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This is the current revision of this page, as edited by Throast (talk | contribs) at 20:20, 25 October 2025 (Edit request on 24 October 2025: re). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this version.
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Reactions section

[edit]

I'm not sure what's being said by the paragraph in Reactions. The source is a speech by President Milanović in which he's talking in more than the usual amount of politician slick talk. If he's suggesting, like I think he's suggesting, that NSATU is being used to sneak active support into the conflict than that's a valid criticism to have on the page. I'm just not sure that's what he's saying.ItsRainingCatsAndDogsAndMen (talk) 23:59, 10 April 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Same, I don't know if it's a problem with the translation, or if context was left out of the quote, but I can't parse what he's trying to say. MilesVorkosigan (talk) 17:14, 8 August 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Extended protected-confirmed edit requests on 24 October 2025

[edit]
  • Adressed the concerns: uncollapsed all sections of infobox except footnotes. They look differently comparing to existing ones because of this, as well as of their modularity.

91.122.21.179 (talk) 17:39, 24 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]


 Waiting for requesting editor to address issues
78.81.123.235 (talk) 11:32, 31 August 2025 (UTC)[reply]

91.122.21.179 (talk) 11:30, 25 September 2025 (UTC)[reply]

@Lklundin, hi. Just noticed your adding to the article. May I suggest my infobox draft at the talk page for you to review and take care of. As an IP-editor, I'm under potential WP:RUSUKR sanctions and can only request formal Extended-protected edit. Please feel free to copy-edit: sure not much to revise. Thank you. 78.81.123.235 (talk) 14:34, 17 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@78.81.123.235: It's too hard to see what you're asking to change with the infoboxes. You removed some info that's there, such as the Ukranian and French spellings of the operation, and removed some sources for the items, such as foundation date. Perhaps you can just recommend changes rather than a wholesale replacement. And don't forget sources unless they're in the article. For the text sections you are asking to add, it would be better to format all the requests like the logistics section below so we can see the formatting and click on the sources to review them. Also, there's some unsourced info you are trying to add, such as the opening leadership section with Curtis A. Buzzard. You'll have more luck with such an extensive edit request if you source everything with independent third party sources. STEMinfo (talk) 23:35, 7 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@STEMinfo, thank you for your attention and notable suggestions. Let me point to each of them:
1. The first, Command, infobox is a modular one: that"s why you didn't notice the drop-down section containing all the info you considered removed. It's not: just moved there to let more important info to be at the non-collapsible infobox part.
2. The second infobox, of the second article section, is a spin-off of operational part of the command to highlight strength and goals.
3 Finally, as suggested, I have separated the text part edit into a new section with a new request template. Please, have a look at it, there are issues with templates visibility: added more sources and wikilinks.
Thank you, 91.122.21.179 (talk) 09:36, 8 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]
I still think you should request changes to the infobox rather than replacing it. For example, I no longer see the source for the foundation date, as I mentioned earlier. It's too hard to see what else is being removed. As far as the text request, the first source I tried to confirm for the appointment of Buzzard is a dead link. Please confirm the sources are still live. STEMinfo (talk) 19:08, 8 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@STEMinfo, thank you for pointing g me:my real bad luck. The only link dead is the first one in the infobox (it was nice trifold *.pdf, still posses it; replaced link by *.html one). As to your suggestion of editing infobox by parts: the current one is my creation and I believe workload for editors would be much heavier if split by parts. The new one is modular: even footnotes ar embedded for convenience of inserting. (You can check my talk page for 9 other infoboxes, 7 if which are already implemented). So, keeping believing. All the other links are alive: checked. Thank you. 91.122.21.179 (talk) 19:39, 8 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]
  • At the top of the article replace current Infobox with an updated modular one (please, help to upload and insert an emblem image from the reference[1] into it to replace current one, after |image=), enable text after |caption =:
NATO Security Assistance and Training Ukraine
Also known asNSATU, Ukraine mission
FounderNorth Atlantic Council
Founding leaderACO (with SHAPE, ADCON)
Leader(first) Christopher Cavoli
GEN Alexus Grynkewich (since JUL 4, 2025)
Military leaderSACEUR (OPCON)
Political leader NAC (DPPC [uk])[a]
NSATU CommanderLTG Curtis Buzzard[b][3]
Unit typeOperational command
Founding
directives
Voluntary non-legally binding Ukraine response consolidator
FoundationJUL 11, 2024[4]
Dates of operationDEC 18, 2024–pres.[5]
Country(recipient)  Ukraine
Allegiance NATO (provider)
MotivesUkraine to prevail, Russia to be deterred[6]
HeadquartersLucius D. Clay  Kaserne
 Germany, DE-HE 50°02′59″N 8°19′31″E / 50.0498°N 8.3254°E / 50.0498; 8.3254
Active regionsACO AOR
SloganHarnessing the strength of Alliance to support Ukraine[7]
Major actionsMilitary aid to AFU
StatusMultinational, active
SizeHHBN-equivalent
Part ofNATO Enhanced Forward Presence (as Command)
Allies
31 contributing countries:

