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Schlacht um die Niederlande

2018-10-08T16:01:43Z

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{{EngvarB|date=December 2017}}
{{good article}}
{{Infobox military conflict
| conflict = Battle of the Netherlands
| partof = the [[Battle of France]]
| image = File:Rotterdam, Laurenskerk, na bombardement van mei 1940.jpg
| image_size = 300px
| caption = The centre of [[Rotterdam]] destroyed after [[Rotterdam Blitz|bombing]]
| date = 10–14 May 1940 10–17 May 1940 (Zealand)
| place = Netherlands
| territory =
| result = German victory
* [[German occupation of the Netherlands]]
* Creation of [[Reichskommissariat Niederlande]]
* Removal of Dutch military presence in the continental [[European Theater (World War II)|European Theater]]
* The Dutch government [[Dutch government-in-exile|goes into exile]] in the United Kingdom
| combatant1 = '''{{flag|Netherlands}}''' {{flagcountry|French Third Republic}} {{flag|United Kingdom}}
| combatant2 = '''{{flagcountry|Nazi Germany}}'''
| commander1 = {{flagicon|Netherlands}} [[Henri Winkelman]] {{flagicon|Netherlands}} [[Jan Joseph Godfried van Voorst tot Voorst]] {{flagicon|French Third Republic}} [[Henri Giraud]]
| commander2 = {{flagicon|Nazi Germany}} [[Fedor von Bock]] (Army Group B) {{flagicon|Nazi Germany}} [[Hans Graf von Sponeck]]
| strength1 = 9 divisions 700 guns<ref>Goossens, Dutch armament: Artillery, [http://www.waroverholland.nl/index.php?page=artillery waroverholland.nl]</ref> 1 tank 5 tankettes 32 armoured cars<ref>Goossens, Dutch armament: Miscellaneous, [http://www.waroverholland.nl/index.php?page=miscellaneous-2 waroverholland.nl]</ref> 145 aircraft<ref>Goossens, Dutch armament: Military airplanes, [http://www.waroverholland.nl/index.php?page=military-airplanes waroverholland.nl]</ref> Total: 280,000 men
| strength2 = 22 divisions 1,378 guns 759 tanks 830 aircraft<ref>Hooton 2007, p. 48</ref> 6 armoured trains<ref>De Jong, Het Koninkrijk, Staatsuitgeverij, 1971</ref> Total: 750,000 men
| casualties1 = 2,332 KIA (Dutch Army)<ref name="waroverholland">Goossens, Balance Sheet, [http://www.waroverholland.nl/index.php?page=balance waroverholland.nl]</ref> 7,000 wounded<ref name="waroverholland"/> 216 French KIA<ref name="waroverholland"/> 43 British KIA<ref name="waroverholland"/> Over 2,000 civilians killed<ref name="waroverholland"/>
| casualties2 = 2,032 KIA<ref name="waroverholland"/> 6,000–7,000 wounded<ref name="waroverholland"/> 4 armoured trains<ref name= french>{{cite book| last = Kaufmann| first = J. E.| last2 = Kaufmann| first2 = H. W.| title = Hitler's Blitzkrieg Campaigns: The Invasion And Defense Of Western Europe, 1939–1940| publisher = Da Capo Press| url = https://books.google.com/books?id=65-v0wkrWYEC&dq=| date = 2 October 2007| pages = 191| isbn = 9780306816918}}</ref> 225–275 aircraft total loss<ref name="waroverholland"/> 1,350 prisoners to England<ref name="waroverholland"/>
| campaignbox =
{{Campaignbox Western Front (World War II)}}
{{Campaignbox Battle of the Netherlands}}
{{Campaignbox Battle of France}}
}}

The '''Battle of the Netherlands''' ({{lang-nl|Slag om Nederland}}) was a military campaign part of [[Battle of France|Case Yellow]] ({{lang-de|Fall Gelb}}), the [[Nazi Germany|German]] invasion of the [[Low Countries]] ([[Belgium]], [[Luxembourg]], and the [[Netherlands]]) and [[French Third Republic|France]] during [[World War II]]. The battle lasted from 10 May 1940 until the surrender of the main Dutch forces on 14 May. Dutch troops in the province of [[Zeeland]] continued to resist the ''[[Wehrmacht]]'' until 17 May when Germany completed its occupation of the whole country.

The Battle of the Netherlands saw some of the earliest mass paratroop drops, to occupy tactical points and assist the advance of ground troops. The German ''[[Luftwaffe]]'' used paratroopers in the capture of several airfields in the vicinity of [[Rotterdam]] and [[The Hague]], helping to quickly overrun the country and immobilise Dutch forces.

After the devastating [[Rotterdam Blitz|bombing of Rotterdam]] by the ''Luftwaffe'', the Germans threatened to bomb other Dutch cities if the Dutch forces refused to surrender. The General Staff knew it could not stop the bombers and ordered the Dutch army to cease hostilities. The last occupied parts of the Netherlands were liberated in 1945.

==Background==
===Prelude===
The United Kingdom and France declared war on Germany in 1939, following the [[German invasion of Poland]], but no major land operations occurred in Western Europe during the period known as the [[Phoney War]] in the winter of 1939–1940. During this time, the British and French built up their forces in expectation of a long war, and the Germans completed their conquest of Poland.<ref>Shirer (1960), p. 633</ref> On 9 October, [[Adolf Hitler]] ordered plans to be made for an invasion of the Low Countries, to use them as a base against Great Britain and to pre-empt a similar attack by the [[Allies of World War II|Allied forces]], which could threaten the vital [[Ruhr Area]].<ref>Frieser (2005), p. 74</ref> A joint Dutch-Belgian peace offer between the two sides was rejected on 7 November.<ref name="gunther1940">{{cite book | url=https://archive.org/stream/in.ernet.dli.2015.149663/2015.149663.Inside-Europe#page/n19/mode/2up | title=Inside Europe | publisher=Harper & Brothers | author=Gunther, John |location=New York|authorlink=John Gunther| year=1940 | pages=xxi}}</ref>

[[File:Mobilisatie 1939 Dutch soldiers on guard.jpg|right|thumb|Dutch soldiers on guard, November 1939]]
The Dutch were ill-prepared to resist such an invasion. When Hitler came to power, the Dutch had begun to re-arm, but more slowly than France or Belgium; only in 1936 did the defence budget start to be gradually increased.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 77">Amersfoort (2005), p. 77</ref> Successive Dutch governments tended to avoid openly identifying Germany as an acute military threat. Partly this was caused by a wish not to antagonise a vital trade partner,<ref>De Jong (1969), p. 438</ref> even to the point of repressing criticism of Nazi policies;<ref>De Jong (1969), p. 506</ref> partly it was made inevitable by a policy of strict budgetary limits with which the conservative Dutch governments tried in vain to fight the [[Great Depression]], which hit Dutch society particularly hard.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 67">Amersfoort (2005), p. 67</ref> [[Hendrikus Colijn]], [[prime minister]] between 1933 and 1939, was personally convinced Germany would not violate Dutch neutrality;<ref>De Jong (1969), p. 541</ref> senior officers made no effort to mobilise public opinion in favour of improving military defence.<ref>De Jong (1969), p. 542</ref>
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1985-038-03, Brücke Nijmwegen, Sicherung durch holländische Soldaten.jpg|thumb|Dutch troops close the barrier of the Nijmegen Waal bridge during the Albania crisis]]
International tensions grew in the late 1930s. Crises were caused by the German [[remilitarization of the Rhineland|occupation of the Rhineland]] in 1936; the ''[[Anschluss]]'' and [[Sudetenland#Sudeten Crisis|Sudeten crisis]] of 1938; and the German occupation of [[Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia|Bohemia and Moravia]] and the [[Italian invasion of Albania]] in the spring of 1939. These events forced the Dutch government to exercise greater vigilance, but they limited their reaction as much as they could. The most important measure was a partial mobilisation of 100,000 men in April 1939.<ref>De Jong (1969), p. 570</ref>

After the [[German invasion of Poland]] in September 1939 and the ensuing outbreak of the Second World War, the Netherlands hoped to remain neutral, as they had done during the [[First World War]] 25 years earlier. To ensure this neutrality, the Dutch army was mobilised from 24 August and entrenched.<ref>De Jong (1969), p. 642</ref> Large sums (almost 900 million [[guilder]]s) were spent on defence.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 363</ref> It proved very difficult to obtain new matériel in wartime, however, especially as the Dutch had ordered some of their new equipment from Germany, which deliberately delayed deliveries.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 78</ref> Moreover, a considerable part of the funds were intended for the [[Dutch East Indies]] (now [[Indonesia]]), much of it related to [[Design 1047 battlecruiser|a plan]] to build three [[battlecruiser]]s.<ref>De Jong (1969), p. 548</ref>

The strategic position of the Low Countries, located between France and Germany on the uncovered flanks of their fortification lines, made the area a logical route for an offensive by either side. In a 20 January 1940 radio speech, [[Winston Churchill]] tried to convince them not to wait for an inevitable German attack, but to join the Anglo-French Entente.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 129</ref> Both the Belgians and Dutch refused, even though the German attack plans had fallen into Belgian hands after a German aircraft crash in January 1940, in what became known as the [[Mechelen Incident]].<ref>De Jong (1969b), pp. 203–208</ref>

The French supreme command considered violating the neutrality of the Low Countries if they had not joined the Anglo-French coalition before the planned large Entente offensive in the summer of 1941, but the French Cabinet, fearing a negative public reaction, vetoed the idea. Kept in consideration was a plan to invade if Germany attacked the Netherlands alone, necessitating an Entente advance through Belgium, or if the Netherlands assisted the enemy by tolerating a German advance into Belgium through the southern part of their territory, both possibilities discussed as part of the ''hypothèse Hollande''.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 92">Amersfoort (2005), p. 92</ref> The Dutch government never officially formulated a policy on how to act in case of either contingency; the majority of ministers preferred to resist an attack, a minority and Queen [[Wilhelmina of the Netherlands]] refused to become a German ally whatever the circumstances.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 143</ref> The Dutch tried on several occasions to act as an intermediary to reach a negotiated peace settlement between the Entente and Germany.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 144</ref>

After the German invasion of [[Battle of Norway|Norway and Denmark]], followed by a warning by the new Japanese naval attaché Captain [[Tadashi Maeda (admiral)|Tadashi Maeda]] that a German attack on the Netherlands was certain,<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 254</ref> it became clear to the Dutch military that staying out of the conflict might prove impossible. They started to fully prepare for war, both mentally and physically. Dutch border troops were put on greater alert.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 251</ref> Reports of the presumed actions of a [[Fifth Column]] in Scandinavia caused widespread fears that the Netherlands too had been infiltrated by German agents assisted by traitors.<ref>De Jong (1969b), pp. 254–256</ref> Countermeasures were taken against a possible assault on airfields and ports.<ref>De Jong (1969b), pp. 256–258</ref> On 19 April a [[state of emergency]] was declared.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 258</ref> However, most civilians still cherished the illusion that their country might be spared,<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 392</ref> an attitude that has since been described as a state of denial.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 393</ref> The Dutch hoped that the restrained policy of the [[Triple Entente|Entente]] and [[Central Powers]] during the First World War might be repeated and tried to avoid the attention of the Great Powers and a war in which they feared a loss of human life comparable to that of the previous conflict. On 10 April Britain and France repeated their request that the Dutch enter the war on their side, but were again refused.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 249</ref>

===Dutch forces===

====Royal Dutch Army====
[[File:Dutch defense lines - ln-en.jpg|right|thumb|upright=1.35|Major Dutch defence lines]]
In the Netherlands, all the objective conditions were present for a successful defence: a dense population, wealthy, young, disciplined and well-educated; a geography favouring the defender; and a strong technological and industrial base including an armaments industry. However, these had not been exploited: while the [[Wehrmacht]] at the time still had many shortcomings in equipment and training, the Dutch army, by comparison, was far less prepared for war.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 324</ref> The myth of the general German equipment advantage over the opposing armies in the [[Battle of France]] was in fact a reality in the case of the Battle of the Netherlands. Germany had a modern army with [[tanks]] and [[dive bombers]] (such as the [[Junkers Ju 87]] ''Stuka''), while the Netherlands had an army whose armoured forces comprised only 39 [[Armored car (military)|armoured cars]] and five [[tankette]]s, and an air force in large part consisting of [[biplanes]]. The Dutch government's attitude towards war was reflected in the state of the country's armed forces, which had not significantly expanded their equipment since before the First World War,<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 64</ref> and were inadequately armed even by the standards of 1918.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 362</ref> During the 1920s, an economic recession lasting from 1920 until 1927 and the general détente in international relations caused a limitation of the defence budget.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 67"/> In that decade, only 1.5 million guilders per annum was spent on equipment.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 72</ref> Both in 1931 and 1933, commissions appointed to economise even further failed, because they concluded that the acceptable minimum had been reached and advised that a spending increase was urgently needed.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), pp. 73, 76</ref> Only in February 1936 was a bill passed creating a special 53.4 million guilder defence fund.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 77" />

The lack of a trained manpower base, a large professional organisation, or sufficient matériel reserves precluded a swift expansion of Dutch forces.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 79</ref> There was just enough artillery to equip the larger units: eight infantry divisions (combined in four Army Corps), one Light (i.e. motorised) Division and two independent brigades (Brigade A and Brigade B), each with the strength of half a division or five battalions. All other infantry combat unit troops were raised as light infantry battalions that were dispersed all over the territory to delay enemy movement.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 351</ref> About two thousand pillboxes had been constructed,<ref>De Jong (1969), p. 562</ref> but in lines without any depth. Modern large fortresses like the Belgian stronghold of [[Eben Emael]] were nonexistent; the only modern fortification complex was that at [[Kornwerderzand]], guarding the [[Afsluitdijk]]. Total Dutch forces equalled 48 regiments of infantry as well as 22 infantry battalions for strategic border defence. In comparison, Belgium, despite a smaller and more aged male population, fielded 22 full divisions and the equivalent of 30 divisions when smaller units were included.

After September 1939, desperate efforts were made to improve the situation, but with very little result. Germany, for obvious reasons, delayed its deliveries; France was hesitant to equip an army that would not unequivocally take its side. The one abundant source of readily available weaponry, the [[Soviet Union]], was inaccessible because the Dutch, contrary to most other nations, did not recognise the communist regime. An attempt in 1940 to procure Soviet armour captured by Finland failed.<ref>Schulten (1979), p. 37</ref>

On 10 May, the most conspicuous deficiency of the Dutch Army lay in its shortage of [[Armoured fighting vehicle|armour]].<ref name="De Jong 1969b, p. 325">De Jong (1969b), p. 325</ref> Whereas the other major participants all had a considerable armoured force, the Netherlands had not been able to obtain the minimum of 146 modern tanks (110 light, 36 medium) they had already considered necessary in 1937.<ref>Schulten (1979), p. 24</ref> A single [[FT-17|Renault FT]] tank, for which just one driver had been trained and which had the sole task of testing antitank obstacles, had remained the only example of its kind and was no longer in service by 1940.<ref>Schulten (1979), pp. 33–37</ref> There were two squadrons of armoured cars, each with a dozen [[AB Landsverk|Landsverk]] M36 or M38 vehicles.<ref>Schulten (1979), pp. 38–40</ref> Another dozen [[DAF M39]] cars were in the process of being taken into service, some still having to be fitted with their main armament.<ref>Schulten (1979), pp. 40–41</ref> A single [[platoon]] of five [[Carden Loyd tankette|Carden-Loyd Mark VI]] tankettes used by the Artillery completed the [[List of Dutch military equipment of World War II|list of Dutch armour]].

