscount Alanbrooke|Alan Brooke]] of favoring the Pacific war, and the argument became heated. The combative General [[Joseph Stilwell]] wrote: "Brooke got nasty, and King got good and sore. King almost climbed over the table at Brooke. God, he was mad. I wished he had socked him."<ref name=Pogue1973_p305>{{Cite book |first=Forrest C. |last= Pogue |title=George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory 1943–1945 |pages=305 |publisher=Viking Adult |year=1973 |isbn=0-670-33694-7}}</ref> |
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[[Kategorie:Bildender Künstler (Österreich)]] |
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[[Kategorie:Hochschullehrer]] |
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[[Kategorie:Österreicher]] |
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[[Kategorie:Geboren 1982]] |
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[[Kategorie:Mann]] |
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{{Personendaten |
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==Consequences== |
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|NAME=Jellitsch, Peter |
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Initially, few new resources were committed to the Far East after Pearl Harbor and the Fall of Singapore. Japanese forces essentially went undefeated for six months after Pearl Harbor as they conquered Southeast Asia and several Pacific islands, threatening [[Australia]]. The Allies were largely caught off guard by the rapid Japanese expansion, with their remaining cruisers and destroyers in the Far East all but wiped out in the [[Battle of the Java Sea]]. The British had withdrawn from the [[Indian Ocean]] citing superior Japanese carrier forces. |
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|ALTERNATIVNAMEN= |
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|KURZBESCHREIBUNG=österreichischer bildender Künstler |
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While freed up from the Pacific and responsibilities to the allies, many Royal Navy [[capital ship]]s were then tied up in the [[Battle of the Mediterranean|Mediterranean]] and [[Arctic convoys of World War II|Arctic]]. |
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|GEBURTSDATUM=25. März 1982 |
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|GEBURTSORT=[[Villach]] |
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The [[Soviet Union]] focused almost entirely on the [[Eastern Front (World War II)|Eastern Front]], repelling the [[Operation Barbarossa|Axis invasion]] and eventually conquering the Eastern European countries, ultimately driving towards Germany. The Soviets only agreed near the end of the war to invade Japanese possessions in China and [[Manchukuo]]. |
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|STERBEDATUM= |
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|STERBEORT= |
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Japan's decisive defeat by the United States at the [[Battle of Midway]], involving the loss of four Japanese fleet carriers and a significant number of trained aircrews, crippled its offensive capability and ended plans for eastern expansion. Nonetheless, the Japanese continued their invasion moves in the South Pacific. |
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}} |
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Up to this point, the Allies had been on the defensive in the Pacific. King advocated (with Roosevelt's tacit consent) the [[Battle of Guadalcanal|invasion of Guadalcanal]]. When General Marshall resisted this line of action (as well as who would command the operation), King stated that the Navy (and the Marines) would then carry out the operation by themselves, and instructed Admiral [[Chester Nimitz]] to proceed with the preliminary planning. King eventually won the argument, and the successful invasion went ahead with the backing of the Joint Chiefs. Not only was it the first time that the Japanese lost ground during the War, but the momentum placed the Allies on the offensive. Australian war historians held Admiral King in high regard for his attention to the Pacific Theatre. <ref name=Bowen> |
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{{cite web |
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|accessdate=2007-12-30 |
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|url=http://www.users.bigpond.com/pacificwar/GermanyFirst/GermanyFirst.html |
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|title=Despite Pearl Harbor, America adopts a 'Germany First' strategy |
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|work=America Fights Back |
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|author=Bowen, James |
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|series=The Pacific War from Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal |
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|publisher=Pacific War Historical Society}}</ref> |
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Unlike the British and Soviets, the United States was willing to wage war offensively on both the Pacific and European fronts without diverting resources from either side. Most of the US [[aircraft carrier|carriers]], [[battleship]]s, and [[cruiser]]s were deployed against Japan. Germany's surface fleet was small and the escort ships used in the [[Second Battle of the Atlantic]] were mostly [[destroyer]]s and [[destroyer escort]]s to counter the [[U-boat]] threat. The Pacific War could be prosecuted successfully with well placed ground troops, usually [[United States Marine Corps|Marines]], though this was also because US Army General [[George C. Marshall]] resisted sending troops to the Pacific, leaving operations like Guadalcanal entirely to the Navy and Marines. Old second-rate battleships remained in the Atlantic theatre, provided bombardment support for the [[Normandy_Landings#Naval_activity|D-Day landings]], which were carried out by the British, Canadian and US Armies. |
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By the end of 1942, the US had suffered heavy losses in carriers and cruisers in the Pacific (as had the Japanese naval vessels) as a result of the Battles of [[Battle of Coral Sea|Coral Sea]], [[Battle of Midway|Midway]], and the prolonged campaigns of attrition around [[Battle of Guadalcanal|Guadalcanal]] and the [[Solomon Islands campaign|Solomon Islands]]. Nonetheless, the Pacific Theater was far from neglected, as shipbuilding programs were accelerated after Pearl Harbor, intended not only replace the early war losses, but also to give the US an insurmountable material advantage. The new ships were ready starting in early 1943, particularly the many carriers of the [[Essex class aircraft carrier|Essex-class]]. There were few trade-offs that the US Navy was forced to make, the only notable one was the cancellation of the [[Montana class battleship|Montana-class battleships]] as such ships were less important than they were pre-war, and as this freed up shipyards to construct the more urgently needed aircraft carriers, amphibious and anti-submarine vessels.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/usnshtp/bb/bb67.htm |title=Montana Class (BB-67 through BB-71) |accessdate=2008-05-28 |author=Department of the Navy |authorlink=United States Navy |publisher=Naval Historical Center }}</ref> |