Commands  •  Alliances •  Mission:
Opponents(to be deterred):
WebsiteOfficial website
Assistance et formation de l'OTAN en matière de sécurité pour l'Ukraine (AFOMSU, French)
«Підготовка та сприяння НАТО Україні з безпеки» (Командування, Ukrainian)
Clay Kaserne (garrison patron Gen. Clay, Military Governor of US Occupation Zone in Germany, 1947- 49). 2012
FoundedJuly 11, 2024 (2024-07-11) (inaugurated)[4]
18 December 2024; 10 months ago (18 December 2024) (activated)[5]
Allegiance SHAPE
TypeCombined joint operational Commd
Role
  • Provisioning of equipment, training to AFU by NATO members/allies
  • AFU long-term doctrine overseeing
Size~ 350 personnel (from 31 countries, incl. Ukraine)[f]
Part of
HeadquartersClay Kaserne, Wiesbaden-ErbenheimHesse, Germany
NicknameUkraine mission
WebsiteWebsite, SHAPE
Commanders
Commander
3-star rank
(firstLTG Curtis A. Buzzard
 United States Army[g]
Deputy
Commander
GM Maik Keller (MAY'25-pres.,  German Army
Ukraine
Mil. Rep.
(first) BRG Hennadii Shapovalov  Ukrainian Ground Forces
ACOM, Force
Dev. Support
(firstBrigadier Richard Bell  British Army[14]
ACOM, TrainingBRG P.H.G.H.Robichaud (JUN'25-pres.,  Canadian Army)[h]
ACOM,
ECLS
(firstBRG Witold Bartoszek  Polish Land Forces[i]
Sr. Enl.
Leader
(first holderSrg.Maj. Mark Morgan
 United States Army[j]
Today
part
of
NSATU •
SAG-U •
EUMAM UA
SAG-U–NSATU joint coordination[n]
EUMAM UA-NSATU data sharing, Ukrainian LNO staff rotation[20]
Footnotes
    1. ^ Defence Policy and Planning Committee of NATO headed by Assistant Secretary General of NATO for Defence Policy and Planning.
    2. ^ Concurrently COM SAG-U (from June 2024).[2]
    3. ^ Second Ishiba Cabinet's defense minister considered Japan's contributing to NSATU.[10]
    4. ^ International Donors Coordination Centre, IDCC, has handed over its responsibilities to NSATU since 2025.[11]: 37 [12]: 44 Table 10 
    5. ^ Since 2022, when Belarus allowed Russia to use its territory to launch the invasion and to launch missiles into Ukraine. 
    6. ^ As of July 2025 HQ-based only. Seven hundred, if accounted for collocated SAG-U with its assisting personnel in SHAPE, Casteau, Belgium, and NSATU's 2 logistics hubs: one in Rzeszów, Poland, and another under development in Câmpia Turzii, Romania. Australia and New Zealand are working closely with representatives of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in addition to 28 NATO countries.[5][13] Eventually 700 personnel are to be staffed in NSATU.[12]: 44 
    7. ^ Starting December 2024, as dual-hatted COM SAG-U (since August 2024).
    8. ^ Brigadier General P.H.G.H.Robichaud's full name is Patrick Henri George Hugh Robichaud.[15]
    9. ^ Assistant Commander - Equipment Coordination and Logistical Support[16]
    10. ^ Since December 2024.[3]
    11. ^ As of August 2025, facilitated under the command since NSATU is responsible for Poland LEN hub, which started in March 2025. Since NSATU inception, it has directly managed 1500 movements.[17]
    12. ^ As of August 2025, cargo tonnage facilitated through Poland LEN hub by NSATU only.
    13. ^ As of July 2025, coordinated since March 2025.[18]
    14. ^ Here’s a snapshot of the current NSATU–SAG-U joint efforts that were confirmed at the 21 July 2025 UDCG extended meeting:
      • US–NATO co‑funding mechanism (new channel announced by US president Donald Trump and Secretary General of NATO Mark Rutte for European and Canadian allies to pool funds to purchase US‑made weapons and technology for Ukraine providing faster access to high‑demand systems);
      • Air defense boost (packages of Patriot missile systems and other advanced air‑defense assets pledged by allies to counter Russia’s intensified missile and drone strikes);
      • Industrial and financial backing (long‑term funding streams to expand defense production capacity in Europe and North America to replenish stocks while sustaining Ukraine’s needs over multiple years).[19]
Preceded by
International Donors Coordination Centre

Strength and goals section

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91.122.21.179 (talk) 06:44, 24 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]

  • Please apply 2 edits to the Strength and goals section.

91.122.21.179 (talk) 15:03, 21 September 2025 (UTC)[reply]

(Aid & Procurement, Logistics, Interoperability, Command, Political Context), plus the references from both English and non-English media up to and after October 2025

    • 📂 NATO–Ukraine Support Report (Oct 2025 → Present)**

- Thematic breakdown (Aid, Logistics, Interoperability, Command, Politics) - References from English & non-English outlets (Spain, Poland, Romania, Germany, France, Ukraine, Italy) - Key takeaways on NATO’s evolving role