The Dutch Artillery had available a total of 676 [[howitzer]]s and [[field gun]]s: 310 [[Krupp]] 75 mm field guns, partly produced in licence; 52 105 mm [[Bofors]] howitzers, the only really modern pieces; 144 obsolete<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 331</ref> Krupp 125 mm guns; 40 150 mm sFH13's; 72 Krupp 150 mm L/24 howitzers and 28 [[Vickers]] 152 mm L/15 howitzers. As antitank-guns 386 [[Böhler]] 47 mm L/39s were available, which were effective weapons but too few in number, being only at a third of the planned strength;<ref>De Jong (1969), p. 545</ref> another three hundred antiquated<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 332</ref> ''6 Veld'' (57 mm) and ''8 Staal'' (84 mm) field guns performed the same role for the covering forces. Only eight of the 120 modern 105 mm pieces ordered from Germany had been delivered at the time of the [[invasion]]. Most artillery was horse-drawn.<ref name="De Jong 1969b, p. 327">De Jong (1969b), p. 327</ref>

The Dutch Infantry used about 2,200 7.92 mm [[Schwarzlose MG M.07/12|Schwarzlose M.08]] machine guns, partly licence produced, and eight hundred [[Vickers machine gun]]s. Many of these were fitted in the pillboxes; each battalion had a heavy machine gun company of twelve. The Dutch infantry squads were equipped with an organic light machine gun, the [[Lewis Gun|M.20 Lewis machine gun]], of which about eight thousand were available. This weapon was prone to jamming and not very suitable for offensive operations. Most Dutch infantry were equipped with the [[Dutch Mannlicher|Geweer M.95]] rifle, adopted in 1895.<ref name = NVL40-56>Nederlandse Vuurwapens: Landmacht en Luchtvaartafdeling, drs G. de Vries & drs B.J. Martens, p.40-56</ref> There were but six 80 mm [[Mortar (weapon)|mortars]] for each regiment. This lack of [[firepower]] seriously impaired the fighting performance of the Dutch infantry.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 330</ref>

Despite the Netherlands being the seat of [[Philips]], one of Europe's largest producers of radio equipment, the Dutch army mostly used telephone connections; only the Artillery had been equipped with the modest number of 225 radio sets.<ref name="De Jong 1969b, p. 327"/>
[[File:BATTLENETHERLANDS2.jpg|thumb|left|Dutch mobile anti-aircraft gun. This AA unit was actually a German AA truck which the Dutch bought from the Allies who captured it in late 1918 from the defeated German army.]]

====Dutch Air Forces====
The [[Dutch air force]], which was not an independent arm of the Dutch armed forces, but part of the Army,<ref name="De Jong 1969b, p. 325" /> on 10 May operated a fleet of 155 aircraft: 28 [[Fokker G.1]] twin-engine destroyers; 31 [[Fokker D.XXI]] and seven [[Fokker D.XVII]] fighters; ten twin-engined [[Fokker T.V]], fifteen [[Fokker C.X]] and 35 [[Fokker C.V]] light bombers, twelve [[Douglas DB-8]] dive bombers (used as fighters)<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 337</ref> and seventeen [[Koolhoven FK-51]] reconnaissance aircraft—thus 74 of the 155 aircraft were biplanes. Of these aircraft 125 were operational.<ref>{{cite web |url= http://www.milavia.net/airforces/netherlands/rnlaf_his.htm|title=Royal Netherlands Air Force, 1939–1945 Second World War |author=Niels Hillebrand |date= 15 May 2004|work=www.milavia.net |accessdate= 25 March 2010}}</ref> Of the remainder the air force school used three Fokker D.XXI, six Fokker D.XVII, a single [[Fokker G.I]], a single Fokker T.V and seven Fokker C.V, along with several training aeroplanes. Another forty operational aircraft served with the marine air service along with about an equal number of reserve and training craft.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 338</ref> The production potential of the Dutch military aircraft industry, consisting of [[Fokker]] and [[Koolhoven (aircraft manufacturer)|Koolhoven]], was not fully exploited due to budget limitations.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 340</ref>

====Training and readiness====
Not only was the [[Dutch Army]] poorly equipped, it was also poorly trained. There had especially been little experience gained in the handling of larger units above the battalion level. From 1932 until 1936, the Dutch Army did not hold summer field manoeuvres in order to conserve military funding.<ref>De Jong (1969), p. 544</ref> Also, the individual soldier lacked many necessary skills. Before the war only a minority of young men eligible to serve in the military had actually been conscripted. Until 1938, those who were enlisted only served for 24 weeks, just enough to receive basic infantry training.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 71</ref> That same year, service time was increased to eleven months.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 77" /> The low quality of conscripts was not compensated by a large body of professional military personnel. In 1940, there were only 1206 professional officers present.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 344</ref> It had been hoped that when war threatened, these deficiencies could be quickly remedied but following the mobilisation of all Dutch forces on 28 August 1939 (bringing Army strength to about 280,000 men)<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 82</ref> readiness only slowly improved: most available time was spent constructing defences.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 349</ref> During this period, munition shortages limited live fire training,<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 329</ref> while unit cohesion remained low.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 346</ref> By its own standards the Dutch Army in May 1940 was unfit for battle. It was incapable of staging an offensive, even at division level, while executing manoeuvre warfare was far beyond its capacities.<ref>De Jong (1969), p. 577</ref>

German generals and tacticians (along with [[Hitler]] himself) had an equally low opinion of the Dutch military and expected that the core region of [[Holland]] proper could be conquered in about three to five days.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 188">Amersfoort (2005), p. 188</ref>

===Dutch defensive strategy===

[[File:Grebbelinie the Netherlands.jpg|thumb|right|upright=1.1|The [[Grebbe line]], a forward defence line of the [[Dutch Water Line]], is shown in dark blue]]
In the 17th century, the [[Dutch Republic]] had devised a defensive system called the [[The Dutch Water Line|Hollandic Water Line]], which during the [[Franco-Dutch War]] protected all major cities in the west, by flooding part of the countryside. In the early 19th century this line was shifted somewhat to the east, beyond [[Utrecht (city)|Utrecht]], and later modernised with fortresses. This new position was called the New Hollandic Water Line. The line was reinforced with new pillboxes in 1940 as the fortifications were outdated. The line was located at the extreme eastern edge of the area lying below sea level. This allowed the ground before the fortifications to be easily inundated with a few feet of water, too shallow for boats, but deep enough to turn the soil into an impassable quagmire. The area west of the New Hollandic Water Line was called [[Fortress Holland]] (Dutch: ''Vesting Holland''; German: ''Festung Holland''), the eastern flank of which was also covered by [[Lake IJssel]] and the southern flank protected by the [[lower course]] of three broad parallel rivers: two effluents of the [[Rhine]], and the [[Meuse]] (or ''Maas''). It functioned as a [[National Redoubt]], which was expected to hold out a prolonged period of time,<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 84">Amersfoort (2005), p. 84</ref> in the most optimistic predictions as much as three months without any allied assistance,<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 366</ref> even though the size of the attacking German force was strongly overestimated.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 322</ref> Before the war the intention was to fall back to this position almost immediately, after a concentration phase (the so-called ''Case Blue'') in the [[Gelderse Vallei]],<ref>De Jong (1969), p. 573</ref> inspired by the hope that Germany would only travel through the southern provinces on its way to Belgium and leave Holland proper untouched. In 1939 it was understood such an attitude posed an invitation to invade and made it impossible to negotiate with the Entente about a common defence. Proposals by German diplomats that the Dutch government would secretly assent to an advance into the country were rejected.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 141</ref>

From September 1939 a more easterly Main Defence Line (MDL) was constructed. This second main defensive position had a northern part formed by the ''Grebbelinie'' ([[Grebbe line]]), located at the foothills of the [[Utrechtse Heuvelrug]], an [[Ice Age]] [[moraine]] between Lake IJssel and the Lower Rhine. It was dug on instigation of the commander of the Field Army Lieutenant-General [[Jan Joseph Godfried baron van Voorst tot Voorst]].<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 87">Amersfoort (2005), p. 87</ref> This line was extended by a southern part: the ''Peel-Raamstelling'' (Peel-Raam Position), located between the river Maas and the Belgian border along the Peel Marshes and the Raam rivulet, as ordered by the Dutch Commander in Chief, General [[Izaak H. Reijnders]]. In the south the intention was to delay the Germans as much as possible to cover a French advance. Fourth and Second Army Corps were positioned at the Grebbe Line; Third Army Corps were stationed at the Peel-Raam Position with the Light Division behind it to cover its southern flank. Brigade A and B were positioned between the Lower Rhine and the Maas. First Army Corps was a strategic reserve in the Fortress Holland, the southern perimeter of which was manned by another ten battalions and the eastern by six battalions.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 360</ref> All these lines were reinforced by pillboxes.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 84"/>

====Positioning of troops====
[[File:Peel-Raamstelling the Netherlands.jpg|thumb|left|upright=1.1|The Peel-Raam Position]]
In front of this Main Defence Line was the ''IJssel-Maaslinie'', a covering line along the rivers IJssel and Maas, connected by positions in the [[Betuwe]], again with pillboxes and lightly occupied by a screen of fourteen "border battalions". Late in 1939 General Van Voorst tot Voorst, reviving plans he had already worked out in 1937,<ref>De Jong (1969), p. 578</ref> proposed to make use of the excellent defensive opportunities these rivers offered. He proposed a shift to a more mobile strategy by fighting a delaying battle at the plausible crossing sites near [[Arnhem]] and [[Gennep]] to force the German divisions to spend much of their offensive power before they had reached the MDL, and ideally even defeat them.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 87"/> This was deemed too risky by the Dutch government and General Reijnders. The latter wanted the army to first offer heavy resistance at the Grebbe Line and Peel Raam Position, and then fall back to the Fortress Holland.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 197</ref> This also was considered too dangerous by the government, especially in light of German air supremacy, and had the disadvantage of having to fully prepare two lines. Reijnders had already been denied full military authority in the defence zones;<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 194</ref> the conflict about strategy further undermined his political position.<ref>De Jong (1969b), pp. 195–196</ref> On 5 February 1940 he was forced to offer his resignation because of these disagreements with his superiors.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 216</ref> He was replaced by General [[Henry G. Winkelman]] who decided that in the north the Grebbe Line would be the main defence line where the decisive battle was to be waged,<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 94</ref> partly because it would there be easier to break out with a [[counteroffensive]] if the conditions were favourable.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 221</ref> However, he took no comparable decision regarding the Peel-Raam Position.

During the [[Phoney War]] the Netherlands officially adhered to a policy of strict neutrality. In secret, the Dutch military command, partly acting on its own accord,<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 148</ref> negotiated with both Belgium and France via the Dutch military attaché in Paris, Lieutenant-Colonel [[David van Voorst Evekink]] to co-ordinate a common defence to a German invasion.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 90</ref> This failed because of insurmountable differences of opinion about the question of which strategy to follow.

====Coordinating with Belgium====
Given its obvious strategic importance, Belgium, though in principle neutral, had already made quite detailed arrangements for co-ordination with Entente troops. This made it difficult for the Dutch to have these plans changed again to suit their wishes. The Dutch desired the Belgians to connect their defences to the Peel-Raam Position, that Reijnders refused to abandon without a fight.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 97</ref> He did not approve of a plan by Van Voorst tot Voorst to occupy a so-called "Orange Position" on the much shorter line 's-Hertogenbosch – [[Tilburg]],<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 191</ref> to form a continuous front with the Belgian lines near [[Turnhout]] as proposed by Belgian General [[Raoul van Overstraeten]].<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 229</ref>

When Winkelman took over command, he intensified the negotiations, proposing on 21 February that Belgium would man a connecting line with the Peel Raam Position along the Belgian part of the [[Zuid-Willemsvaart]].<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 230</ref> The Belgians refused to do this unless the Dutch reinforced their presence in [[Limburg (Netherlands)|Limburg]]; the Dutch had no forces available with which to fulfill this request. Repeated Belgian requests to reconsider the Orange Position were refused by Winkelman. Therefore, the Belgians decided to withdraw, in the event of an invasion, all their troops to their main defence line, the [[Albert Canal]]. This created a dangerous gap forty kilometres wide.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 231</ref> The French were invited to fill it.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 96</ref> The French Commander in Chief General [[Maurice Gamelin]] was more than interested in including the Dutch in his continuous front as — like [[Major-General (United Kingdom)|Major-General]] [[Bernard Montgomery]] four years later — he hoped to circle around the ''[[Westwall]]'' when the Entente launched its planned 1941 offensive. But he did not dare to stretch his supply lines that far unless the Belgians and Dutch would take the allied side before the German attack. When both nations refused, Gamelin made it clear that he would occupy a connecting position near [[Breda]].<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 92"/> The Dutch did not fortify this area. In secret, Winkelman decided on 30 March<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 224</ref> to abandon the Peel-Raam Position immediately at the onset of a German attack and withdraw his Third Army Corps to the [[Linge]] to cover the southern flank of the Grebbe Line, leaving only a covering force behind.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 100</ref> This Waal-Linge Position was to be reinforced with pillboxes; the budget for such structures was increased with a hundred million guilders.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 225</ref>

After the German attack on Denmark and Norway in April 1940, when the Germans used large numbers of [[airborne troops]], the Dutch command became worried about the possibility they too could become the victim of such a strategic assault. To repulse an attack, five infantry battalions were positioned at the main ports and airbases, such as [[The Hague]] airfield of [[Ypenburg]] and the Rotterdam airfield of [[Waalhaven]].<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 101</ref> These were reinforced by additional AA-guns, two tankettes and twelve of the 24 operational armoured cars.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 188" /> These specially directed measures were accompanied by more general ones: the Dutch had posted no less than 32 [[hospital ship]]s throughout the country and fifteen trains to help make troop movements easier.

===French strategy===
In addition to the Dutch Army and the [[18th Army (Wehrmacht)|German 18th Army]], a third force, not all that much smaller than either, would operate on Dutch soil: the [[French 7th Army]]. It had its own objectives within the larger French strategy, and French planning had long considered the possibility of operations in Dutch territory. The coastal regions of [[Zeeland|Zealand]] and [[Holland]] were difficult to negotiate because of their many waterways. However, both the French and the Germans saw the possibility of a surprise flanking attack in this region. For the Germans this would have the advantage of bypassing the Antwerp-[[Namur (city)|Namur]] line. The Zealand Isles were considered to be strategically critical, as they are just opposite the [[Thames]] estuary, so their capture would pose a special menace to the safety of England.

Rapid forces, whether for an offensive or defensive purpose, were needed to deny vital locations to the enemy. Long before the Germans did, the French had contemplated using airborne troops to achieve speedy attacks. As early as 1936 the French had commissioned the design of light airborne tanks, but these plans had been abandoned in 1940, as they possessed no cargo planes large enough to carry them. A naval division and an infantry division were earmarked to depart for Zealand to block the [[Western Scheldt]] against a German crossing. These would send forward forces over the Scheldt estuary into the Isles, supplied by overseas shipping.

French Commander in Chief General Maurice Gamelin feared the Dutch would be tempted into a quick capitulation or even an acceptance of German protection. He therefore reassigned the former French strategic reserve, the 7th Army, to operate in front of Antwerp to cover the river's eastern approaches in order to maintain a connection with the Fortress Holland further to the north and preserve an allied left flank beyond the Rhine. The force assigned to this task consisted of the 16th Army Corps, comprising the 9th Motorised Infantry Division (also possessing some tracked armoured vehicles) and the 4th Infantry Division; and the 1st Army Corps, consisting of the 25th Motorised Infantry Division and the 21st Infantry Division. This army was later reinforced by the 1st Mechanised Light Division, an armoured division of the French Cavalry and a first class powerful unit. Together with the two divisions in Zealand, seven French divisions were dedicated to the operation.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 240">Amersfoort (2005), p. 240</ref>

Although the French troops would have a higher proportion of motorised units than their German adversaries, in view of the respective distances to be covered, they could not hope to reach their assigned sector advancing in battle deployment before the enemy did. Their only prospect of beating the Germans to it lay in employing rail transport. This implied they would be vulnerable in the concentration phase, building up their forces near Breda. They needed the Dutch troops in the Peel-Raam Position to delay the Germans for a few extra days to allow a French deployment and entrenchment, but French rapid forces also would provide a security screen. These consisted of the reconnaissance units of the armoured and motorised divisions, equipped with the relatively well-armed [[Panhard 178]] armoured car. These would be concentrated into two task forces named after their commander: the ''Groupe Beauchesne'' and the ''Groupe Lestoquoi''.