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The surrender of Italy in 1943 enabled the transfer of some Allied carriers and battleships to the [[Indian Ocean]], where they could launch strikes against Japanese conquered possessions in Southeast Asia. However, the Royal Navy had to keep most of its key units at home to maintain a strong presence in the Arctic, being tied down by Nazi Germany's last capital ship, the [[German battleship Tirpitz]]. After a series of sorties in 1944 finally resulting in the sinking of ''Tirpitz'', then the British were able to transfer carriers and battleships to the Pacific. |
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By the time Germany was defeated, the Allies had liberated [[Burma]], the [[Philippines]], and a string of island bases leading up to the home islands of Japan, including [[Iwo Jima]] and [[Okinawa]]. The U.S. started a massive reallocation of Army troops to the Pacific to prepare for the invasion of Japan, known as [[Operation Downfall]], but during preparations Japan surrendered following detonation of [[atomic bomb]]s over [[Hiroshima]] and [[Nagasaki, Nagasaki|Nagasaki]] and invasion by Soviet forces in China and [[Manchukuo]]. |
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===British/Commonwealth involvement in the Pacific=== |
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The "Europe First" policy had political implications, as it limited the employment of British and Empire forces in the Pacific. The Australian Government had sought U.S. military assistance in 1942, when it was faced with the possibility of Japanese invasion, and while Australia had made a significant contribution to the Pacific War, it had never been an equal partner with its U.S. counterparts in strategic decision-making. While General MacArthur had more Australian than US forces under his command in 1942, it has been claimed that he nonetheless decreed that all Australian victories would be reported as "Allied victories", while American victories would be reported as American. It is also a widely-held view that, from mid-1943 onwards, MacArthur confined the Australian Army divisions under his command to tough and largely irrelevant actions, while reserving the more prestigious actions for US troops, resulting in enduring antipathy towards MacArthur in Australia.<ref>http://www.fact-archive.com/encyclopedia/Douglas_MacArthur</ref><ref name="Jackson 2006 500">{{cite book | last = Jackson | first = Ashley | title = The British Empire and the Second World War | publisher = Hambledon Continuum | year = 2006 | location = London | pages = 500 | isbn = 1-85285-417-0 }}</ref> |
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It was argued that a British presence would act as a counter-balance to the powerful and increasing U.S. presence in the Pacific, and the Australians would warmly welcome the British Pacific Fleet when they established their main base in [[Sydney]].<ref name="Jackson 2006 500"/> The measure was forced on Churchill by the British Chiefs of Staff, not only to re-establish British presence in the region, but to mitigate any perception in the U.S. that the British were doing nothing to help defeat Japan. However, Admiral Ernest King and General [[George C. Marshall]] had continually resisted operations that would assist the British agenda in reclaiming or maintaining any part of its pre-war colonial holdings in the Pacific or the eastern Mediterranean. King was adamant that naval operations against Japan remain 100% American, and angrily resisted the idea of a British naval presence in the Pacific at the [[Quadrant Conference]] in late 1944, citing (among other things) the difficulty of supplying additional naval forces in the theater. For much the same reason, General [[Henry Arnold]] resisted the offer of RAF units in the Pacific. Roosevelt, however, overruled King and allowed British Empire forces to deploy in the Pacific. |
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Despite King's reservations, the [[British Pacific Fleet]] did acquit itself sufficiently in the Pacific, as the [[Comparison of armoured to unarmoured flight deck designs|armoured flight decks]] of their aircraft carriers appeared to hold up well against [[Kamikaze]] attacks. The British had a limited presence against Japan up until the last months of the war. |
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==Analysis== |
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One clear result of the Europe first policy was that battles in the European theater tended to be set-piece, pre-planned events. With fewer resources, the United States commanders in the Pacific tended to run much smaller, innovative operations and were forced to be more flexible in their strategic planning, in order to save lives. For example, as a result of fortuitous events, the [[Battle of Leyte]] and later [[Battle of Iwo Jima]] were undertaken with almost no strategic foreplanning. |
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The differences in the theaters were also due to their nature; as Europe was heavily land-based, the best perceived way to beat Nazi Germany was to invade the continent. When [[End of World War II in Europe|Germany surrendered]], [[Battle of Berlin|Berlin had been captured]] and only [[Norway]] and [[Denmark]] remained in Axis hands. By contrast, to defeat Imperial Japan, a naval power spread out wide across islands in the world's largest ocean, key islands could be taken (such as Leyte) to cut off supply lines and bypass major bases such as [[Rabaul]] and [[Truk Lagoon]]; examples of such campaigns included [[Operation Cartwheel]]. At the end of World War II the Japanese still held most of their conquered possessions in China and Southeast Asia until the Soviet intervention. |
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==See also== |
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*[[Asia First]] |
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==References== |
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{{Reflist}} |
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*Hornfischer, James D. ''Neptune's Inferno: The US Navy at Guadalcanal.'' New York: Bantam Books, 2011. ISBN 978-0-553-80670-0. |
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{{DEFAULTSORT:Europe First}} |
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[[Category:Politics of World War II]] |
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[[Category:United Kingdom–United States relations]] |
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[[da:Europa først]] |
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[[fr:L'Allemagne d'abord]] |
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[[lt:Europa pirmiausia]] |
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[[no:Europa først]] |
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[[ro:Mai întâi Europa]] |
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[[zh:歐洲優先]] |
Version vom 18. August 2018, 00:19 Uhr
Wartungsseite Löschkandidaten
Peter Jellitsch (* 25. März 1982 in Villach) ist ein österreichischer Künstler, der mit den Medien Zeichnung, Malerei und Installation arbeitet. Er lebt und arbeitet in Wien.