    • visual map of the logistics hubs and command nodes** (Clay Kaserne, Rzeszów, Zurawica, Câmpia Turzii, etc.)
  • At the top replace current infobox with an updated one:
UKRAINE MISSION
  • DEC 2024 (IOC)
  • APR 2025 (FOC)
  • present
Part of foreign military assistance
during ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine
Mission
statement
【Enduring, predictable, coherent
support to Ukraine through the
coordination of Allied logistics,
training, and planning efforts on
and up to 24-month horizon】
  • Development
    framework
  • Training areas
  • Logistics hubs
  • Technical cells
  • Ukraine-organized 4-monthly
    OFDeF conferences, in support
  • ~140, in facilitation globally[7]
  • Two, sub-commands-managed
  • Two, under supervision
Operational scope
  • Training, equiping coordination
  • Force generation
  • Logistics
Locations
50°02′58″N 08°19′28″E / 50.04944°N 8.32444°E / 50.04944; 8.32444
Rzeszów Logistics Enabling Node (LEN-P), Remote Maintenance  and  Distribution Cell–Ukraine (RDC-U), PL[a]

50°06′36″N 22°01′08″E / 50.11000°N 22.01889°E / 50.11000; 22.01889
Zurawica RTW (Regional Technical Workshop), PL[12]: 51 

Plannedon 24-month horizon
Planned by DPPC [uk]
Commanded by LTG Curtis Buzzard[b]
with SACEUR,[21]DSACEUR Admiral Keith Blount
ObjectiveAllied doctrinal support of AFU for its NATO membership, full interoperability of forces
Date18 December 2024 (2024-12-18)present (CET UTC+01:00/CEST UTC+02:00)
Executed by COM NSATU/SAG-U (dual hatted) with UDCG deliverables
OutcomeOngoing and evolving:[18]
  • 25,000 AFU soldier trainees, and 500 equipment movements, per quarter[c]
  • Burden-sharing unity
  • Allies policy harmonization
  • Frictions deconfliction[22]
NATO | NSATU main operational sites: DE, PL
Mission assessment criteria
  • Qualitatively: progress to desired end states
  • Quantatively: cargo throuput tonnage provided; number of AFU personnel trainees coordinated

Picture gallery: NSATU
    • at the bottom add the following:

Leadership and command

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NSATU commander
Lt. Gen. Curtis A. Buzzard

Lieutenant General Curtis A. Buzzard, US Army, serves as the inaugural commander of NSATU and is dual-hatted as the Commander of the Security Assistance Group – Ukraine (SAG-U). Buzzard was nominated for his third star assignment to the Wiesbaden-based Ukraine support command in July 2024, assuming the additional NATO position in December 2024.[e] Buzzard’s leadership role as both NSATU and SAG-U commander reflects the transition of support coordination from an American-led, bilateral SAG-U to a genuine NATO-led, multinational command. The dual-hatting also unifies reporting structures and minimizes redundancy between American and NATO systems.[26]

Deputy commander
Major General Maik Keller (Germany)
Other senior staff

The post of Deputy Commander at NSATU is occupied by Major General Maik Keller, German Army, who assumed the role in May 2025, according to Ukrainian and NATO official briefings.[27][28] Keller’s appointment represents Bundeswehr commitment to NSATU operations in Wiesbaden HQ and at logistics hubs, with German officers rotating through key leadership positions. Other staff rotations and handovers are subject to the periodic reorganization typical of NATO multinational headquarters.

Organizational structure

[edit]
Staff composition and nationalities

As of August 2025, staffed by around 350 core personnel, representing as many as 31 NATO and partner nations, NSATU integrates several Indo-Pacific partners, notably Australia and New Zealand personnel, and Ukrainian liaison officers who form a central element in requirements identification and real-time operational dialogue.[17][28]

Command relationships

NSATU operates as a NATO command under Allied Command Operations (ACO), with reporting lines through the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) at SHAPE. Its mandate, governance, and planning priorities are established by the North Atlantic Council on the advice of the Defense Policy and Planning Committee (DPPC), consistent with the NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP).[29] NSATU does not act as an “operating force,” but instead as a joint, multinational coordination and oversight body for international security assistance and training.[30]

Integration with other entities

NSATU’s role is distinct from, but closely coordinated with, several major bilateral and EU multi-lateral efforts: the EU Military Assistance Mission for Ukraine (EUMAM UA), the UK's Operation Interflex, Canada’s Operation UNIFIER, the US-led JMTG-Ukraine, and others.[f][17][33]

Headquarters and operational sites section

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91.122.21.179 (talk) 06:42, 24 October 2025 (UTC) 91.122.21.179 (talk) 12:15, 7 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Headquarters and operational sites

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Main headquarters
Clay Kaserne, Wiesbaden, Germany

Wiesbaden has for years served as a U.S. Army Europe command hub and, since November 2022, as the location for the US-led SAG-U before its shift to NATO’s multilateral command after 2024. The selection of this site - a major NATO facility with extensive infrastructure, secure communications, and robust transport links - was intended to enable high-volume, secure operational coordination of bulk flows required by the Ukraine mission.[5]

Logistics nodes
Rzeszów, Poland

The primary logistics enabling node for NSATU, a location functioning as the main logistics and repair hub for Western aid to Ukraine during the earlier phases of the war.[34] There is, at Rzeszów, a dense presence of US, NATO, Polish, and other allied forces; runway activity and customs data confirm immense throughput capacities for weapons, vehicles, and medical evacuations.[12]: 50–51  NSATU's coordination of security at Rzeszów, beginning in January 2025, includes two German Patriot batteries stationed in eastern Poland to provide integrated air and missile defense of the hub against air threats.[35]