===German strategy and forces===
During the many changes in the operational plans for ''Fall Gelb'' the idea of leaving the Fortress Holland alone, just as the Dutch hoped for, was at times considered.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 128</ref> The first version of 19 October 1939 suggested the possibility of a full occupation if conditions were favourable.<ref>De Jong (1969b), pp. 62–63</ref> In the version of 29 October it was proposed to limit the transgression to a line south of [[Venlo]].<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 65</ref> In the ''Holland-Weisung'' (Holland Directive) of 15 November it was decided to conquer the entire south, but in the north to advance no further than the Grebbe Line, and to occupy the [[Wadden Islands|Frisian Isles]].<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 129">Amersfoort (2005), p. 129</ref> [[Hermann Göring]] insisted on a full conquest as he needed the Dutch airfields against Britain; also he was afraid the Entente might reinforce Fortress Holland after a partial defeat and use the airfields to bomb German cities and troops.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 129"/> Another rationale for complete conquest was that as the fall of France itself could hardly be taken for granted, it was for political reasons seen as desirable to obtain a Dutch capitulation, because a defeat might well bring less hostile governments to power in Britain and France. A swift defeat would also free troops for other front sectors.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 140">Amersfoort (2005), p. 140</ref>

Though it was thus on 17 January 1940<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 283</ref> decided to conquer the whole of the Netherlands, few units could be made available for this task. The main effort of ''Fall Gelb'' would be made in the centre, between [[Namur (city)|Namur]] and [[Sedan, France]]. The attack on central Belgium was only a feint — and the attack on Fortress Holland only a side show of this feint. Although both the [[6th Army (Wehrmacht)|6th]] and [[18th Army (Wehrmacht)|18th Army]] were deployed on the Dutch border, the first, much larger, force would move south of [[Venlo]] to Belgium, leaving just the 18th Army under General [[Georg von Küchler]] to defeat the Dutch main force.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 138</ref> Of all German armies to take part in the operation this was by far the weakest. It contained only four regular infantry divisions (the [[207th Infantry Division (Wehrmacht)|207th]], 227th, 254th and [[256th Infantry Division (Wehrmacht)|256th Infantry]] Division), assisted by three reserve divisions ([[208th Infantry Division (Wehrmacht)|208th]], 225th, and 526th Infantry Division) that would not take part in the fighting. Six of these divisions were "Third Wave" units only raised in August 1939 from territorial ''[[Landwehr]]'' units. They had few professional officers and little fighting experience apart from those who were [[World War I]] veterans. Like the Dutch Army, most soldiers (88%) were insufficiently trained. The seventh division was the 526th Infantry Division, a pure security unit without serious combat training. The German divisions, with a nominal strength of 17,807 men, were fifty percent larger than their Dutch counterparts and possessed twice their effective [[firepower]], but even so the necessary numerical superiority for a successful offensive was simply lacking.

To remedy this, assorted odds and ends were used to reinforce 18th Army. The first of these was the only German cavalry division, aptly named [[1st Cavalry Division (Wehrmacht)|1st ''Kavalleriedivision'']]. The mounted troops of this unit, accompanied by some infantry, were to occupy the weakly defended provinces east of the river IJssel and then try to cross the [[Afsluitdijk]] (Enclosure Dike). A simultaneous landing in Holland near [[Enkhuizen]] was to be attempted, using barges to be captured in the small port of [[Stavoren]].<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 140"/> As both efforts were unlikely to succeed, the mass of regular divisions was reinforced by the ''[[SS-Verfügungstruppe|SS-Verfügungsdivision]]'' (including ''SS-Standarten'' ''Der Führer'', ''Deutschland'' and ''Germania'') and ''[[Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler]]'', which would serve as assault infantry to breach the Dutch fortified positions.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 139">Amersfoort (2005), p. 139</ref> Still this added only 1{{fraction|1|3}} division to the equation.

[[File:SdKfz101.jpg|thumb|[[Panzer I]] tank, now on display in the [[German Tank Museum]], [[Munster, Lower Saxony|Munster]], [[Germany]] (2005).]]
To ensure a victory the Germans resorted to unconventional means. The Germans had trained two airborne/airlanding assault divisions. The first of these, the ''[[German 1st Fallschirmjäger Division|7. Flieger-Division]]'', consisted of paratroopers; the second, the [[22nd Air Landing Division (Wehrmacht)|22nd ''Luftlande-Infanteriedivision'']], of airborne infantry. Initially the plan was that the main German assault was to take place in [[Flanders]], and it was expected these troops would be used for a crossing attempt over the river [[Scheldt]] near [[Ghent]]. This operation was cancelled, so it was decided to use them to obtain an easy victory in the Netherlands.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 142">Amersfoort (2005), p. 142</ref> The airborne troops would on the first day attempt to secure the airfields around the Dutch [[seat of government]], The Hague, and then capture that government, together with the Dutch High Command and Queen Wilhelmina.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 143">Amersfoort (2005), p. 143</ref> German officers actually took lessons on how to address royalty on such occasions. The plan, ''Fall Festung'', had been developed by [[Hitler]] personally, embellishing an earlier idea to let an envoy offer "armed protection of the Dutch neutrality", that is, to become a German [[protectorate]].<ref>De Jong (1969b), pp. 296–297</ref> In the event this did not bring forth the desired immediate collapse, the bridges at [[Rotterdam]], [[Dordrecht]] and [[Moerdijk]] would simultaneously be secured to allow a mechanised force to relieve the airborne troops from the south. This force was to be the [[9th Panzer Division (Wehrmacht)|German 9th Panzer Division]]. This was the only German armoured division having just two tank battalions, one understrength, in its single tank regiment;<ref>Jentz (1998), p. 116</ref> the total number of tanks in the unit was 141.<ref>Jentz (1998), p. 121</ref> The intention was that it should exploit a breach in the Dutch lines created by the 254th and 256th Infantry Division, and join up with them, forming the ''XXVI. Armeekorps'', on the Gennep – [['s-Hertogenbosch]] axis.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 140"/> At the same time an offensive would be staged against the Grebbe Line in the east by the 207th and 227th Infantry Division, united to form ''X. Armeekorps'',<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 139"/> to engage the main bulk of the Dutch Field Army. The expectation was that in spite of the lack of numerical superiority,<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 305</ref> they would force the Dutch back to the east front of the Fortress Holland or beyond. If the Dutch did not capitulate on the first day, the Eighteenth Army expected to enter the Fortress Holland on the third day from the south over the Moerdijk bridges and thereby ensure victory; there was no strict timetable for the total destruction of the Dutch forces.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 142"/> A peculiar aspect of the command structure was that the airborne attack was solely a ''Luftwaffe'' operation; the airborne forces would initially not be under operational command of the German Army. The attack on Rotterdam was ultimately to be an Army operation and considered by it as the ''[[Schwerpunkt]]'' (focal point) of the campaign in the Netherlands;<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 143"/> 18th Army saw the air landings as primarily subservient to the ''XXVI. Armeekorps'' advance.

Of all operations of ''Fall Gelb'' this one most strongly embodied the concept of a ''[[Blitzkrieg]]'' as the term was then understood: a ''Strategischer Überfall'' or strategic assault. Also, like ''Fall Gelb'' as a whole, it involved a high risk strategy.

===The Oster affair===
The German population and troops generally disliked the idea of violating Dutch neutrality. German [[propaganda]] therefore justified the invasion as a reaction to a supposed Entente attempt to occupy the Low Countries, similar to the justification used by the German Empire to invade Belgium in World War I.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 145</ref> Some German officers were averse to the Nazi regime and were also uneasy about the invasion.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 105</ref> One of them, Colonel [[Hans Oster]], an ''[[Abwehr]]'' (German military intelligence) officer, began in March 1939 to pass along information to his friend, the Dutch military attaché in Berlin, Major [[Gijsbertus J. Sas]].<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 106</ref> This information included the attack date of ''Fall Gelb''.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 107</ref> Sas informed the [[Allies of World War II|Allies]] via other military attachés.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 126</ref> However, several postponements while the Germans waited for favourable weather conditions led to a series of false alarms, which left the Dutch government and others somewhat sceptical of the information.<ref>De Jong (1969b), pp. 124–126</ref> Sas' correct prediction of the date of the attack on Denmark and Norway went largely unheeded.<ref>De Jong (1969b), pp. 244–247</ref> Though he indicated a German armoured division would try to attack [[Fortress Holland]] from [[North Brabant]] and that there was a plan to capture the Queen, Dutch defensive strategy was not adapted and it was not understood these were elements of a larger scheme.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 323</ref> On 4 May Sas again warned that an attack was imminent; this time it coincided with a warning from [[Pope Pius XII]].<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 308</ref> When on the evening of 9 May Oster again phoned his friend saying just "Tomorrow, at dawn", Dutch troops were put on alert.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 103</ref>

Oster was a leading figure of the [[German resistance]] from 1938 to 1943, and was one of those hanged after the [[20 July plot|20 July 1944 bomb plot]] to assassinate Hitler.<ref>Shirer (1960), pp. 1024, 1073</ref>

==Battle==

===10 May===
[[File:Duitse parachutisten landen in Nederland op 10 mei 1940b.jpg|thumb|left|German paratroops dropping into the Netherlands on 10 May 1940]]
[[File:RMSDeltaNorth.jpg|thumb|upright=1.35|right|The geography of the landing areas: at the coast is The Hague; Rotterdam is at ''n'', Waalhaven at ''9'' and Dordrecht at ''7''; ''h'' indicates the Hollands Diep]]
On the morning of 10 May 1940 the Dutch awoke to the sound of [[aircraft engine]]s roaring in the sky. Germany had commenced operation ''Fall Gelb'' and attacked the Netherlands, [[Battle of Belgium|Belgium]], [[Battle of France|France]] and [[German occupation of Luxembourg in World War II#Invasion|Luxembourg]], in the case of the Low Countries without a declaration of war given before hostilities; France was already at war.

In the night the Luftwaffe violated Dutch airspace. One wing, ''[[Kampfgeschwader 4]]'' (KG 4), traversed it and then disappeared to the west, giving the Dutch the illusion that the operation was directed at England. But over the [[North Sea]] it turned to the east again to stage a surprise attack on the Dutch airfields, together with the other wings. Led by ''[[Oberst]]'' (Colonel) [[Martin Fiebig]], KG 4 hit the naval airfield at De Kooy, destroying 35 aircraft, most of them trainers.<ref>Grimm, P. e.a. pp. 21–27</ref> Fiebig himself was shot down and spent five days as a Dutch [[prisoner of war]]. {{Not a typo|KG 4}} also hit Amsterdam-[[Schiphol]], where the Dutch lost a third of their medium bombers, and The Hague airfields where I./KG 4 destroyed half of the 21 defending fighters to assist ''[[Kampfgeschwader 30]]'' (KG 30) and ''[[Kampfgeschwader 54]]'' (KG 54) in attacks upon ports and communications.<ref name="Hooton 1994, p. 241">Hooton 1994, p. 241.</ref> KG 4 lost 11 [[Heinkel He 111]] bombers in total on 10 May and three [[Junkers Ju 88]]s; KG 30 and 54 another nine bombers.<ref>Grimm, P. e.a. pp. 22–27</ref> ''[[Jagdgeschwader 26]]'' (JG 26) and ''[[Zerstörergeschwader 26]]'' (ZG 26) shot down 25 Dutch aircraft in aerial combat for a loss of nine fighters, with [[Albert Kesselring]]'s ''[[Luftflotte 2]]'' in total claiming 41. The Dutch were left with just 70 aircraft by the end of the day. They claimed most of the German aircraft destroyed on 10 May. Spread out over Dutch territory, they continued to engage the ''Luftwaffe'' where possible, claiming 13 victories over German fighter aircraft by 14 May.<ref name="Hooton 1994, p. 241"/>

Immediately after the bombardments, between 04:30 and 05:00 local time, paratroopers were landed near the airfields. Dutch [[anti-aircraft warfare|anti-aircraft batteries]] shot down numerous [[Ju-52|Ju 52]] [[transport plane]]s of the Luftwaffe's ''Transportgruppen''. German Ju 52 losses in the entire battle amounted to about 250, representing 50% of the fleet's strength.{{cn|date=December 2017}}

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 141-0460, Rotterdam, Brennende Ju 52.jpg|left|thumb|Burning German [[Junkers Ju 52]]s at Ypenburg]]
The [[Battle for The Hague|attack on The Hague]] ended in operational failure. The paratroopers were unable to capture the main airfield at [[Leidschenveen-Ypenburg|Ypenburg]] in time for the airborne infantry to land safely in their Junkers. Though one armoured car had been damaged by a bomb, the other five Landsverks, assisted by machine gun emplacements, destroyed the eighteen Junkers of the first two waves, killing many occupants.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 192</ref> When the airstrip was blocked by wrecks the remaining waves aborted the landing and tried to find alternatives, often putting down their teams in meadows or on the beach, thus dispersing the troops. The small auxiliary airfield of [[Ockenburg]] was only lightly defended, and fell at once to German attack. The airfield of [[Valkenburg (South Holland)|Valkenburg]] was likewise quickly occupied, the morale of the defenders shaken by the bombardment. However, the landing strip was still under construction and the ground water level had not yet been lowered: planes landing there sank away in the soft soil. None of the airfields were thus capable of receiving substantial reinforcements. In the end the paratroopers occupied Ypenburg but failed to advance into The Hague, their route blocked by hastily assembled Dutch troops. Early in the afternoon they were dispersed by fire from three Dutch artillery batteries.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 197</ref> Dutch batteries likewise drove away the German occupants from the other two fields, the remnant airborne troops taking refuge in nearby villages and mansions.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 199</ref>
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 141-1308, Flugplatz Waalhaven, zerstörte Ju 52.jpg|right|thumb|German losses on [[Waalhaven]] airfield were limited]]
The [[Battle of Rotterdam|attack on Rotterdam]] was much more successful. Twelve [[Heinkel He 59]] [[seaplane]]s, crowded with two platoons of troops, landed in the heart of the city and unloaded assault teams that captured the [[Willemsbrug]], a [[bridge]] over the [[Nieuwe Maas]], to form a bridgehead.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 341</ref> At the same time the military airfield of [[Waalhaven]], positioned south of the city on the island of [[IJsselmonde (island)|IJsselmonde]], was attacked by airborne forces.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 340</ref> Here an infantry battalion was stationed, but so close to the airfield that the paratroopers landed near its positions. A confused fight followed. The first wave of Junkers suffered no losses and the transports continued to land. In the end the Dutch defenders were overwhelmed. The German troops, steadily growing in numbers, began to move to the east to occupy IJsselmonde and eventually made contact with the paratroopers tasked with occupying the vital bridge at Dordrecht. Although the [[Royal Netherlands Navy]] intervened—the [[torpedo boat]]s ''Z5'' and ''TM 51'' attacked the ''Willemsbrug'' and later the [[destroyer]] [[Admiralen class destroyer|HNLMS ''Van Galen'']] sailed up the [[Nieuwe Waterweg]] to bombard the airfield at short range—this only resulted in the ''Van Galen'' foundering after being bombed. A plan to commit the [[gunboat]]s [[Flores class sloops|HNLMS ''Flores'']] and [[HNLMS Johan Maurits van Nassau|HNLMS ''Johan Maurits van Nassau'']] was therefore abandoned.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 363">Amersfoort (2005), p. 363</ref> At the [[Island of Dordrecht]] the Dordrecht bridge was captured but in the city itself the garrison held out.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 338</ref> The long [[Moerdijk bridges]] over the broad [[Hollands Diep]] estuary connecting the island to North Brabant province were captured and a bridgehead fortified on the southern side.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 336</ref>

[[File:Rotterdam May 1940 1.svg|left|thumb|German landings in Rotterdam]] The Germans, executing a plan approved by Hitler,<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 201</ref> tried to capture the IJssel and Maas bridges intact, using commando teams of ''[[Brandenburgers]]'' that began to infiltrate over the Dutch border ahead of the main advance, with some troops arriving on the evening of 9 May. During the night of 10 May they approached the bridges: several teams had a few men dressed as Dutch military police pretending to bring in a group of German prisoners, to fool the Dutch detonation teams. Some of these "military policemen" were real Dutchmen, members of the ''[[Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging]]'', the Dutch Nazi party.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 214</ref> Most of these attempts failed and the bridges were blown, on two occasions with ''Brandenburgers'' and all. The main exception was the [[Gennep]] railway bridge.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 215</ref> Immediately an [[armoured train]] crossed it followed by a troop train, both driving right through the Peel-Raam Position at [[Mill, Netherlands|Mill]] and unloading an infantry battalion behind the defence line.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 220</ref>

The Dutch released reports of German soldiers in disguise to the international news agencies. This caused a [[fifth column]] scare, especially in Belgium and France. However, unlike the situation later on in those two countries, in the Netherlands there was no mass exodus of civilian refugees, clogging the roads. Generally German soldiers behaved in a civilised manner towards the Dutch population, forming neat queues at the shops to buy goods rationed in Germany, such as [[chocolate]].

After the generally failed assaults on the bridges, the German divisions began crossing attempts over the rivers IJssel and Maas. The first waves typically were destroyed, due to insufficient preparatory fire on the pillboxes.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 218</ref> At most places a secondary bombardment destroyed the pillboxes and the infantry divisions crossed the river after building pontoon bridges; but at some, as Venlo, the attempt was aborted. At [[Arnhem]], ''Leibstandarte Der Fuehrer'' led the assault and that day advanced to the Grebbe Line, followed by ''207. Infanteriedivision''.