Nach einer abgeschlossenen Lehre zum Tischler im Jahr 2001 absolvierte Jellitsch die Berufsreifeprüfung. Von 2003 bis 2010 studierte er Architektur an der Akademie der bildenden Künste Wien. Von 2005 bis 2006 absolvierte er ein Gastjahr an der Universität für angewandte Kunst Wien. Seit 2012 ist er Lektor an der Akademie der bildenden Künste.
2015 war er Teilnehmer der ersten Vienna Biennale in der Gruppenausstellung 24/7: the human condition.[1]
Ausstellungen
- 2012 Field Conditions, San Francisco Museum of Modern Art, US (Gruppenausstellung)
- 2013 Fokus Sammlung 04, Museum Moderner Kunst Kärnten, AT (Gruppenausstellung)
- 2014 Only Real, Public Works, Chicago, US
- 2014 Dernières Nouvelles de l‘Ether, La Panacèe, Montpellier, FR (Gruppenausstellung)
- 2014 Strabag Artaward International, Strabag Artlounge, Wien, AT (Gruppenausstellung)
- 2014 Without You I’m Nothing, Strabag Artlounge, Wien, AT
- 2015 It could be like this…, Museum Moderner Kunst Kärnten, AT
- 2015 24/7: the human condition, Museum für angewandte Kunst, Wien, AT (Gruppenausstellung)
- 2015 Figur/Struktur, Werke aus der Strabag Artcollection, RLB Kunstbrücke, Innsbruck, AT (Gruppenausstellung)
- 2016 From Bits to Paper, Le Shadok, Strasbourg, FR (Gruppenausstellung)
- 2016 Only the Memory, Galerie Crone, Wien, AT
- 2016 The Campaign for Art, San Francisco Museum of Modern Art, US (Gruppenausstellung)
- 2016 Sequenced Perceptions, Galerie Clemens Gunzer, Zürich, CH (Gruppenausstellung)
- 2017 Black is still the new black, Collectors Depot, Pörtschach, AT (Gruppenausstellung)
- 2017 The House of Dust, Cneai, Paris, FR (Gruppenausstellung)
- 2017 Patents and Palm Trees, Galerie Crone, Wien, AT
- 2018 Filter Bubble, Kunstverein Kärnten, AT (Gruppenausstellung)
- 2018 Jetzt Für Immer, Birgit Lauda Art Foundation, Wien, AT
Auszeichnungen
- 2010 Carl Appel Preis
- 2010 Outstanding Artist Award
- 2013 Margarete Schütte-Lihotzky Stipendium
- 2013 Förderungspreis für Bildende Kunst des Landes Kärnten
- 2014 Theodor Körner Preis
- 2014 Strabag Kunstpreis
- 2014 MAK Schindler Stipendium
Publikationen
- Joseph Becker, Sandra Petrasevic: Peter Jellitsch : Automatic Writing & Everything Else. Hrsg.: Peter Jellitsch, Birgit Lauda Art Foundation. Verlag für Moderne Kunst, Wien 2018, ISBN 978-3-903228-81-8.
- Sébastian Pluot, Marlies Wirth: Peter Jellitsch : The way you moved through me. Hrsg.: Peter Jellitsch. Verlag für Moderne Kunst, Wien 2016, ISBN 978-3-903131-73-6.
Weblinks
Einzelnachweise
- ↑ KuratorInnen und Mitwirkende - Vienna Biennale 2015: Ideas for Change. In: viennabiennale.org. Vienna Biennale 2015, abgerufen am 17. August 2018.
Personendaten | |
---|---|
NAME | Jellitsch, Peter |
KURZBESCHREIBUNG | österreichischer bildender Künstler |
GEBURTSDATUM | 25. März 1982 |
GEBURTSORT | Villach |