Câmpia Turzii, Romania

The logistics node at Câmpia Turzii, Romania, is being scaled up as a secondary logistics enabling node. The base, known as "Baza 71 Aeriană General Emanoil Ionescu", houses, among others, US multi-role fighter squadrons and drone units, and is being upgraded according to NATO-funded expansion contracts. As of October 2025, Câmpia Turzii is not reported to be at operational parity with Rzeszów but is being developed as an additional logistics corridor and redundancy, while risk of cross-border traffic exposure in Poland persists.[23]

Staff at SHAPE

The NSATU staff footprint is further supplemented by personnel at SHAPE in Casteau, Belgium, as well as liaison/coordination points at two logistics nodes. These numbers account for the cited "up to 700" personnel figure, which includes "assisting personnel" distributed across NSATU HQ, SHAPE, and node sites.[g][7]

References

  1. ^ "nsatu-eDmnN1.png".
  2. ^ a b c "Ukraine, Allies and Partners meet to better align international military support". shape.nato.int. 10 February 2025. Retrieved 8 October 2025. Cite error: The named reference "PDF" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
  3. ^ a b "Leadership". shape.nato.int/nsatu. Retrieved 16 July 2025.
  4. ^ a b "NSATU Assumes Responsibilities to Support Ukraine". SHAPE.nato.int. 18 December 2024. Retrieved 16 July 2025.
  5. ^ a b c d Siebold, Sabine (2 July 2025). "Military aid increasingly focuses on boosting Ukraine's defence industry". Reuters. Retrieved 16 July 2025.
  6. ^ "SACEUR briefs German cabinet on security environment". SHAPE Public Affairs Office. 27 August 2025. Retrieved 29 August 2025 – via SHAPE.NATO.int.
  7. ^ a b c d "Trifold" (PDF). Retrieved 8 October 2025 – via SHAPE.NATO.int.
  8. ^ "Strategic Headwinds: Understanding the Forces Shaping Ukraine's Path to Peace". CSIS. Retrieved 21 August 2025.
  9. ^ Massie, Justin; Tallová, Barbora (10 April 2025). "Friends in need, friends indeed? Explaining variation in military support to Ukraine". European Journal of International Security. Cambridge University Press: 1-26. doi:10.1017/eis.2025.13.
  10. ^ Yamaguchi, Mari (9 April 2025). "Japan's Ishiba and NATO chief vow to deepen security ties as regional threats rise". APnews. Retrieved 10 October 2025. Details of Japan's participation still need to be discussed, but the Japanese Self Defense Force, if stationed, is not expected to involve combative roles because of the country's postwar pacifist principles.
  11. ^ Special Inspector General for OAR Report to the Congress, Q4FY2024 (PDF) (Report). 13 November 2024. Retrieved 28 July 2025 – via media.defence.gov.
  12. ^ a b c d e Special Inspector General for OAR Report to the Congress, Q3FY2025 (PDF) (Report). 15 August 2025. Retrieved 15 August 2025 – via stateoig.gov. Cite error: The named reference "OAR2" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
  13. ^ Soare, Andreea (3 October 2024). "S-a aprobat participarea Armatei Române la misiunea de asistență de securitate și instruire NATO-NSATU și înființarea unui centru de instruire maritimă pentru militarii ucraineni, în România". mediafax.ro (in Romanian).
  14. ^ "SACEUR on Support for Ukraine: We Are Moving as Quickly as We Can". NSATU HQ Public Affairs Office. 28 July 2025. Retrieved 5 August 2025 – via shape.nato.int.
  15. ^ Le, Tam (16 July 2025). "Canadian Brig. Gen. Patrick Robichaud Observes JMTG-U OPFOR". 7th Army Training Command. Retrieved 8 October 2025.
  16. ^ "Enhancing support for Ukraine". NSATU HQ Public Affairs Office. 2 October 2025. Retrieved 8 October 2025 – via shape.nato.int.
  17. ^ a b c d Matiushenko, Ievgen (29 August 2025). "Major General Maik Keller, NSATU Deputy Commander - Ukrinform: Exclusive". Ukrinform. Retrieved 30 August 2025.
  18. ^ a b Allison, George (12 June 2025). "New NATO command now coordinates 60% of Ukraine aid". UK Defence Journal. Retrieved 24 August 2025.
  19. ^ Allison, George (1 August 2025). "NATO backs new US-led channel to accelerate aid to Ukraine". UK Defence Journal. Retrieved 24 September 2025.
  20. ^ "Strong Together: EU and NATO Intensify Training Cooperation in Strausberg". NSATU HQ Public Affairs Office. 29 July 2025. Retrieved 21 August 2025.
  21. ^ "Transfer of Patriot units to Kyiv being prepared, says NATO's top commander". Reuters.com. 17 July 2025. Retrieved 17 July 2025 – via Reuters. «Preparations are underway, we are working very closely with the Germans on the Patriot transfer», Alexus Grynkewich told a conference in the German city of Wiesbaden. «The guidance that I have been given has been to move out as quickly as possible.»
  22. ^ Slattery, Gram; Stone, Mike; Landay, Jonathan; Holland, Steve (17 July 2025). "Trump promised Patriots for Ukraine. Now Europe has to provide them". Reuters. Retrieved 17 July 2025.
  23. ^ a b "România, hub strategic NATO: Comandament logistic propus de președintele Nicușor Dan" [Romania becomes NATO logistics hub: Nicușor Dan asks for Parliament's approval]. PodTV.ro (in Romanian). 18 September 2025. Retrieved 24 September 2025. The command will have the status of Allied Command and will be part of the NATO-HQ NSATU [...] Command.
  24. ^ "Netherlands uses new NATO channel to pay for US arms for Ukraine". Reuters.com. 4 August 2025. Retrieved 4 August 2025. In a statement, the alliance said, "Working closely with Ukraine and the United States, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe Alexus Grynkewich will validate packages that correspond to Ukraine's needs, such as air defence, ammunition and other critical equipment for rapid delivery from U.S. stockpiles".
  25. ^ "NSATU Divisions". Retrieved 8 October 2025 – via shape.nato.int/nsatu.
  26. ^ "USA Leaves Key Logistics Hub For Ukraine Aid in Poland: Was It Trump Or Planned in Advance". Defence Express. 9 April 2025. Retrieved 30 August 2025.
  27. ^ "Deputy Commander". Retrieved 30 August 2025 – via NATO.int.
  28. ^ a b "NSATU deputy commander outlines center's key functions". Ukrinform. 29 August 2025. Retrieved 30 August 2025.
  29. ^ Jans, Karljin (18 March 2022). "Will Russia's invasion boost NATO's budget?". Clingendal Institute. Archived from the original on 31 May 2023. Retrieved 8 October 2025. [...]which goes beyond the idea of the 2% target. This will require focusing on Alliance readiness levels with, at the centre the NATO Defence Planning Process, addressing the full spectrum of challenges.
  30. ^ "NATO Ambassadors visit SHAPE". 10 October 2025. Retrieved 10 October 2025 – via NATO.int.
  31. ^ a b "Forging the Future of Ukraine's Combat Power: One Year of Force Development". NSATU Public Affairs Office. 2 October 2025. Retrieved 8 October 2025.
  32. ^ "L'UE favorable à former l'armée ukrainienne après larret Des combats". Euronews. 29 August 2025. Retrieved 30 August 2025.
  33. ^ Le, Tam (1 June 2025). "Task Force Saber assumes JMTG-U mission during transfer of authority ceremony". 7th Army Training Command. Retrieved 8 October 2025. [...]during their time in supporting the AFU as part of the JMTG-U mission, including training over 400 Ukrainian soldiers in leadership skills, providing for the real life support needs for over 4,000 soldiers,[...]
  34. ^ "NATO to open logistics centre in Rzeszów, Poland to repair Ukrainian Equipment". 23 July 2023. Retrieved 30 August 2025 – via pravda.com.ua.
  35. ^ "Bundeswehr verstärkt Engagement bei NSATU [The Bundeswehr Engagement at the NSATU]" (in German). Retrieved 30 August 2025 – via Bundeswehr.de.