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1981-064-18A, Westfeldzug, Übergang über die Maas.jpg|right|thumb|Despite the destruction of the ''Wilhelminabrug'' and the ''Sint Servaasbrug'' (pictured) German troops passed Maastricht, a vital traffic hub, relatively quickly. Photo taken 10 May 1940 in Maastricht]]
Even before the armoured train arrived, 3rd Army Corps had already been planned to be withdrawn from behind the Peel-Raam Position, taking with it all the artillery apart from 36 ''8 Staal'' pieces. Each of its six regiments was to leave a battalion behind to serve as a covering force, together with fourteen "border battalions". The group was called the "Peel Division".<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 213</ref> This withdrawal was originally planned for the first night after the invasion, under cover of darkness, but due to the rapid German advance an immediate retreat was ordered at 06:45, to avoid 3rd Army Corps becoming entangled with enemy troops.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 153</ref> The corps joined "Brigade G",<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 358</ref> six battalions already occupying the Waal-Linge line, and was thus brought up to strength again. It would see no further fighting.

The Light Division, based at [[Vught]], was the only manoeuvre force the Dutch Army possessed. Its planned withdrawal had been similarly executed a day early. Its regiments had biked over the Maas and Waal bridges and then turned left through the [[Alblasserwaard]] when it was decided in the afternoon to let it counterattack the German airborne landing on IJsselmonde. It reached the [[Noord (river)|Noord]], the river separating the Alblasserwaard from IJsselmonde, in the evening.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 348</ref> There they discovered that the sector near the only bridge, built in 1939, was not strongly occupied by the airborne troops, as the Germans simply had not known of its existence because of outdated maps. It was decided to postpone a crossing until the next day, to gather sufficient forces. No attempt was made to establish a bridgehead.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 349</ref>

Meanwhile, on the evening of the 10th, around 22:00, French reconnaissance elements using [[Panhard 178]] [[Armored car (military)|armoured cars]] had started to arrive at the Dutch border, forming a vanguard for the [[French 1st Light Mechanized Division|French 1st Mechanised Light Division]]. This division operated, with the 25e DIM on its left, on the northern flank of the [[French 7th Army]]; its mission was to ensure contact between the ''Vesting Holland'' and Antwerp.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 230</ref> Attempts to co-ordinate the French advance with Colonel [[Leonard Johannes Schmidt]], the military commander of the Dutch troops on [[Noord-Brabant]], were largely unsuccessful as, apart from the fact he could not be reached that day, Dutch defences there were already collapsing. At Mill, ''256. Infanteriedivision'' at first could not exploit the opportunity offered by having a battalion in the back of the defenders because it failed to locate it. When a first attack by forward elements had been repulsed, a full assault at the Main Defense Line was initially postponed to the next day because most artillery had not yet passed the single pontoon bridge over the Meuse, which had caused a traffic jam after having been damaged by an incident. In the early evening in a sudden change of plans it was decided to attack even though artillery support was absent apart from one 105 mm battery. An unrequested Stuka attack that also happened to hit the Mill sector just prior to the advance routed some Dutch defenders, creating a weak section in the line from which the Dutch troops were dislodged.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 226</ref> Though the Germans were slow to exploit the breakthrough, Colonel Schmidt at 20:30 ordered the Peel-Raam Position to be abandoned and his troops to fall back to the west improvising a new line at the [[Zuid-Willemsvaart]] canal.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 227</ref>

In the North, by the end of the day, ''1. Kavalleriedivision'' had reached the line [[Meppel]]–[[Groningen (city)|Groningen]], delayed by logistical problems and Dutch demolition teams blowing up 236 bridges. Dutch troop strength in that area was weak.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), pp. 316–320</ref>

In the extreme south, the six border battalions in the province of [[Limburg (Netherlands)|Limburg]] only slightly delayed the advance of the German Sixth Army; before noon the area had been overrun and the strategic city of [[Maastricht]] had surrendered, opening the way for the German feint offensive into Central Belgium. The Germans however, failed to capture the main bridge intact, forcing them to delay the crossing by the 4th Panzer Division until the next day.

===11 May===
On 11 May the Dutch commander General Winkelman was faced with two priorities. First of all he wanted to eliminate the German airborne troops. Though the strategic assault had failed, he feared a further enemy build-up via Waalhaven and saw the German possession of the Moerdijk bridges as a serious impediment to the movement of allied reinforcements to the Fortress Holland.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 162</ref> The second priority was closely related to the first: enabling the French army to build up a strong defensive line in North Brabant, to connect the Fortress Holland with the Allied main force in Belgium.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 165</ref> As he had withdrawn most of his troops from the area, Winkelman had only limited means available to influence this process, largely leaving the task to local commanders.

In both respects, little was achieved this day. The planned counterattack by the Light Division against the airborne troops on IJsselmonde failed. In the nick of time the bridge over the river Noord had been prepared for defence by the German paratroopers, and it proved impossible to force it. Several attempts to cross the river by boat managed only to establish a few isolated bridgeheads,<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 350</ref> and at 10:15 the Light Division was given permission to break off the crossing at this point and ordered to shift its axis of attack by reinforcing Dutch troops on the Island of Dordrecht,<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 351</ref> where it arrived that night. After clearing the Island of Dordrecht of enemy troops the division was to advance into IJsselmonde over the Dordrecht bridge in order to reach Rotterdam.

Earlier during the day, two attempts were made by Dutch battalions to carry out an attack against the western flank of the German perimeter. The first battalion, withdrawn from the Belgian border, partly crossed the [[Oude Maas]] at two points ([[Oud-Beijerland]] and [[Puttershoek]]) and tried to storm the bridge at [[Barendrecht]] into IJsselmonde;<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 345</ref> the second battalion, taken from the Fortress Holland forces positioned at the [[Hoekse Waard]], had crossed the [[Dordtse Kil]] to the Island of Dordrecht the previous day, using the ferry at [[Wieldrecht]], and now tried to expand its bridgehead.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 346</ref> Although its crossings were successful, the advance of the first battalion was executed only hesitantly; the troops were surprised by German counterattacks and dispersed. The second battalion was likewise surprised, with many men being taken prisoner.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 347</ref> In the afternoon a French reconnaissance unit, the ''5e Groupe de Reconnaissance de Division d'Infanterie'', with the assistance of another Dutch border battalion attempted an attack on the southern Moerdijk bridgehead, but the armoured cars of ''6e Cuirassiers'' with which it was reinforced were heavily bombed by German Stukas and had to retreat.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 344</ref>

[[File:General der Fallschirmjäger Kurt Student.jpg|thumb|left|General der Fallschirmjäger [[Kurt Student]]]]
In Rotterdam, though reinforced by an infantry regiment, the Dutch failed to completely dislodge the German airborne troops from their bridgehead on the northern bank of the Maas.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 363"/> Despite permission from General [[Kurt Student]], the German commander in Rotterdam refused to evacuate this bridgehead and the few German defenders held fast in a single office building, protected by a canal in front of them and covered by fire from the south bank. The two remaining Dutch bombers failed to destroy the ''Willemsbrug''. The German forces involved in the attack of the previous day on The Hague also held out, none of the attempts to eliminate the isolated groups of in total about 1600 paratroopers and airlanded forces met with success.

In North Brabant, the situation swiftly deteriorated. The French commanders of the 7th Army had expected that Dutch resistance at the Meuse and the Peel-Raam Position, by a force about five divisions strong, would have gained them at least four days to build up a defensive line near Breda. They were unpleasantly surprised to learn that the best three divisions had been moved to the north and that the remaining forces were already in full retreat.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 235">Amersfoort (2005), p. 235</ref> The withdrawal of the Peel Division from the Peel-Raam Position to the [[Zuid-Willemsvaart]], a canal some {{convert|10|to|30|km|mi}} to the west, meant leaving behind their well-entrenched positions and the little artillery available in exchange for a totally unprepared line. Moreover, the eastern bank of the canal was higher than the western bank, providing excellent cover for the attackers. Finally, the order to withdraw never reached the troops at Mill; this caused one sector of the canal, near [[Heeswijk]], to be left undefended;<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 229</ref> as this sector contained a bridge which was not demolished, the Germans were effortlessly able to cross the canal around 13:00. A second crossing at [[Erp, Netherlands|Erp]], against opposition, led to a general collapse of the line.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 231</ref> By the end of the 11th, the Germans had crossed the Zuid-Willemsvaart at most places and the Peel Division had largely disintegrated.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 235"/> Plans by Colonel Schmidt to concentrate his forces on the line [[Tilburg]]-[['s-Hertogenbosch]] thus came to nothing. As the French refused to advance further to the northeast than Tilburg, apart from some reconnoitring armoured cars that went as far as [[Berlicum]], this created a dangerous gap. Winkelman, sensitive to the general Dutch weakness in the region, requested the British government to send an Army Corps to reinforce allied positions in the area and bomb Waalhaven airfield.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 164</ref>

All the efforts in the south were made on the assumption the Grebbe Line would be able to beat off attacks on its own; its reserves had even been partly shifted to the counterattack against the airborne forces. However, there were some indications that a problem was developing in this sector. Motorised elements of ''SS Standarte "Der Fuehrer"'', preceding ''207. Infanteriedivision'', had reached the southernmost part of the Grebbe Line, in front of the ''Grebbeberg'', on the evening of the 10th.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 266</ref> This Main Defense Line sector had no inundations in front of it and had therefore been chosen as the main attack axis of the division. It was protected by a line of outposts (''voorpostenlinie''), manned by two companies of infantry.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 267</ref> At about half past three in the morning of the 11th, German artillery started shelling the outposts, followed at dawn by an attack by two battalions of ''Der Fuehrer''. As the German shelling had cut the telephone lines, no artillery support could be requested by the Dutch defenders. Defence was further hampered by the fact that the terrain had not yet been cleared of vegetation, which offered good cover for the attackers.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 269</ref> At noon a breakthrough was accomplished at the extreme north of the outpost line and the Dutch positions were then slowly rolled up from behind.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 272</ref> The outnumbered and inferiorly armed companies resisted as well as they could, but by evening, all outposts were in German hands.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 275</ref> The commander of 2nd Army Corps, Major-General [[Jacob Harberts]], failed to react adequately. He did not realise that motorised SS troops had been involved in the attack, and thought that the outposts had been surrendered to a small probing German force through the cowardice of the defenders.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 276</ref> He ordered a night counterattack by the single reserve battalion of 4th Division.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 278</ref> This attack was abandoned; on its approach the battalion was fired upon by Dutch troops manning the main line who had not been notified of its approach, leading to much confusion, and an engineer bridge necessary to cross the Grift rivulet was not brought forward in time. However, heavy preparatory Dutch artillery fire had the unintended effect of causing the Germans to abandon their plans for a night attack.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 279</ref>

Meanwhile, in the North, ''1. Kavalleriedivision'' advanced through the province of [[Friesland]] towards the final Dutch fall-back line, the ''Wonsstelling'', reaching [[Sneek]] in the evening. Most Dutch troops had been evacuated from the north over the [[Afsluitdijk]].<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 320">Amersfoort (2005), p. 320</ref>

===12 May===
{{see also|Battle of the Grebbeberg}}
On the morning of 12 May General Winkelman remained moderately optimistic.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 168</ref> He still assumed a firm defence line could eventually be established in North Brabant with the help of the French and expected good progress could be made in eliminating the airborne forces, while not being aware of any special danger to the Grebbe Line. During the day his hopes would be dashed.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), pp. 171–172</ref>

In the two previous days, ''9. Panzerdivision'' had seen little action. It crossed the Meuse early on the morning of 11 May, but that day was unable to advance quickly over roads congested with the supply trains of the infantry divisions. The armoured division was under orders to link up with the airborne troops as soon as the Peel-Raam Position had been breached by the infantry forces. As the entire Dutch front had dissolved, the conditions were favourable for such an attempt. In this it would not be hindered by the French forces. Because the German 6th Army was threatening its right flank and there was no time to prepare a defence line, Gamelin ordered the 7th Army to withdraw its left flank. ''2e Brigade Légère Mécanique'', part of ''[[1st Light Mechanized Division (France)|1e Division Légère Mécanique]]'', which had arrived at Tilburg, retreated to the south. Also, the ''25e Division d'Infanterie Motorisée'' at Breda progressed no further to the north than the river [[Mark (Dintel)|Mark]]. As the initial order to occupy the [[Geertruidenberg]] sector had not been followed upon, the route to the Moerdijk bridges would not be blocked and the German armoured division would not be engaged by its stronger French mechanised counterpart. Reconnaissance elements of the 9th Panzer Division effectively exploited this opportunity: at dawn, north of Tilburg, near [[Loon op Zand]], they surprised Colonel Schmidt and took him prisoner. Dutch troops in the province thereby lost all unified command.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 237</ref> Shortly after noon German armoured cars had penetrated thirty kilometres further to the west and made contact with the southern Moerdijk bridgehead, cutting off Fortress Holland from the Allied main force; at 16:45 they reached the bridges themselves.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 238">Amersfoort (2005), p. 238</ref> The northern part of that force would not long remain in the region: at 13:35 Gamelin ordered a complete withdrawal to Antwerp of all French troops in North-Brabant, who would now limit themselves to rear-guard actions.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 243</ref>

The Light Division tried to systematically reconquer the Island of Dordrecht by advancing on a broad front, using four battalions with little artillery support.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 352</ref> On its left flank, where there was almost no enemy presence, the advance went according to plan. The battalion on the right flank however, ran into an attacking German force of battalion strength that had been ordered by General Student to circle around the outskirts of the city to relieve the pressure being placed on his troops holding the Dort bridges.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 353</ref> In confused street fighting the German troops were successful in blocking the battalion; the other Dutch units then halted their advance around noon. Though higher command soon ordered a better concentration of forces instead of some mopping-up action, due to a lack of clear lines of command, no subsequent attack materialised that day.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 355</ref>

In Rotterdam and around The Hague again little was done against the paratroopers. Most Dutch commanders, still afraid of a presumed Fifth Column, limited themselves to security measures;<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 364">Amersfoort (2005), p. 364</ref> they had been ordered not to stage any attacks above company level.
[[File:Grebbeberg the Netherlands.jpg|right|thumb|upright=1.35| The ''Grebbeberg'' seen from the south; the slopes facing the attackers in the east were more gradual (2005)]]
While the situation in the south was becoming critical, in the east the Germans made a first successful effort in dislodging the Dutch defenders on the ''Grebbeberg''. After preparatory artillery bombardment in the morning, at around noon a battalion of ''Der Fuehrer'' attacked an eight hundred metres wide sector of the main line, occupied by a Dutch company.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 281</ref> Exploiting the many dead angles in the Dutch field of fire, it soon breached the Dutch positions, which had little depth.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 282">Amersfoort (2005), p. 282</ref> A second German battalion then expanded the breach to the north. Dutch artillery, though equal in strength to the German, failed to bring sufficient fire on the enemy concentration of infantry, largely limiting itself to interdiction. Eight hundred metres to the west was a Stop Line, a continuous trench system from which the defenders were supposed to wage an active defence, staging local counterattacks. However, due to a lack of numbers, training, and heavy weapons the attacks failed against the well-trained SS troops. By the evening the Germans had brought the heavily forested area between the two lines under their control.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 284</ref> Spotting a weak point, one of the SS battalion commanders, [[Obersturmbannführer]] [[Hilmar Wäckerle]], suddenly attacked with a hastily assembled force of about company strength. In a, for this battle, rare instance of [[infiltration tactics]] he broke through the Stop Line, quickly advancing {{convert|1|mi|km|order=flip|abbr=on}} to the west until being halted by a fall-back line along the [[Rhenen]] railroad. The breakthrough caused a panic among the defenders, who largely abandoned the Stop Line at this point; but as Wäckerle had had no time to co-ordinate his action with other units, it was not further exploited. Order was restored at the Stop Line and the SS company became isolated and surrounded.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 285</ref> The earlier general German advance later caused the main line to be abandoned for over {{convert|2|mi|km|order=flip|abbr=on}} to the north because the troops there feared an attack from behind.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 282"/>

It had been well understood by the Dutch that the forces occupying the Grebbe Line would not be sufficiently strong to repel all attacks by themselves; they were intended to delay an offensive long enough for reserves to reinforce them. Due to the failure the previous day to understand that the German main assault was imminent, these reserves would not arrive in time to intervene in the fight at the defence zone between the two trench systems. This was all the more serious as the Stop Line had no depth and lacked large shelters to accommodate enough troops to stage a strong frontal counterattack. In the late evening it was decided to execute a flank attack from the north the next day.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 290">Amersfoort (2005), p. 290</ref>

In the North, the Wons Position formed a bridgehead at the eastern end of the Enclosure Dike; it had a long perimeter of about nine kilometres to envelop enough land to receive a large number of retreating troops without making them too vulnerable to air attack.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 320"/> On 12 May units with a combined strength of only two battalions were still present, so the line was weakly held. This was exploited by the first German unit to arrive, the single bicycle battalion of ''1. Kavalleriedivision''. At noon it quickly penetrated the line in a concentrated attack, forcing the defenders to withdraw to the Enclosure Dike. For some the German advance cut off their escape route by land; they sailed away from the small port of [[Makkum, Wûnseradiel|Makkum]], taking the last remaining vessels on the eastern side of Lake IJssel. This denied the Germans any craft for a crossing attempt, which plan was now abandoned.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 324">Amersfoort (2005), p. 324</ref>
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 141-1117, Rotterdam, ausgebrannte Öltanks.jpg|left|thumb|upright=1.35|Burnt-out [[Shell Oil]] reservoirs]]
In the afternoon General Winkelman received information about armoured forces advancing in the [[Langstraat]] region, on the road between 's-Hertogenbosch and the Moerdijk bridges. He still fostered hopes that those forces were French, but the announcement by Radio [[Bremen]] at 23:00 that German tanks had linked up with the paratroopers ended those hopes.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 170</ref> At last he began to understand the essence of the German strategy. He ordered the artillery batteries in the Hoekse Waard to try to destroy the Moerdijk bridges and sent a special engineering team to Rotterdam to blow up the ''Willemsbrug''. Pessimistic about the general situation at this point, he also ordered the vast strategic oil reserves of [[Royal Dutch Shell]] at [[Pernis, Netherlands|Pernis]] to be set on fire.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 172">Amersfoort (2005), p. 172</ref> Having been informed by Winkelman of his concerns earlier in the afternoon, the Dutch government asked [[Winston Churchill]] for three British divisions to turn the tide. The new prime minister answered that he simply did not have any reserves; however, three British torpedo boats were sent to Lake IJssel.<ref>De Jong (1970) p. 272</ref> Also, 2nd Welsh Guard battalion was prepared to be sent to [[Hook of Holland]] though it would not arrive in time.