Notes

  1. ^ The LEN-P synchronizes the inbound aid receipt, transfer and onward movement of donated materiel to the AFU. The RDC-U is responsible for the maintenance and repair of equipment once donated to the AFU.[12]: 50–51 
  2. ^ Starting December 2024, as dual-hatted COM SAG-U (since August 2024).[2]
  3. ^ Minimum coordinated, and managed directly, by NSATU respectively.[17]
  4. ^ As of October 2025, contingency facility; under renovation. On 17 September 2025, Romanian president requested parliamentary approval for establishment of the LEN-R Command.[23]
  5. ^ Concurrently COM SAG-U from August 2024.[2]
  6. ^ Joint and Trilateral Cooperation: Mechanisms and Milestones
    • Formal and Operational Integration
    From 2025 onwards, joint activities by EUMAM UA, NSATU, and SAG-U to reach operational coherence include:
    Joint Training Conferences: Used to realign priorities, share outcomes and lessons learned, and agree on standards for training content, delivery, and evaluation.
    Reciprocal Information Exchange: All three organizations maintain open channels for intelligence sharing, doctrinal alignment, and operational planning to reduce redundancies and ensure resources reach the front where most needed;[31]
    • Joint Equipment and Sustainment Working Groups
    The NSATU Capability Sustainment Working Group (CSWG), launched in January 2025, involves three organizations. Its remit includes:
    Joint troubleshooting of supply and sustainment bottlenecks —particularly for complex NATO-standard equipment now flooding into Ukraine’s inventory.
    Inclusion of Ukrainian defense industry representatives, paving the way for international contract integration and domestic capability-building;[31]
    • Integrated Lessons Learned and Doctrinal Development
    The partnership has resulted in rapid adaptation, among other, of:
    battlefield lessons - with integration into both EUMAM UA and NSATU curricula and propagated across all donor nations;
    a shared template for End-of-Training Reports (ETRs) capturing and disseminating best practices, challenges, and innovations
    N.B.: As of October 2025, EUMAM UA, akin to NSATU, operates only on EU/EU+ territory. Any proposal for in-country training is contingent on a future truce or agreement.[32]
  7. ^ Exact breakdown is not disclosed.
I have no opinion on the content of the proposed new infobox but this proposed infobox was a dog's breakfast of broken embedding. It also uses {{small}} in violation of MOS:SMALLFONT and probably has other problems. I have cleaned up the syntax and embedding errors as much as possible, which entailed commenting out some of the proposed faux-header text. I recommend proposing a simpler infobox. An infobox is meant to summarize the key facts mentioned in the article. – Jonesey95 (talk) 00:44, 12 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Jonesey95, thank you for your valuable comments and suggestion. Sure, all accepted. The only reversal I would propose is to return collapsible modular view: not only for infoboxes to be concise, but for possibility to un-collapse them for printing, if any, to keep only non-child sections. Please, feel free to edit further. Regards, 91.122.21.179 (talk) 06:53, 12 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]
See MOS:HIDE. Content in articles should not be collapsed. – Jonesey95 (talk) 14:37, 12 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Jonesey95, thank you again for correcting mistakes. My idea was to follow inherently collapsible (by design) module Command structure. Thank you for a link to clarify. 91.122.21.179 (talk) 18:49, 12 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Not done for now:: Please consider incorporating the changes suggested by Jonesey95. Please also consider making these requests a bit more readable by using Template:Text diff or simply describing the chnages that should be made (instesad of copy-pasting large sections of the article). Throast {{ping}} me! (talk | contribs) 22:20, 23 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Throast, please consider implementing the infobox as a whole: it's a modular one with more information and graphics. Previous comment was about it only. I believe incerting infobox edits part by part would waste editor's time and prone to mistakes. You can visually compare existing infobox in Strength and goals section with suggested one in a section above (changes implemented). Reopening request.91.122.21.179 (talk) 06:42, 24 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]
There are two infoboxes on this talk page, neither of which look like the ones in the current article. This is a very confusing edit request, it is poorly formatted and convoluted, which makes it very hard for uninvolved editors to address these. Throast {{ping}} me! (talk | contribs) 10:36, 24 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Throast, thank you very much for implementation of all my edits. Please, make the section on top of the See also as a separate one: sorry for unclear instruction. 91.122.21.179 (talk) 17:10, 24 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]
a) The first subsection ("Main headquarters") does not have any citations. b) If you want the infoboxes added, please remove all instances of {{small}} and {{big}}, as they violate MOS:SMALL. Throast {{ping}} me! (talk | contribs) 17:55, 24 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Edit request on 24 October 2025