Contrary to Winkelman, the German command was very satisfied with the day's events. It had been feared that the third day of the operation might become a "crisis day", the XXVI ''Armeekorps'' having to overcome near Breda the resistance of several French divisions. The Germans had also been concerned that they may face some Belgian or even British divisions. Therefore, von Bock had before the invasion requested to be reinforced in this effort by another Army Corps.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 141</ref> When this had been denied by chief of staff [[Franz Halder]], he had arranged the formation of an extra Army Corps headquarters to direct the complex strategic situation of simultaneously fighting the Allies and advancing into the Fortress Holland over the Moerdijk bridges.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 142"/> As on 12 May no actual crisis seemed to materialise, with the French retreating and Belgian and British forces being completely absent, von Bock decided that XXVI ''Armeekorps'' would be responsible for pursuing the French south towards Antwerp, while some forces would be directed by the new headquarters, ''Generalkommando XXXIX'' under command of ''Generalleutnant'' [[Rudolf Schmidt]], to advance north with ''254. Infanteriedivision'', most of ''9. Panzerdivision'', and ''SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler''.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 167</ref>

===13 May===
[[File:HMS Codrington.jpg|thumb|right|HMS ''Codrington'', which evacuated many members of the Dutch Royal family from the Netherlands]]
In the early morning of 13 May General Winkelman advised the Dutch government that he considered the general situation to be critical. On land the Dutch had been cut off from the Allied front and it had become clear no major Allied landings were to be expected to reinforce the Fortress Holland by sea; without such support there was no prospect of a prolonged successful resistance. German tanks might quickly pass through Rotterdam; Winkelman had already ordered all available antitank-guns to be placed in a perimeter around The Hague, to protect the seat of government. However, an immediate collapse of the Dutch defences might still be prevented if the planned counterattacks could seal off the southern front near Dordrecht and restore the eastern line at the Grebbeberg. Therefore, the cabinet decided to continue the fight for the time being,<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 176</ref> giving the general the mandate to surrender the Army when he saw fit and the instruction to avoid unnecessary sacrifices. Nevertheless, it was also deemed essential that Queen Wilhelmina was to be brought to safety; she departed around noon from [[Hoek van Holland]], where a British [[Irish Guards]] battalion was present,<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 225</ref> on [[HMS Hereward|HMS ''Hereward'']], a British destroyer, and when [[sea mine]]s made it too dangerous to try to reach Zealand, she went to England.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 175</ref> The previous evening, the Queen's only child and [[heir presumptive]] [[Juliana of the Netherlands|Princess Juliana]], together with her husband [[Prince Bernhard of Lippe-Biesterfeld]] and their children, had departed from [[IJmuiden]] on [[HMS Codrington|HMS ''Codrington'']] for [[Harwich]]. Arrangements for the departure had already been made before the invasion.<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 264</ref> As the Queen constitutionally was part of the government, her departure confronted the cabinet with the choice whether to follow her or remain. After heated discussions it was decided to leave also: the ministers sailed at 19:20 from Hoek van Holland on [[HMS Windsor|HMS ''Windsor'']] to form a [[government in exile]] in London, having conferred all governmental authority over the homeland to Winkelman.<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 288</ref> Three Dutch merchant ships, escorted by British warships, transferred government [[bullion]] and diamond stocks to the United Kingdom.<ref>[http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pdfs/small/cab-66-7-wp-40-158-38.pdf The National Archives – War Cabinet Weekly Résumé (No. 37) of the Naval, Military and Air Situation]</ref>

While two tank companies of ''9. Panzerdivision'' remained with XXVI ''Armeekorps'' to pursue the withdrawing French, the other four began to cross the Moerdijk traffic bridge at 05:20.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 172"/> Two staff companies with tanks also went to the northern side. The Dutch made some attempts to indirectly block the advance of the German armour. At around 06:00 the last operational medium bomber, a Fokker T. V, dropped two bombs on the bridge; one hit a bridge pillar but failed to explode; the bomber was shot down. Dutch batteries in the [[Hoekse Waard]], despite dive bomber attacks, tried to destroy the bridge by artillery fire, but the massive structure was only slightly damaged.<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 300</ref> Attempts to inundate the Island of Dordrecht failed, as the inlet sluices could not be opened—and were too small anyway.<ref name="De Jong 1970, p. 301">De Jong (1970), p. 301</ref>

The Light Division tried to cut the German corridor by advancing to the west and linking up with a small ferry bridgehead over the [[Dortse Kil]]. However, two of the four battalions available were inefficiently deployed in a failed effort to recapture the suburbs of Dordrecht;<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 358</ref> when the other two battalions approached the main road, they were met head on by a few dozen German tanks. The vanguard of the Dutch troops, not having been informed of their presence, mistook the red air recognition cloths strapped on top of the German armour for orange flags French vehicles might use to indicate their friendly intentions—orange being seen by the Dutch as their national colour—and ran towards the vehicles to welcome them, only understanding their error when they were gunned down. The battalions, subsequently hit by a Stuka bombardment, fled to the east; a catastrophe was prevented by 47mm and 75 mm batteries halting with direct AP fire the assault of the German tanks. The left wing of the Light Division despite the heavy losses then completed an ordered withdrawal to the [[Alblasserwaard]] at around 13:00.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 359</ref> In the early afternoon eight tanks reduced the ferry bridgehead. A tank company also tried to capture the old inner city of Dordrecht without infantry support, audaciously breaching barricades, but was ordered to retreat after heavy street fighting<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 360</ref> in which at least two [[Panzerkampfwagen II]]s were destroyed and three tanks heavily damaged. All Dutch troops were withdrawn from the island in the night.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 361</ref>

German armoured forces advanced north over the Dordrecht bridge to [[IJsselmonde (island)|IJsselmonde]] island. Three tanks, two PzKpfw. IIs and a [[Panzerkampfwagen III]] of the staff platoon of the 1st Tank Battalion, stormed the Barendrecht bridge into the Hoekse Waard, but all of them were lost to a single 47 mm antitank-gun. Though the Germans did not follow up their attack, this area too was abandoned by the Dutch troops.<ref name="De Jong 1970, p. 301"/>

[[File:Willemsbrug 1878.jpg|left|upright=1.35|thumb|The Willemsbrug shortly after its opening in 1878, as seen from Noordereiland. A new bridge was completed nearby in 1981, and this one was demolished.]]
In Rotterdam a last attempt was made to blow up the Willemsbrug. The commander of the 2nd Battalion Irish Guards in Hoek van Holland, {{convert|20|mi|km|order=flip|abbr=on}} to the west, refused to participate in the attempt as being outside the scope of his orders.<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 302</ref> Two Dutch companies, mainly composed of [[Dutch Marine Corps|Dutch marines]], stormed the bridgehead.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 364"/> The bridge was reached and the remaining fifty German defenders in the building in front of it were on the point of surrender when after hours of fighting the attack was abandoned because of heavy flanking fire from the other side of the river.<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 303</ref>

In the North, the commander of ''1. Kavalleriedivision'', Major General [[Kurt Feldt]], faced the unenviable task of having to advance over the Enclosure Dike because of a lack of ships.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 324"/> This dam was blocked by the Kornwerderzand Position, which protected a major sluice complex regulating the water level of Lake IJssel, which had to be sufficiently high to allow many Fortress Holland inundations to be maintained. The main fortifications contained 47 mm antitank-guns. Long channel piers projected in front of and behind the sluices, on both the right and left; on these, pillboxes had been built which could place a heavy enfilading fire on the dam, which did not provide the slightest cover for any attacker.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), pp. 324–325</ref> On 13 May the position was reinforced by a 20 mm anti aircraft battery.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 326">Amersfoort (2005), p. 326</ref> It had been Feldt's intention to first destroy the position by a battery of siege mortars, but the train transporting it had been blocked on 10 May by a blown railway bridge at [[Winschoten]]. Several air attacks on 13 May had little effect;<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 326"/> in the late afternoon five bicycle sections tried to approach the main bunker complex under cover of an artillery bombardment, but soon fled after being fired upon; the first was pinned down and could only retreat under cover of darkness, leaving behind some dead.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 327</ref>

In the East the Germans tried to overcome the resistance in the Grebbe Line by also deploying the other division of X [[Armeekorps]], the ''227. Infanteriedivision''. It was ordered to break through a second attack axis near Scherpenzeel, where a dry approach route had been discovered through the inundations.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 300</ref> The line in this area was defended by the Dutch 2nd Infantry Division. Two German regiments were to attack simultaneously, in adjacent sectors.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 301</ref> However, after the regiment on the right, ''366. Infanterieregiment'', reached the start position for the attack, the regiment on the left, ''412. Infanterieregiment'', became delayed by flanking fire from the Dutch outpost line, the position of which had not been correctly determined. It allowed itself to get involved in fragmented firefights, and although the reserve regiment was also eventually brought forward, little progress was made against the outposts. Meanwhile, the waiting ''366. Infanterieregiment'' was pounded by concentrated Dutch artillery fire and had to withdraw, resulting in a complete failure of the attack by ''227. Infanteriedivision''.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 304</ref>

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-1987-1210-502, Polen, Stukas.jpg|thumb|Junkers Ju 87 Bs.]]
On the extreme south of the Grebbe Line, the Grebbeberg, the Germans were now deploying three SS battalions including support troops and three fresh infantry battalions of IR.322; two of IR.374 laid in immediate reserve. During the evening and night of 12–13 May the Dutch had assembled in this sector about a dozen<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 308</ref> battalions. These forces consisted of the reserve battalions of several army corps, divisions and brigades, and the independent Brigade B, which had been freed when the Main Defence Line in the [[Land van Maas en Waal]] had been abandoned as part of the withdrawal of III Army Corps from North Brabant. However, not all of these units would be concentrated into a single effort for a counterattack to retake the main line. Some battalions had been fed immediately into the battle at the Stop Line and others were kept in reserve, mainly behind the fall-back line near the Rhenen railroad. Furthermore, most battalions were a quarter below strength. Four were to be used, under command of Brigade B, for the flanking attack from the north.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 290"/> This attack was delayed for several hours; when it finally started late in the morning of 13 May, it ran right into a comparable advance by two battalions of ''Der Fuehrer''. This brigade, unaware of Dutch intentions, had shifted its attack axis to the north to roll up the Grebbe Line from behind.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 291</ref> A confused [[meeting engagement|encounter battle]] followed in which the vanguard of the Dutch troops, poorly supported by their artillery, began to give way at around 12:30 to the encroaching SS troops. Soon this resulted in a general withdrawal of the brigade, which turned into a rout when, at about 13:30, the Grebbeberg area was bombed by 27 [[Junkers Ju 87|Ju 87 Stukas]].<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 294</ref>

Meanwhile, ''207. Infanteriedivision'' was for the first time committed to battle at the Grebbeberg itself when two battalions of its ''322. Infanterieregiment'' attacked the Stop Line. The first wave of German attackers was beaten back with serious losses, but a second wave managed to fragment the trench line, which then was taken after heavy fighting.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 295</ref> The regiment subsequently proceeded to mop up the area to the west, delayed by resistance from several Dutch command posts.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 296</ref> It withdrew in the late afternoon, just as the SS battalions further north, to avoid a preparatory artillery bombardment, shifted to a more western position. After redeployment the Germans intended to renew their attack in order to take the Rhenen fall-back line and the village of [[Achterberg]]. However, these preparations would prove to be superfluous: the Dutch had already disappeared.

The same Stuka bombardment that had put Brigade B to rout also broke the morale of the reserves at Rhenen. In the morning these troops had already shown severe discipline problems, with units disintegrating and leaving the battlefield because of German interdiction fire.<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 311</ref> In the late afternoon most of 4th Infantry Division was fleeing westwards.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 299</ref> The Germans had expected that the Dutch would attempt to plug any gaps in the line<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 173</ref> and indeed it had been planned to shift to the north two regiments of the Dutch 3rd Army Corps for this purpose.<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 323</ref> But Dutch command now suffered such a loss of control that any thoughts to re-establish a continuous front had to be abandoned. A {{convert|8|km|abbr=on}} wide gap had appeared in the defences. Fearing that otherwise they would be encircled, at 20:30 Van Voorst tot Voorst ordered the three Army Corps to immediately abandon both the Grebbe Line and the Waal-Linge Position and to retreat during the night to the East Front of Fortress Holland at the New Holland Water Line.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 305</ref> The Germans, however, did not at once exploit their success; only around 21:00 had it become apparent to them that the gap even existed, when the renewed advance had met no enemy resistance.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 307</ref>

===14 May===
[[File:Duitse inval.png|upright=1.35|right|thumb|Dutch situation just before the [[Rotterdam Blitz]].
'''Legend:'''
{{legend|#0000ff|Location of the Dutch defence lines and area within Dutch troops are present}}
{{legend|#f35565|Heavy Dutch defence line against [[armoured vehicle]]s}}
{{legend|#7affff|Dutch defences in [[Zeeland]]}}
{{legend|#ffde01|Belgian defence line}}
{{legend|#2d9b0b|French defences in the Netherlands}}
{{legend|#cf8cd0|Position of German troops as well as areas under German control}}]]

Despite his pessimism expressed to the Dutch government and the mandate he had been given to surrender the Army, General Winkelman awaited the outcome of events, avoiding actually capitulating until it was absolutely necessary. In this he was perhaps motivated by a desire to engage the opposing German troops for as long as possible, to assist the Allied war effort.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 178</ref> In the early morning of 14 May, though the situation remained critical, a certain calm was evident in the Dutch Headquarters.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 180</ref>

In the North, a German artillery bombardment of the Kornwerderzand Position began at 09:00. However, the German batteries were forced to move away after being surprised by [[counterfire]] from the 15 cm. aft cannon of [[HNLMS Johan Maurits van Nassau]], which had sailed into the [[Wadden Sea]].<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 329</ref> Feldt now decided to land on the coast of [[North-Holland]]. A few barges were found; only after the capitulation however, was the crossing actually executed. During this operation one barge foundered and the remainder lost their way. Fears for such a landing had caused Winkelman on 12 May to order the occupation of an improvised "Amsterdam Position" along the [[North Sea Canal]], but only weak forces were available.<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 333</ref>

In the East, under cover of [[ground fog]] the field army successfully withdrew from the Grebbe Line to the East Front without being bombed as had been feared, and disengaged from the gradually pursuing enemy troops. The new position had some severe drawbacks: the inundations were mostly not yet ready and the [[Earthworks (engineering)|earthworks]] and [[berm]]s needed because trenches would be flooded in the [[peat]] soil had not yet been constructed, so defences had to be improvised to accommodate the much larger number of troops.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 306</ref>

On IJsselmonde the German forces prepared to cross the Maas in Rotterdam, which was defended by about eight Dutch battalions. Crossings would be attempted in two sectors. The main attack would take place in the centre of the city, with the German 9th Panzer Division advancing over the ''Willemsbrug''. Then ''SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler'' would cross to operate on its immediate left and east of Rotterdam a battalion of the 16th Infantry Regiment of ''22. Luftlandedivision'' would cross on boats. These auxiliary attacks might prevent a concentration of Dutch forces, blocking the 9th Panzer Division's advance through a densely built up urban area intersected by canals. In view of these conditions and the limited means available, there was a major emphasis on air support. Already on 13 May, von Küchler, fearing that the British might reinforce the Fortress Holland, had instructed Schmidt: "Resistance in Rotterdam should be broken with all means, if necessary threaten with and carry out the annihilation [''Vernichtung''] of the city".<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 335</ref> In this he was to be supported by the highest command level as Hitler would state in ''Führer-Weisung Nr. 11'' (Führer-Directive N°11): "On the northern wing the power of the Army of Holland to resist has proven stronger than had been assumed. Political as well as military grounds demand to quickly break this resistance. (...) Furthermore the speedy conquest of the Fortress Holland is to be facilitated through a deliberate weakening of the [air] power operated by Sixth Army".<ref>Amersfoort (2005), pp. 367–368</ref> ''[[Kampfgeschwader 54]]'', using [[Heinkel He 111]] bombers, was therefore shifted from Sixth to Eighteenth Army.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 368</ref>

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1984-021-17, Rotterdam, Kapitulation.jpg|left|thumb|upright=1.35|Dutch negotiator, carrying white flag, moves toward the German positions on the Noordereiland on 14 May, 1940.]]
Generals Kurt Student and Schmidt desired a limited air attack to temporarily paralyse the defences, allowing the tanks to break out of the bridgehead; severe urban destruction was to be avoided as it would only hamper their advance.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), pp. 366–367</ref> However, ''Luftwaffe'' commander [[Hermann Göring]], worried about the fate of his surrounded airborne troops, hoped to force an immediate Dutch national capitulation by a much more extensive bombardment. His head of operations, General [[Otto Hoffmann von Waldau]], described this option as a "radical solution" (''Radikallösung'').<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 367</ref> Despite misgivings by [[Albert Kesselring]] about its scope and necessity,<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 345</ref> at 11:45 ninety Heinkels took off for a [[carpet bombing]] of the inner city of Rotterdam.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 369</ref>

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1984-021-14, Zerstörtes Rotterdam.jpg|right|thumb|upright=1.35|German troops advance through a destroyed section of Rotterdam]]
At 09:00 a German messenger crossed the ''Willemsbrug'' to bring an ultimatum from Schmidt to Colonel [[Pieter Scharroo]], the Dutch commander of Rotterdam, demanding a capitulation of the city; if a positive answer had not been received within two hours the "severest means of annihilation" would be employed.<ref name="De Jong 1970, p. 348">De Jong (1970), p. 348</ref> However, Scharroo did not receive the message until 10:30. Not feeling inclined to surrender regardless, he asked Winkelman for orders; the latter, hearing that the document had not been signed nor contained the name of the sender, instructed him to send a Dutch envoy to clarify matters and gain time.<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 349</ref> At 12:15 a Dutch captain handed this request to von Choltitz. On the return of the German envoy at 12:00, Schmidt had already sent a radio message that the bombardment had to be postponed because negotiations had started.<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 350</ref> Just after the Dutch envoy had received a second ultimatum, now signed by Schmidt and with a new expiry time of 16:20, around 13:20 two formations of Heinkels arrived,<ref name="De Jong 1970, p. 348"/> not having received any recall orders. This was later explained by the Germans as a result of their having already pulled in their tow aerials.<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 351</ref> Schmidt ordered red flares to be fired to signal that the bombardment was to be broken off, but only the squadron making the bomb run from the southwest abandoned its attack, after their first three planes had dropped their bombs. The other 54 Heinkels, having approached from the east, continued to drop their share of the grand total of 1308 bombs,<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 370</ref> destroying the inner city and killing 814 civilians. The ensuing fires destroyed about 24,000 houses, making almost 80,000 inhabitants homeless.<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 366</ref> At 15:50 Scharroo capitulated to Schmidt in person.<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 368</ref> Meanwhile, Göring had ordered a second bombardment of the city—a group of Heinkels had already left—to be carried out unless a message was received that the whole of Rotterdam was occupied.<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 369</ref> When Schmidt heard of the order, he hastily sent an uncoded message at 17:15 claiming the city was taken, although this had yet to take place. The bombers were recalled just in time.<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 370</ref>

==The surrender of the Dutch Army==
[[File:Battle-of-the-Netherlands-WOII-ani.gif|thumb|right|upright=0.9|The phases of the Dutch occupation]]

Winkelman at first intended to continue the fight, even though Rotterdam had capitulated and German forces from there might now advance into the heart of the Fortress Holland. The possibility of terror bombings was considered before the invasion and had not been seen as grounds for immediate capitulation; provisions had been made for the continuation of effective government even after widespread urban destruction.<ref>De Jong (1969b), pp. 366–367</ref> The perimeter around The Hague might still ward off an armoured attack and the New Holland Water Line had some defensive capability; though it could be attacked from behind, it would take the Germans some time to deploy their forces in the difficult polder landscape.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 181">Amersfoort (2005), p. 181</ref> However, he soon received a message from Colonel [[Cuno Eduard Willem baron van Voorst tot Voorst]], the commander of the city of [[Utrecht (city)|Utrecht]], that the Germans demanded its surrender; leaflets were dropped by propaganda planes announcing that only unconditional surrender could "spare it the fate of Warsaw".<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 182</ref> Winkelman concluded that it apparently had become the German policy to devastate any city offering any resistance; in view of his mandate to avoid unnecessary suffering and the hopelessness of the Dutch military position he decided to surrender.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 183</ref> All higher-level army units were informed at 16:50 by [[Telegraphy#Telex|Telex]] of his decision and ordered to first destroy their weapons and then offer their surrender to the nearest German units. At 17:20 the German envoy in The Hague was informed.<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 375</ref> At around 19:00 Winkelman gave a radio speech informing the Dutch people. This was also how the German command became aware the Dutch had surrendered;<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 179</ref> the Dutch troops had generally disengaged from the enemy and had not yet made contact. The Dutch surrender implied that in principle a cease-fire should be observed by both parties.

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1969-097-17, Kapitulation der Niederlande.jpg|upright|thumb|[[Henri Winkelman|Winkelman]], in the centre, leaves the school building in which the negotiations took place]]
Winkelman acted both in his capacity of commander of the Dutch Army and of highest executive power of the homeland. This created a somewhat ambiguous situation. On the morning of 14 May the commander of the [[Royal Dutch Navy]], Vice-Admiral [[Johannes Furstner]], had left the country to continue the fight;<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 181"/> Dutch naval vessels were generally not included in the surrender. Eight ships and four unfinished hulks had already departed,<ref>De Jong (1970), pp. 385–386</ref> some smaller vessels were sunk off, and nine others sailed for England in the evening of 14 May. The ''Hr. Ms. Johan Maurits van Nassau'' was sunk by German bombers while crossing.<ref>De Jong (1970), pp. 393–397</ref> The commander of the main Dutch naval port of [[Den Helder]], Rear-Admiral [[Hoyte Jolles]], concluded that his base, with a naval garrison of 10,000, its own air service, and extensive land defences, should continue to resist also. Only with some difficulty did Winkelman convince him to obey the surrender order.<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 374</ref> Large parts of the Dutch Army were also reluctant to believe or accept the surrender, especially those units that hardly had seen any fighting, such as 3rd and 4th Army Corps and Brigade A.<ref>De Jong (1970), pp. 376–377</ref>

At 05:00 on 15 May a German messenger reached The Hague, inviting Winkelman to [[Rijsoord]] for a meeting with von Küchler to negotiate the articles of a written capitulation document. Both quickly agreed on most conditions, Winkelman declaring to have surrendered army, naval and air forces. When von Küchler demanded that pilots still fighting for the allies should be treated as [[francs-tireurs]]—seen by the Germans as guerilla fighters outside the laws of war—Winkelman's refusal made it clear to the Germans that only the armed forces in the homeland, with the exception of Zealand, would capitulate, not the country itself.<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 384</ref> On other points a swift agreement was reached and the document was signed at 10:15.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 184</ref>

==The fighting in Zealand==
The province of [[Zeeland|Zealand]] was exempt from the surrender; fighting continued there in a common allied effort with French troops. The Dutch forces in the province comprised eight full battalions of army and naval troops.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 244">Amersfoort (2005), p. 244</ref> They were commanded by Rear-Admiral [[Hendrik Jan van der Stad]], who, being a naval officer, had been directly subordinated to Winkelman.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 238"/> The area was under naval command because of the predominance of the naval port of [[Vlissingen|Flushing]] on the island of [[Walcheren]] which controlled the access to Antwerp via the [[Western Scheldt]]. The northern islands of the province were defended only by a few platoons. The defence of [[Zeelandic Flanders]], the Dutch part of Flanders, was largely left to the Allies. The main Dutch army forces would thus be concentrated in [[Zuid-Beveland]], the peninsula east of Walcheren, to deny the enemy this approach route to Vlissingen. Zuid-Beveland was connected to the coast of North Brabant by an isthmus; at its eastern and most narrow end the Bath Position had been prepared, occupied by an infantry battalion. This was mainly intended as a collecting line for possible Dutch troops retreating from the east. At its western end was the longer Zanddijk Position, occupied by three battalions.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 239</ref>

Three French GRDIs (''Groupes de Reconnaissance de Division d'Infanterie'') had arrived on 10 May; these motorised units subsequently departed for North Brabant, but from 11 May the area was reinforced by two French infantry divisions: the ''60e Division d'Infanterie'',<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 240" /> a B-class division, and the newly formed naval ''68e Division d'Infanterie''. Part of their equipment was brought by ship through Flushing harbour. Most troops of these divisions would remain south of the Western Scheldt in Zeelandic Flanders, where two of the eight Dutch battalions were also present, as were two border companies. Only two French regiments were sent to the northern bank. On 13 May the Dutch troops were placed under French operational command and ''68e Division d'Infanterie'' was transferred to the 7th Army.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 241</ref> Cooperation between the two allies left much to be desired and was plagued by poor communications, misunderstandings and differences regarding strategy. The Dutch considered the Bath and Zanddijk Positions to be very defensible because of the open polder landscape and extensive inundations. However, the French commander, General [[Pierre-Servais Durand]], was not convinced of their value and positioned his troops at more conspicuous obstacles. On the evening of 13 May one regiment, the ''271e'' of ''68e Division d'Infanterie'', occupied the [[Canal through Zuid-Beveland]] and the other, the ''224e'' of ''60 Division d'Infanterie'', took a position at the [[Sloe]] straights separating the island of [[Walcheren]] from Zuid-Beveland, even though there was not sufficient time for adequate entrenchment. This prevented an effective concentration of Allied forces, allowing the Germans, despite a numerical inferiority, to defeat them piecemeal.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 255</ref>

On 14 May the Germans had occupied almost all of North Brabant. ''SS-Standarte Deutschland'', quickly advancing to the Western Scheldt, reached the Bath Position.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 244"/> This cut off the retreat of ''27e Groupe de Reconnaissance de Division d'Infanterie'', which was subsequently destroyed defending [[Bergen-op-Zoom]]. The morale of the defenders of the Bath Position, already shaken by stories from Dutch troops fleeing to the west, was severely undermined by the news that Winkelman had surrendered; many concluded that it was useless for Zealand to continue resisting as the last remaining province. A first preparatory artillery bombardment on the position in the evening of 14 May caused the commanding officers to desert their troops, who then also fled.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 245</ref>

On the morning of 15 May ''SS-Standarte Deutschland'' approached the Zanddijk Position. A first attack around 08:00 on outposts of the northern sector was easily repulsed, as the Germans had to advance over a narrow dike through the inundations, despite supporting air strikes by dive bombers.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 246</ref> However, the bombardment caused the battalions in the main positions to flee,<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 247</ref> and the entire line had to be abandoned around 14:00 despite the southern part being supported by the French torpedo boat ''L'Incomprise''.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 248</ref>

On 16 May ''SS-Standarte Deutschland'', several kilometres to the west of the Zanddijk Position, approached the Canal through Zuid-Beveland, where the French ''271e Régiment d’Infanterie'' was present, only partly dug in and now reinforced by the three retreated Dutch battalions. An aerial bombardment that morning routed the defenders before the ground attack had even started; the first German crossings around 11:00 led to a complete collapse. An attempt in the evening of the same day to force the eight hundred metres long [[Sloedam]], over which most of the French troops had fled to Walcheren, ended in failure.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 249</ref> On 16 May the island of [[Tholen]] was taken against light opposition; on 17 May [[Schouwen-Duiveland]] fell.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 250</ref>

While the commanders of the remaining Dutch troops on South-Beveland refused direct commands by their superior to threaten the German flank, on 17 May a night attack at 03:00 across the Sloedam failed. The Germans now demanded the capitulation of the island; when this was refused they bombed [[Arnemuiden]] and Flushing. [[Middelburg]], the province's capital city, was heavily shelled by artillery, its inner city partially burning down. The heavy bombardment demoralised the largely French defenders, and the Germans managed to establish a bridgehead around noon.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 251</ref> The few Dutch troops present on Walcheren, about three companies, ceased their resistance. In the evening the encroaching Germans threatened to overrun the French forces that had fled into Flushing, but a gallant delaying action led by brigade-general [[Marcel Deslaurens]] in person, in which he was killed, allowed most troops to be evacuated over the Western Scheldt.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 252</ref>

After [[Noord-Beveland|North-Beveland]] had surrendered on 18 May, Zeelandic Flanders was the last remaining unoccupied Dutch homeland territory. On orders of the French, all Dutch troops were withdrawn on 19 May to [[Ostend]] in Belgium, as their presence would be demoralising and confusing to their own forces. On 27 May all of Zeelandic Flanders had been occupied.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 253</ref>

==Aftermath==
Following the Dutch defeat, Queen Wilhelmina established a [[Dutch government in exile|government-in-exile]] in England.<ref>Shirer (1960), p. 723</ref> The German occupation officially began on 17 May 1940. It would be five years before the entire country was liberated, during which time over 210,000 inhabitants of the Netherlands became victims of war, among them 104,000 Jews and other minorities, victims of genocide. Another 70,000 more may have died from indirect consequences, such as poor nutrition or limited medical services.<ref>Oorlogsverliezen 1940–1945. Maandschrift van het Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, blz. 749. [http://www.cbs.nl/NR/rdonlyres/1FA7DF00-F612-4F46-8539-E04DCFECD7BA/0/2007k4b15p53art.pdf cbs.nl]</ref>