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To editor X2step: you, probably, unwittingly closed my unanswered edit request: reopened. 91.122.21.179 (talk) 06:58, 10 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]

91.122.21.179 (talk) 06:17, 8 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]

  • Please, add the following at the top of the See also section:

Logistics operations

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NSATU draws lessons from earlier military logistics operations.[1]

Coordination, throughput, movement volume

Interviews with NSATU’s Deputy Commander, German and Ukrainian sources, and UK defense journalists confirm a throughput rate of 18,000+ tons of materiel per month via NSATU's Rzeszów hub with over 60,000 tracked movements since NSATU assumed responsibility in March 2025.[2]

Logistics node sovereignty

A critical dimension in official European and Ukrainian statements is that NATO and NSATU do not deliver aid directly into Ukraine. All materials are delivered to and must be collected from designated logistics nodes on NATO alliance territory. This deliberate, repeated distinction is emphasized at the highest levels (NATO, German, UK MoD, and Ukrainian Defense Ministry), and is central to assuaging alliance member concerns regarding escalation and direct involvement in the conflict.[3]

Maintenance and sustainment

Every two to three months, NSATU organizes maintenance working groups involving donor countries, Western defense industry representatives, Ukrainian officials, and sometimes front-line Ukrainian unit experts. This process has been effective in resolving spare parts shortages (an example being the repair of a Patriot radar).[4][5]

Training roles and programmes

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Training coordination mandate

NSATU’s training coordination function is to harmonize the identification of Ukrainian training needs, match them to allied capacity, for scheduling and reporting processes. Training is not delivered by NSATU staff but by participating nations under the coordination umbrella provided by NSATU.[6]

Training partner programmes and Ukrainian involvement

Prominent among the delivery agents are the EU Military Assistance Mission in Support of Ukraine (EUMAM UA), the UK’s Operation Interflex, Canada’s Operation UNIFIER, and several bilateral arrangements coordinated through the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine (JMTG-U), US-led.[7] EUMAM UA alone, operating through its commands in Germany and Poland, has taken a leading role since its creation, with other major contributors from the US, UK, and NATO international training groupings of no fewer than 18 countries by early 2025.[a][8] A hallmark of the training system is the involvement of Ukrainian instructors in “train-the-trainer” programs. NSATU actively enables Ukrainian personnel to assume increasing roles in all training efforts.[8]

Scale and outputs

As of July 2025, output reporting states the cumulative figure for Ukrainian troops trained under SAG–U/NSATU-coordinated programs at over 192,000 since February 2022.[9]: 44 Table 10 [10]: 46 Infobox  The scale and reach of these programs - spanning 140+ different training areas globally - are validated in NATO and UK defense press also affirmed in Ukrainian MoD and NATO press releases.[11] The figure includes ongoing, cyclical basic and specialist training delivered outside Ukraine, primarily in Poland, Germany, the UK, and other NATO states territories.[5]

Multinational partner coordination

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Joint and multinational staffing, partner synchronization

Much of NSATU’s day-to-day work is organizing and deconflicting a wide array of partner-led contributions to Ukraine, from logistics delivery and training, to medical support and capability enhancement. This is achieved through direct participation in the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the "Ramstein Format" with its "capability coalitions" and interoperability standards applied, e.g., donated armor, artillery, and air defense equipment from dozen of countries is fielded without compatibility issues), which have shifted substantial planning and execution burden to NSATU oversight since February 2025.[7]