==Notes==
{{reflist|22em}}

==References==
{{refbegin}}
* {{citation|editor1-first=Herman|editor1-last=Amersfoort|editor2-first=Piet|editor2-last=Kamphuis|year=2005|title=Mei 1940 — De Strijd op Nederlands grondgebied|language=Dutch|location=Den Haag|publisher=Sdu Uitgevers|isbn=90-12-08959-X}}
* {{citation|last1=Schulten|first1=C.M.|last2=Theil|first2=J.|year=1979|title=Nederlandse Pantservoertuigen|language=Dutch|location=Bussum|publisher=Unieboek BV|isbn=90-269-4555-8}}
* Star Busmann, C.W. ''Partworks and Encyclopedia of World War II''
* {{citation|first=Louis|last=De Jong|authorlink=Loe de Jong|year=1969|title=Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Deel 1: Voorpel|language=Dutch|location=Amsterdam|publisher=Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie}}
* {{citation|first=Louis|last=De Jong|year=1969|title=Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Deel 2: Neutraal|language=Dutch|location=Amsterdam|publisher=Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie}}
* {{citation|first=Louis|last=De Jong|year=1970|title=Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Deel 3: Mei '40|language=Dutch|location=Amsterdam|publisher=Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie}}
* {{citation|authorlink = E.R. Hooton|first=E.R.|last=Hooton|year=1994|title= Phoenix Triumphant: The Rise and Rise of the Luftwaffe|publisher= Brockhampton Press|isbn=1-86019-964-X}}
* {{citation|first=E.R.|last=Hooton|year=2007|title=Luftwaffe at War, Volume 2; Blitzkrieg in the West 1939–1940|location=London|publisher=Chevron/Ian Allen|isbn=978-1-85780-272-6}}
* {{citation|last=Jentz|first=Thomas L.|year=1998|title=Die deutsche Panzertruppe 1933–1942 — Band 1|language=German|location=Wölfersheim-Berstadt|publisher=Podzun-Pallas-Verlag|isbn=3-7909-0623-9}}
* {{citation|first=Karl-Heinz|last=Frieser|year=2005|title=Blitzkrieg-Legende — Der Westfeldzug 1940|language=German|publisher=R. Oldenbourg Verlag München}}
* {{citation|authorlink=William L. Shirer|last=Shirer|first=William L.|year=1960|title=The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany|location=New York|publisher=Simon & Schuster|isbn= 0-671-62420-2}}
* {{citation|authorlink = Ronald E. Powaski|last=Powaski|first=Ronald E.|title=Lightning War: Blitzkrieg in the West, 1940| publisher=John Wiley|year=2003|isbn=9780471394310}}
* {{citation|last=Powaski|first=Ronald E.|title=Lightning War: Blitzkrieg in the West, 1940| publisher=Book Sales Inc.|year=2008|isbn=9780785820970}}
* Goossens, Allert M.A. (2011), [http://www.waroverholland.com/ History Site "War Over Holland – the Dutch struggle May 1940"]
* {{citation|last=Grimm|first=P. e.a.|title=Verliesregister 1939–1945. Alle militaire vliegtuigverliezen in Nederland tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Verliesregister 1940| publisher=Studiegroep Luchtoorlog 1939–1945, Nederlands Instituut voor Militaire Historie|year=2008}}
{{refend}}
{{World War II}}
{{Subject bar
| portal1=British Army
| portal2=Military history of France
| portal3=Military of Germany
| portal4=Netherlands
| portal5=World War II
| commons=y
| commons-search=Category:Battle of the Netherlands
}}
{{coord missing|Netherlands}}
{{DEFAULTSORT:Netherlands, Battle of}}

[[Category:1940 in the Netherlands]]
[[Category:Battle of France]]
[[Category:Battles and operations of World War II involving the Netherlands]]
[[Category:Battles of World War II involving Germany]]
[[Category:Battles of World War II involving France]]
[[Category:Battles and operations of World War II involving the United Kingdom|B]]
[[Category:Conflicts in 1940]]
[[Category:Invasions by Germany]]
[[Category:Invasions of the Netherlands]]
[[Category:World War II invasions]]
[[Category:Germany–Netherlands military relations]]
[[Category:May 1940 events]]

Schlacht um die Niederlande

2018-10-08T15:59:35Z

129.234.0.27:

{{EngvarB|date=December 2017}}
{{good article}}
{{Infobox military conflict
| conflict = Battle of the Netherlands
| partof = the [[Battle of France]]
| image = File:Rotterdam, Laurenskerk, na bombardement van mei 1940.jpg
| image_size = 300px
| caption = The centre of [[Rotterdam]] destroyed after [[Rotterdam Blitz|bombing]]
| date = 10–14 May 1940 10–17 May 1940 (Zealand)
| place = Netherlands
| territory =
| result = German victory
* [[German occupation of the Netherlands]]
* Creation of [[Reichskommissariat Niederlande]]
* Removal of Dutch military presence in the continental [[European Theater (World War II)|European Theater]]
* The Dutch government [[Dutch government-in-exile|goes into exile]] in the United Kingdom
| combatant1 = '''{{flag|Netherlands}}''' {{flagcountry|French Third Republic}} {{flag|United Kingdom}}
| combatant2 = '''{{flagcountry|Nazi Germany}}'''
| commander1 = {{flagicon|Netherlands}} [[Henri Winkelman]] {{flagicon|Netherlands}} [[Jan Joseph Godfried van Voorst tot Voorst]] {{flagicon|French Third Republic}} [[Henri Giraud]]
| commander2 = {{flagicon|Nazi Germany}} [[Fedor von Bock]] (Army Group B) {{flagicon|Nazi Germany}} [[Hans Graf von Sponeck]]
| strength1 = 9 divisions 700 guns<ref>Goossens, Dutch armament: Artillery, [http://www.waroverholland.nl/index.php?page=artillery waroverholland.nl]</ref> 1 tank 5 tankettes 32 armoured cars<ref>Goossens, Dutch armament: Miscellaneous, [http://www.waroverholland.nl/index.php?page=miscellaneous-2 waroverholland.nl]</ref> 145 aircraft<ref>Goossens, Dutch armament: Military airplanes, [http://www.waroverholland.nl/index.php?page=military-airplanes waroverholland.nl]</ref> Total: 280,000 men
| strength2 = 22 divisions 1,378 guns 759 tanks 830 aircraft<ref>Hooton 2007, p. 48</ref> 6 armoured trains<ref>De Jong, Het Koninkrijk, Staatsuitgeverij, 1971</ref> Total: 750,000 men
| casualties1 = 2,332 KIA (Dutch Army)<ref name="waroverholland">Goossens, Balance Sheet, [http://www.waroverholland.nl/index.php?page=balance waroverholland.nl]</ref> 7,000 wounded<ref name="waroverholland"/> 216 French KIA<ref name="waroverholland"/> 43 British KIA<ref name="waroverholland"/> Over 2,000 civilians killed<ref name="waroverholland"/>
| casualties2 = 2,032 KIA<ref name="waroverholland"/> 6,000–7,000 wounded<ref name="waroverholland"/> 4 armoured trains<ref name= french>{{cite book| last = Kaufmann| first = J. E.| last2 = Kaufmann| first2 = H. W.| title = Hitler's Blitzkrieg Campaigns: The Invasion And Defense Of Western Europe, 1939–1940| publisher = Da Capo Press| url = https://books.google.com/books?id=65-v0wkrWYEC&dq=| date = 2 October 2007| pages = 191| isbn = 9780306816918}}</ref> 225–275 aircraft total loss<ref name="waroverholland"/> 1,350 prisoners to England<ref name="waroverholland"/>
| campaignbox =
{{Campaignbox Western Front (World War II)}}
{{Campaignbox Battle of the Netherlands}}
{{Campaignbox Battle of France}}
}}

The '''Battle of the Netherlands''' ({{lang-nl|Slag om Nederland}}) was a military campaign part of [[Battle of France|Case Yellow]] ({{lang-de|Fall Gelb}}), the [[Nazi Germany|German]] invasion of the [[Low Countries]] ([[Belgium]], [[Luxembourg]], and the [[Netherlands]]) and [[French Third Republic|France]] during [[World War II]]. The battle lasted from 10 May 1940 until the surrender of the main Dutch forces on 14 May. Dutch troops in the province of [[Zeeland]] continued to resist the ''[[Wehrmacht]]'' until 17 May when Germany completed its occupation of the whole country.

The Battle of the Netherlands saw some of the earliest mass paratroop drops, to occupy tactical points and assist the advance of ground troops. The German ''[[Luftwaffe]]'' used paratroopers in the capture of several airfields in the vicinity of [[Rotterdam]] and [[The Hague]], helping to quickly overrun the nation and immobilise Dutch forces.

After the devastating [[Rotterdam Blitz|bombing of Rotterdam]] by the ''Luftwaffe'', the Germans threatened to bomb other Dutch cities if the Dutch forces refused to surrender. The General Staff knew it could not stop the bombers and ordered the Dutch army to cease hostilities. The last occupied parts of the Netherlands were liberated in 1945.

==Background==
===Prelude===
The United Kingdom and France declared war on Germany in 1939, following the [[German invasion of Poland]], but no major land operations occurred in Western Europe during the period known as the [[Phoney War]] in the winter of 1939–1940. During this time, the British and French built up their forces in expectation of a long war, and the Germans completed their conquest of Poland.<ref>Shirer (1960), p. 633</ref> On 9 October, [[Adolf Hitler]] ordered plans to be made for an invasion of the Low Countries, to use them as a base against Great Britain and to pre-empt a similar attack by the [[Allies of World War II|Allied forces]], which could threaten the vital [[Ruhr Area]].<ref>Frieser (2005), p. 74</ref> A joint Dutch-Belgian peace offer between the two sides was rejected on 7 November.<ref name="gunther1940">{{cite book | url=https://archive.org/stream/in.ernet.dli.2015.149663/2015.149663.Inside-Europe#page/n19/mode/2up | title=Inside Europe | publisher=Harper & Brothers | author=Gunther, John |location=New York|authorlink=John Gunther| year=1940 | pages=xxi}}</ref>

[[File:Mobilisatie 1939 Dutch soldiers on guard.jpg|right|thumb|Dutch soldiers on guard, November 1939]]
The Dutch were ill-prepared to resist such an invasion. When Hitler came to power, the Dutch had begun to re-arm, but more slowly than France or Belgium; only in 1936 did the defence budget start to be gradually increased.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 77">Amersfoort (2005), p. 77</ref> Successive Dutch governments tended to avoid openly identifying Germany as an acute military threat. Partly this was caused by a wish not to antagonise a vital trade partner,<ref>De Jong (1969), p. 438</ref> even to the point of repressing criticism of Nazi policies;<ref>De Jong (1969), p. 506</ref> partly it was made inevitable by a policy of strict budgetary limits with which the conservative Dutch governments tried in vain to fight the [[Great Depression]], which hit Dutch society particularly hard.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 67">Amersfoort (2005), p. 67</ref> [[Hendrikus Colijn]], [[prime minister]] between 1933 and 1939, was personally convinced Germany would not violate Dutch neutrality;<ref>De Jong (1969), p. 541</ref> senior officers made no effort to mobilise public opinion in favour of improving military defence.<ref>De Jong (1969), p. 542</ref>
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1985-038-03, Brücke Nijmwegen, Sicherung durch holländische Soldaten.jpg|thumb|Dutch troops close the barrier of the Nijmegen Waal bridge during the Albania crisis]]
International tensions grew in the late 1930s. Crises were caused by the German [[remilitarization of the Rhineland|occupation of the Rhineland]] in 1936; the ''[[Anschluss]]'' and [[Sudetenland#Sudeten Crisis|Sudeten crisis]] of 1938; and the German occupation of [[Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia|Bohemia and Moravia]] and the [[Italian invasion of Albania]] in the spring of 1939. These events forced the Dutch government to exercise greater vigilance, but they limited their reaction as much as they could. The most important measure was a partial mobilisation of 100,000 men in April 1939.<ref>De Jong (1969), p. 570</ref>

After the [[German invasion of Poland]] in September 1939 and the ensuing outbreak of the Second World War, the Netherlands hoped to remain neutral, as they had done during the [[First World War]] 25 years earlier. To ensure this neutrality, the Dutch army was mobilised from 24 August and entrenched.<ref>De Jong (1969), p. 642</ref> Large sums (almost 900 million [[guilder]]s) were spent on defence.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 363</ref> It proved very difficult to obtain new matériel in wartime, however, especially as the Dutch had ordered some of their new equipment from Germany, which deliberately delayed deliveries.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 78</ref> Moreover, a considerable part of the funds were intended for the [[Dutch East Indies]] (now [[Indonesia]]), much of it related to [[Design 1047 battlecruiser|a plan]] to build three [[battlecruiser]]s.<ref>De Jong (1969), p. 548</ref>

The strategic position of the Low Countries, located between France and Germany on the uncovered flanks of their fortification lines, made the area a logical route for an offensive by either side. In a 20 January 1940 radio speech, [[Winston Churchill]] tried to convince them not to wait for an inevitable German attack, but to join the Anglo-French Entente.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 129</ref> Both the Belgians and Dutch refused, even though the German attack plans had fallen into Belgian hands after a German aircraft crash in January 1940, in what became known as the [[Mechelen Incident]].<ref>De Jong (1969b), pp. 203–208</ref>

The French supreme command considered violating the neutrality of the Low Countries if they had not joined the Anglo-French coalition before the planned large Entente offensive in the summer of 1941, but the French Cabinet, fearing a negative public reaction, vetoed the idea. Kept in consideration was a plan to invade if Germany attacked the Netherlands alone, necessitating an Entente advance through Belgium, or if the Netherlands assisted the enemy by tolerating a German advance into Belgium through the southern part of their territory, both possibilities discussed as part of the ''hypothèse Hollande''.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 92">Amersfoort (2005), p. 92</ref> The Dutch government never officially formulated a policy on how to act in case of either contingency; the majority of ministers preferred to resist an attack, a minority and Queen [[Wilhelmina of the Netherlands]] refused to become a German ally whatever the circumstances.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 143</ref> The Dutch tried on several occasions to act as an intermediary to reach a negotiated peace settlement between the Entente and Germany.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 144</ref>

After the German invasion of [[Battle of Norway|Norway and Denmark]], followed by a warning by the new Japanese naval attaché Captain [[Tadashi Maeda (admiral)|Tadashi Maeda]] that a German attack on the Netherlands was certain,<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 254</ref> it became clear to the Dutch military that staying out of the conflict might prove impossible. They started to fully prepare for war, both mentally and physically. Dutch border troops were put on greater alert.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 251</ref> Reports of the presumed actions of a [[Fifth Column]] in Scandinavia caused widespread fears that the Netherlands too had been infiltrated by German agents assisted by traitors.<ref>De Jong (1969b), pp. 254–256</ref> Countermeasures were taken against a possible assault on airfields and ports.<ref>De Jong (1969b), pp. 256–258</ref> On 19 April a [[state of emergency]] was declared.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 258</ref> However, most civilians still cherished the illusion that their country might be spared,<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 392</ref> an attitude that has since been described as a state of denial.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 393</ref> The Dutch hoped that the restrained policy of the [[Triple Entente|Entente]] and [[Central Powers]] during the First World War might be repeated and tried to avoid the attention of the Great Powers and a war in which they feared a loss of human life comparable to that of the previous conflict. On 10 April Britain and France repeated their request that the Dutch enter the war on their side, but were again refused.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 249</ref>

===Dutch forces===

====Royal Dutch Army====
[[File:Dutch defense lines - ln-en.jpg|right|thumb|upright=1.35|Major Dutch defence lines]]
In the Netherlands, all the objective conditions were present for a successful defence: a dense population, wealthy, young, disciplined and well-educated; a geography favouring the defender; and a strong technological and industrial base including an armaments industry. However, these had not been exploited: while the [[Wehrmacht]] at the time still had many shortcomings in equipment and training, the Dutch army, by comparison, was far less prepared for war.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 324</ref> The myth of the general German equipment advantage over the opposing armies in the [[Battle of France]] was in fact a reality in the case of the Battle of the Netherlands. Germany had a modern army with [[tanks]] and [[dive bombers]] (such as the [[Junkers Ju 87]] ''Stuka''), while the Netherlands had an army whose armoured forces comprised only 39 [[Armored car (military)|armoured cars]] and five [[tankette]]s, and an air force in large part consisting of [[biplanes]]. The Dutch government's attitude towards war was reflected in the state of the country's armed forces, which had not significantly expanded their equipment since before the First World War,<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 64</ref> and were inadequately armed even by the standards of 1918.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 362</ref> During the 1920s, an economic recession lasting from 1920 until 1927 and the general détente in international relations caused a limitation of the defence budget.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 67"/> In that decade, only 1.5 million guilders per annum was spent on equipment.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 72</ref> Both in 1931 and 1933, commissions appointed to economise even further failed, because they concluded that the acceptable minimum had been reached and advised that a spending increase was urgently needed.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), pp. 73, 76</ref> Only in February 1936 was a bill passed creating a special 53.4 million guilder defence fund.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 77" />

The lack of a trained manpower base, a large professional organisation, or sufficient matériel reserves precluded a swift expansion of Dutch forces.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 79</ref> There was just enough artillery to equip the larger units: eight infantry divisions (combined in four Army Corps), one Light (i.e. motorised) Division and two independent brigades (Brigade A and Brigade B), each with the strength of half a division or five battalions. All other infantry combat unit troops were raised as light infantry battalions that were dispersed all over the territory to delay enemy movement.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 351</ref> About two thousand pillboxes had been constructed,<ref>De Jong (1969), p. 562</ref> but in lines without any depth. Modern large fortresses like the Belgian stronghold of [[Eben Emael]] were nonexistent; the only modern fortification complex was that at [[Kornwerderzand]], guarding the [[Afsluitdijk]]. Total Dutch forces equalled 48 regiments of infantry as well as 22 infantry battalions for strategic border defence. In comparison, Belgium, despite a smaller and more aged male population, fielded 22 full divisions and the equivalent of 30 divisions when smaller units were included.