According to NATO representative Ariella Viehe, NSATU coordinated the first four military deliveries packages – worth a total of around $2 billion and funded by The Netherlands (4 August 2025), Denmark, Norway and Sweden (5 August), Germany (13 August), and Canada (24 August) - under the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List initiative (PURL), a mechanism to deliver urgently needed equipment from US stockpiles to Ukraine.[7][12] Major bilateral and coalition contributions highlighted in European defense reporting illustrate increasing European leadership in direct aid flows, with Germany, the UK, the EU collectively, and Norway each surpassed €1 billion in defense-specific commitments for Ukraine in 2024 alone.[2]

Embedded coordination

Permanent Ukrainian representatives operate within the command structures of three organizations, and senior staff regularly rotate between EUMAM UA ST-C, SAG-U, and NSATU headquarters for briefings and joint planning. European reports point to the embedded nature of Ukrainian military liaison teams, not only in the headquarters but also at each operational node. This structure ensures nearly real-time synchronization of operational requirement signals (supply shortfalls, urgent instructional needs, etc.) with NATO and partner systems.[5]

24-Month planning horizon

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Forecasting and strategic resilience

The two-year rolling planning visibility window is intended neither as a fixed, immovable plan nor a simple ammunition spreadsheet, but as an operational 'forecast horizon' for donors' procurement and training cycles to synchronize with Ukraine’s own force development and sustainment plans. European partners, in particular, have advocated for this approach to provide 'predictability for Kyiv' and allow for more efficient long-term logistics contracts, defense industry ramp-ups, and training program design. Regular Operation Force Development Framework conferences in Poland, organized by Ukraine and supporred by NSATU/ SAG–U, provide for information sharing and planning process cycling.[7] Interviews with German and Ukrainian staff emphasize the goal of giving Ukraine at least 6 months of assured visibility into upcoming donations so it can better plan operational launches and minimize the uncertainty of late-stage material gaps.[5]

Planning and review authority

The NATO Defense Policy and Planning Committee (DPPC) sets the outer edges of this planning, in close liaison with Allied Command Operations, Allied Command Transformation, and, crucially, the Ukrainian General Staff and Ministry of Defense. This is a core part of NSATU’s mandate and is regularly referenced in both NATO documents and European reporting.[13]

References

  1. ^ Ti, Ronald. "9. Logistics Lessons Observed: A Critical Enabler and Vulnerability". Tactical and Strategic Insights from the Russo-Ukrainian War. p. 184-202. doi:10.47788/VPNU6680. The first of these 'lessons observed' is that resilient operational logistics remains an essential ingredient for success.
  2. ^ a b Allison, George (12 June 2025). "New NATO command now coordinates 60% of Ukraine aid". UK Defence Journal. Retrieved 24 August 2025.
  3. ^ Cite error: The named reference natopress was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  4. ^ J10 NSATU (2 June 2025). "Forging the Future of Ukraine's Combat Power: OFDeF Conference Strengthens NATO-Ukraine Integration". Retrieved 30 August 2025 – via globalsecurity.org.{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
  5. ^ a b c d Matiushenko, Ievgen (29 August 2025). "Major General Maik Keller, NSATU Deputy Commander - Ukrinform: Exclusive". Ukrinform. Retrieved 30 August 2025.
  6. ^ "Head of the Mission of Ukraine to NATO visits NSATU in Germany". NSATU Public Affairs Office. 3 September 2025. Retrieved 24 October 2025 – via SHAPE.nato.int.
  7. ^ a b c d "Forging the Future of Ukraine's Combat Power: One Year of Force Development". NSATU Public Affairs Office. 2 October 2025. Retrieved 8 October 2025 – via SHAPE.nato.int.
  8. ^ a b "NSATU deputy commander outlines center's key functions". Ukrinform. 29 August 2025. Retrieved 30 August 2025.
  9. ^ Special Inspector General for OAR Report to the Congress, Q3FY2025 (PDF) (Report). 15 August 2025. Retrieved 15 August 2025 – via stateoig.gov.
  10. ^ Special Inspector General for OAR Report to the Congress, Q4FY2024 (PDF) (Report). 13 November 2024. Retrieved 28 July 2025 – via media.defence.gov.
  11. ^ "Trifold" (PDF). Retrieved 8 October 2025 – via SHAPE.NATO.int.
  12. ^ Allison, George (10 August 2025). "Netherlands funds $500m U.S. equipment package for Ukraine". UK Defence Journal. Retrieved 10 October 2025.
  13. ^ "NATO - Topic: NATO Defence Planning Process". 16 April 2025. Retrieved 30 August 2025 – via NATO.int.

Notes

  1. ^ *The Strausberg Model: EU-NATO Training Synergy
    The collaboration at the Special Training Command (ST-C) in Strausberg, Germany serves as an exemplar of EU-NATO synergy. In July 2025, meetings between Brigadier General Maurice Timmermans (DCOM EUMAM UA) and Major General Maik Keller (DCOM NSATU) formalized a unified training pipeline:
    • EUMAM UA delivers training for Ukrainian soldiers.
    • NSATU leads on doctrine, best practices, and evaluation—ensuring that all graduates are not only skilled but NATO-interoperable.

91.122.21.179 (talk) 12:15, 7 October 2025 (UTC) Thank you.[reply]

91.122.21.179 (talk) 20:55, 25 September 2025 (UTC)[reply]

  • Please add at the top of the References section:
+
===Notes=== {{notelist}}

91.122.21.179 (talk) 07:13, 8 October 2025 (UTC) 91.122.21.179 (talk) 20:55, 25 September 2025 (UTC)[reply]

 Not done for now: Please establish a consensus with editors engaged in the subject area before using the {{Edit COI}} template for this proposed change. Bowler the Carmine | talk 18:35, 8 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Bowler the Carmine, thank you. According to the label of this page under Learn more about this page, the article is a start-class with only one project unvolved. So labelling it for future conflict of interest as suggested makes little sense AFAIK. So, to facilitate their potential attention nevertheless, I am to reopen my request. Thank you. 91.122.21.179 (talk) 18:54, 8 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]
 Not done:I cannot decipher what changes you want to be made. As mentioned above, please make these more readable. Throast {{ping}} me! (talk | contribs) 22:22, 23 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Throast, thank you for attention. Below is textdiff: editors requested plain prose to check references easily. Now you have both. Seems, too much bytes at this page already... 91.122.21.179 (talk) 06:20, 24 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Where do you want all this prose added exactly? The "See also" section should only contain links, not prose. Do you want "Logistics operations" to be its own section? In that case, you formatted the headings wrong. Or do you want it to be a subsection of the existing "Reactions" section, which is above the "See also" section? Throast {{ping}} me! (talk | contribs) 10:23, 24 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Throast, please read my answer in the section above. I shall separate requests by sections next time. Two infoboxes are illustrating different perspectives: one is for the organizations as such, the other is about its operations with namesake infobox template. To combine them would make too long to print out.
Both of them are uncollapsed now: please check (except notes sections per other my infiboxes you implemented). Thanks again. 91.122.21.179 (talk) 17:26, 24 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]
There are several paragraphs without any citations. A few individual sentences at the end of paragraphs are also missing citations. This can't be added in this state. Throast {{ping}} me! (talk | contribs) 17:58, 24 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Throast, working. Let you know later on. Thanks 91.122.21.179 (talk) 18:01, 24 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Throast, thank you for patience: done. All the wrong formatting is removed from infoboxes (only map labels are with small fonts for formatting reasons, and capitalized acronyms - for stylistic). Added refs for un references paras (one is from the article, would note be reflected at the talk page).
Please, implement. Have a nice day, 91.122.21.179 (talk) 20:44, 24 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Small font should not be used for any reason in infoboxes. If possible, please remove all of them. The last few sentences under "Scale and outputs" and "Training partner programmes and Ukrainian involvement" still do not have citations. Abbreviations like "/w" (instead of "with") or "#1" (instead of "first") should also not be used. It might be helpful to familiarize yourself with WP:MOS. Throast {{ping}} me! (talk | contribs) 20:56, 24 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Throast, thank you. Reworked. Essentially, every sentence is referenced now. That's why I prefer suggesting infoboxes: at least online citations don't distract from reading, because they are visually at the right edge. Hopefully, passable now.

PS. It woul be excellent if you, or somebody on your request, downloads a logo to Wiki data (link is provided at the infobox where to place it. The logo is in public domain, as all NATO images published at their website 🕸) 91.122.21.179 (talk) 22:21, 24 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]

 Done I have implemented the requested edits. There were lots of non-standard style choices, typos, and formatting issues which I tried to correct, but I'm sure I didn't catch them all due to the sheer amount of content. The infoboxes seem somewhat excessive, but I don't edit articles in this subject area, so I'm not sure. I'm leaving it up to the editorial process to iron out. To the requester: Any changes I made to your text are intentional. Please do not re-open any of the requests above. If you have further comments or corrections, please open a new request. Throast {{ping}} me! (talk | contribs) 12:47, 25 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Throast Done Thanks a lot, especially, for the logo: can not do it without an account. This month the organization is added to military command structure of NATO: will provide a category to insert later on. Have a nice weekend. 91.122.21.179 (talk) 13:20, 25 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]
I've done another spot check and noticed that there are still unsourced sections in the article. For example, the first few sentences in the "24-month planning horizon" section are not supported by reference 34. Where did you get the quotes "forecast horizon" and "predictability for Kyiv" from? I've added maintenance tags in the meantime and am hoping you will work to address these issues. Throast {{ping}} me! (talk | contribs) 17:23, 25 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Throast, sorry. It shall be with [31]. Late summer interview with deputy commander: please, replace double quote marks with single ones, as they are coined terms, not a citation. Would appreciate if you add it: one instance of it already in the article.
Neither the first nor the second sentence in that section seem to be supported by reference 31. That source does not mention a "two-year" or "24-month" plan, or even Kyiv, at all. Throast {{ping}} me! (talk | contribs) 19:38, 25 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Throast, 24-month term is from the mission statement at *.pdf trifold[1]. The narrative of the interviewee is linked to the statement in those two sentences. Hopefully, this clarifies the figure and sense. 91.122.21.179 (talk) 20:06, 25 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]
You should go through the entire article and submit a new edit request where you insert missing citations. Throast {{ping}} me! (talk | contribs) 20:19, 25 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Please, consider adding the category [[Category:Formations of the NATO Military Command Structure 1994–present]], as NSATU are clearly listed in the chain of command at SHAPE.NATO.int website,from which you downloaded logo. Thank you, 91.122.21.179 (talk) 18:05, 25 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]

  1. ^ Cite error: The named reference TRI was invoked but never defined (see the help page).