After September 1939, desperate efforts were made to improve the situation, but with very little result. Germany, for obvious reasons, delayed its deliveries; France was hesitant to equip an army that would not unequivocally take its side. The one abundant source of readily available weaponry, the [[Soviet Union]], was inaccessible because the Dutch, contrary to most other nations, did not recognise the communist regime. An attempt in 1940 to procure Soviet armour captured by Finland failed.<ref>Schulten (1979), p. 37</ref>

On 10 May, the most conspicuous deficiency of the Dutch Army lay in its shortage of [[Armoured fighting vehicle|armour]].<ref name="De Jong 1969b, p. 325">De Jong (1969b), p. 325</ref> Whereas the other major participants all had a considerable armoured force, the Netherlands had not been able to obtain the minimum of 146 modern tanks (110 light, 36 medium) they had already considered necessary in 1937.<ref>Schulten (1979), p. 24</ref> A single [[FT-17|Renault FT]] tank, for which just one driver had been trained and which had the sole task of testing antitank obstacles, had remained the only example of its kind and was no longer in service by 1940.<ref>Schulten (1979), pp. 33–37</ref> There were two squadrons of armoured cars, each with a dozen [[AB Landsverk|Landsverk]] M36 or M38 vehicles.<ref>Schulten (1979), pp. 38–40</ref> Another dozen [[DAF M39]] cars were in the process of being taken into service, some still having to be fitted with their main armament.<ref>Schulten (1979), pp. 40–41</ref> A single [[platoon]] of five [[Carden Loyd tankette|Carden-Loyd Mark VI]] tankettes used by the Artillery completed the [[List of Dutch military equipment of World War II|list of Dutch armour]].

The Dutch Artillery had available a total of 676 [[howitzer]]s and [[field gun]]s: 310 [[Krupp]] 75 mm field guns, partly produced in licence; 52 105 mm [[Bofors]] howitzers, the only really modern pieces; 144 obsolete<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 331</ref> Krupp 125 mm guns; 40 150 mm sFH13's; 72 Krupp 150 mm L/24 howitzers and 28 [[Vickers]] 152 mm L/15 howitzers. As antitank-guns 386 [[Böhler]] 47 mm L/39s were available, which were effective weapons but too few in number, being only at a third of the planned strength;<ref>De Jong (1969), p. 545</ref> another three hundred antiquated<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 332</ref> ''6 Veld'' (57 mm) and ''8 Staal'' (84 mm) field guns performed the same role for the covering forces. Only eight of the 120 modern 105 mm pieces ordered from Germany had been delivered at the time of the [[invasion]]. Most artillery was horse-drawn.<ref name="De Jong 1969b, p. 327">De Jong (1969b), p. 327</ref>

The Dutch Infantry used about 2,200 7.92 mm [[Schwarzlose MG M.07/12|Schwarzlose M.08]] machine guns, partly licence produced, and eight hundred [[Vickers machine gun]]s. Many of these were fitted in the pillboxes; each battalion had a heavy machine gun company of twelve. The Dutch infantry squads were equipped with an organic light machine gun, the [[Lewis Gun|M.20 Lewis machine gun]], of which about eight thousand were available. This weapon was prone to jamming and not very suitable for offensive operations. Most Dutch infantry were equipped with the [[Dutch Mannlicher|Geweer M.95]] rifle, adopted in 1895.<ref name = NVL40-56>Nederlandse Vuurwapens: Landmacht en Luchtvaartafdeling, drs G. de Vries & drs B.J. Martens, p.40-56</ref> There were but six 80 mm [[Mortar (weapon)|mortars]] for each regiment. This lack of [[firepower]] seriously impaired the fighting performance of the Dutch infantry.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 330</ref>

Despite the Netherlands being the seat of [[Philips]], one of Europe's largest producers of radio equipment, the Dutch army mostly used telephone connections; only the Artillery had been equipped with the modest number of 225 radio sets.<ref name="De Jong 1969b, p. 327"/>
[[File:BATTLENETHERLANDS2.jpg|thumb|left|Dutch mobile anti-aircraft gun. This AA unit was actually a German AA truck which the Dutch bought from the Allies who captured it in late 1918 from the defeated German army.]]

====Dutch Air Forces====
The [[Dutch air force]], which was not an independent arm of the Dutch armed forces, but part of the Army,<ref name="De Jong 1969b, p. 325" /> on 10 May operated a fleet of 155 aircraft: 28 [[Fokker G.1]] twin-engine destroyers; 31 [[Fokker D.XXI]] and seven [[Fokker D.XVII]] fighters; ten twin-engined [[Fokker T.V]], fifteen [[Fokker C.X]] and 35 [[Fokker C.V]] light bombers, twelve [[Douglas DB-8]] dive bombers (used as fighters)<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 337</ref> and seventeen [[Koolhoven FK-51]] reconnaissance aircraft—thus 74 of the 155 aircraft were biplanes. Of these aircraft 125 were operational.<ref>{{cite web |url= http://www.milavia.net/airforces/netherlands/rnlaf_his.htm|title=Royal Netherlands Air Force, 1939–1945 Second World War |author=Niels Hillebrand |date= 15 May 2004|work=www.milavia.net |accessdate= 25 March 2010}}</ref> Of the remainder the air force school used three Fokker D.XXI, six Fokker D.XVII, a single [[Fokker G.I]], a single Fokker T.V and seven Fokker C.V, along with several training aeroplanes. Another forty operational aircraft served with the marine air service along with about an equal number of reserve and training craft.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 338</ref> The production potential of the Dutch military aircraft industry, consisting of [[Fokker]] and [[Koolhoven (aircraft manufacturer)|Koolhoven]], was not fully exploited due to budget limitations.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 340</ref>

====Training and readiness====
Not only was the [[Dutch Army]] poorly equipped, it was also poorly trained. There had especially been little experience gained in the handling of larger units above the battalion level. From 1932 until 1936, the Dutch Army did not hold summer field manoeuvres in order to conserve military funding.<ref>De Jong (1969), p. 544</ref> Also, the individual soldier lacked many necessary skills. Before the war only a minority of young men eligible to serve in the military had actually been conscripted. Until 1938, those who were enlisted only served for 24 weeks, just enough to receive basic infantry training.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 71</ref> That same year, service time was increased to eleven months.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 77" /> The low quality of conscripts was not compensated by a large body of professional military personnel. In 1940, there were only 1206 professional officers present.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 344</ref> It had been hoped that when war threatened, these deficiencies could be quickly remedied but following the mobilisation of all Dutch forces on 28 August 1939 (bringing Army strength to about 280,000 men)<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 82</ref> readiness only slowly improved: most available time was spent constructing defences.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 349</ref> During this period, munition shortages limited live fire training,<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 329</ref> while unit cohesion remained low.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 346</ref> By its own standards the Dutch Army in May 1940 was unfit for battle. It was incapable of staging an offensive, even at division level, while executing manoeuvre warfare was far beyond its capacities.<ref>De Jong (1969), p. 577</ref>

German generals and tacticians (along with [[Hitler]] himself) had an equally low opinion of the Dutch military and expected that the core region of [[Holland]] proper could be conquered in about three to five days.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 188">Amersfoort (2005), p. 188</ref>

===Dutch defensive strategy===

[[File:Grebbelinie the Netherlands.jpg|thumb|right|upright=1.1|The [[Grebbe line]], a forward defence line of the [[Dutch Water Line]], is shown in dark blue]]
In the 17th century, the [[Dutch Republic]] had devised a defensive system called the [[The Dutch Water Line|Hollandic Water Line]], which during the [[Franco-Dutch War]] protected all major cities in the west, by flooding part of the countryside. In the early 19th century this line was shifted somewhat to the east, beyond [[Utrecht (city)|Utrecht]], and later modernised with fortresses. This new position was called the New Hollandic Water Line. The line was reinforced with new pillboxes in 1940 as the fortifications were outdated. The line was located at the extreme eastern edge of the area lying below sea level. This allowed the ground before the fortifications to be easily inundated with a few feet of water, too shallow for boats, but deep enough to turn the soil into an impassable quagmire. The area west of the New Hollandic Water Line was called [[Fortress Holland]] (Dutch: ''Vesting Holland''; German: ''Festung Holland''), the eastern flank of which was also covered by [[Lake IJssel]] and the southern flank protected by the [[lower course]] of three broad parallel rivers: two effluents of the [[Rhine]], and the [[Meuse]] (or ''Maas''). It functioned as a [[National Redoubt]], which was expected to hold out a prolonged period of time,<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 84">Amersfoort (2005), p. 84</ref> in the most optimistic predictions as much as three months without any allied assistance,<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 366</ref> even though the size of the attacking German force was strongly overestimated.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 322</ref> Before the war the intention was to fall back to this position almost immediately, after a concentration phase (the so-called ''Case Blue'') in the [[Gelderse Vallei]],<ref>De Jong (1969), p. 573</ref> inspired by the hope that Germany would only travel through the southern provinces on its way to Belgium and leave Holland proper untouched. In 1939 it was understood such an attitude posed an invitation to invade and made it impossible to negotiate with the Entente about a common defence. Proposals by German diplomats that the Dutch government would secretly assent to an advance into the country were rejected.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 141</ref>

From September 1939 a more easterly Main Defence Line (MDL) was constructed. This second main defensive position had a northern part formed by the ''Grebbelinie'' ([[Grebbe line]]), located at the foothills of the [[Utrechtse Heuvelrug]], an [[Ice Age]] [[moraine]] between Lake IJssel and the Lower Rhine. It was dug on instigation of the commander of the Field Army Lieutenant-General [[Jan Joseph Godfried baron van Voorst tot Voorst]].<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 87">Amersfoort (2005), p. 87</ref> This line was extended by a southern part: the ''Peel-Raamstelling'' (Peel-Raam Position), located between the river Maas and the Belgian border along the Peel Marshes and the Raam rivulet, as ordered by the Dutch Commander in Chief, General [[Izaak H. Reijnders]]. In the south the intention was to delay the Germans as much as possible to cover a French advance. Fourth and Second Army Corps were positioned at the Grebbe Line; Third Army Corps were stationed at the Peel-Raam Position with the Light Division behind it to cover its southern flank. Brigade A and B were positioned between the Lower Rhine and the Maas. First Army Corps was a strategic reserve in the Fortress Holland, the southern perimeter of which was manned by another ten battalions and the eastern by six battalions.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 360</ref> All these lines were reinforced by pillboxes.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 84"/>

====Positioning of troops====
[[File:Peel-Raamstelling the Netherlands.jpg|thumb|left|upright=1.1|The Peel-Raam Position]]
In front of this Main Defence Line was the ''IJssel-Maaslinie'', a covering line along the rivers IJssel and Maas, connected by positions in the [[Betuwe]], again with pillboxes and lightly occupied by a screen of fourteen "border battalions". Late in 1939 General Van Voorst tot Voorst, reviving plans he had already worked out in 1937,<ref>De Jong (1969), p. 578</ref> proposed to make use of the excellent defensive opportunities these rivers offered. He proposed a shift to a more mobile strategy by fighting a delaying battle at the plausible crossing sites near [[Arnhem]] and [[Gennep]] to force the German divisions to spend much of their offensive power before they had reached the MDL, and ideally even defeat them.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 87"/> This was deemed too risky by the Dutch government and General Reijnders. The latter wanted the army to first offer heavy resistance at the Grebbe Line and Peel Raam Position, and then fall back to the Fortress Holland.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 197</ref> This also was considered too dangerous by the government, especially in light of German air supremacy, and had the disadvantage of having to fully prepare two lines. Reijnders had already been denied full military authority in the defence zones;<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 194</ref> the conflict about strategy further undermined his political position.<ref>De Jong (1969b), pp. 195–196</ref> On 5 February 1940 he was forced to offer his resignation because of these disagreements with his superiors.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 216</ref> He was replaced by General [[Henry G. Winkelman]] who decided that in the north the Grebbe Line would be the main defence line where the decisive battle was to be waged,<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 94</ref> partly because it would there be easier to break out with a [[counteroffensive]] if the conditions were favourable.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 221</ref> However, he took no comparable decision regarding the Peel-Raam Position.

During the [[Phoney War]] the Netherlands officially adhered to a policy of strict neutrality. In secret, the Dutch military command, partly acting on its own accord,<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 148</ref> negotiated with both Belgium and France via the Dutch military attaché in Paris, Lieutenant-Colonel [[David van Voorst Evekink]] to co-ordinate a common defence to a German invasion.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 90</ref> This failed because of insurmountable differences of opinion about the question of which strategy to follow.

====Coordinating with Belgium====
Given its obvious strategic importance, Belgium, though in principle neutral, had already made quite detailed arrangements for co-ordination with Entente troops. This made it difficult for the Dutch to have these plans changed again to suit their wishes. The Dutch desired the Belgians to connect their defences to the Peel-Raam Position, that Reijnders refused to abandon without a fight.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 97</ref> He did not approve of a plan by Van Voorst tot Voorst to occupy a so-called "Orange Position" on the much shorter line 's-Hertogenbosch – [[Tilburg]],<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 191</ref> to form a continuous front with the Belgian lines near [[Turnhout]] as proposed by Belgian General [[Raoul van Overstraeten]].<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 229</ref>

When Winkelman took over command, he intensified the negotiations, proposing on 21 February that Belgium would man a connecting line with the Peel Raam Position along the Belgian part of the [[Zuid-Willemsvaart]].<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 230</ref> The Belgians refused to do this unless the Dutch reinforced their presence in [[Limburg (Netherlands)|Limburg]]; the Dutch had no forces available with which to fulfill this request. Repeated Belgian requests to reconsider the Orange Position were refused by Winkelman. Therefore, the Belgians decided to withdraw, in the event of an invasion, all their troops to their main defence line, the [[Albert Canal]]. This created a dangerous gap forty kilometres wide.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 231</ref> The French were invited to fill it.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 96</ref> The French Commander in Chief General [[Maurice Gamelin]] was more than interested in including the Dutch in his continuous front as — like [[Major-General (United Kingdom)|Major-General]] [[Bernard Montgomery]] four years later — he hoped to circle around the ''[[Westwall]]'' when the Entente launched its planned 1941 offensive. But he did not dare to stretch his supply lines that far unless the Belgians and Dutch would take the allied side before the German attack. When both nations refused, Gamelin made it clear that he would occupy a connecting position near [[Breda]].<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 92"/> The Dutch did not fortify this area. In secret, Winkelman decided on 30 March<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 224</ref> to abandon the Peel-Raam Position immediately at the onset of a German attack and withdraw his Third Army Corps to the [[Linge]] to cover the southern flank of the Grebbe Line, leaving only a covering force behind.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 100</ref> This Waal-Linge Position was to be reinforced with pillboxes; the budget for such structures was increased with a hundred million guilders.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 225</ref>

After the German attack on Denmark and Norway in April 1940, when the Germans used large numbers of [[airborne troops]], the Dutch command became worried about the possibility they too could become the victim of such a strategic assault. To repulse an attack, five infantry battalions were positioned at the main ports and airbases, such as [[The Hague]] airfield of [[Ypenburg]] and the Rotterdam airfield of [[Waalhaven]].<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 101</ref> These were reinforced by additional AA-guns, two tankettes and twelve of the 24 operational armoured cars.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 188" /> These specially directed measures were accompanied by more general ones: the Dutch had posted no less than 32 [[hospital ship]]s throughout the country and fifteen trains to help make troop movements easier.

===French strategy===
In addition to the Dutch Army and the [[18th Army (Wehrmacht)|German 18th Army]], a third force, not all that much smaller than either, would operate on Dutch soil: the [[French 7th Army]]. It had its own objectives within the larger French strategy, and French planning had long considered the possibility of operations in Dutch territory. The coastal regions of [[Zeeland|Zealand]] and [[Holland]] were difficult to negotiate because of their many waterways. However, both the French and the Germans saw the possibility of a surprise flanking attack in this region. For the Germans this would have the advantage of bypassing the Antwerp-[[Namur (city)|Namur]] line. The Zealand Isles were considered to be strategically critical, as they are just opposite the [[Thames]] estuary, so their capture would pose a special menace to the safety of England.

Rapid forces, whether for an offensive or defensive purpose, were needed to deny vital locations to the enemy. Long before the Germans did, the French had contemplated using airborne troops to achieve speedy attacks. As early as 1936 the French had commissioned the design of light airborne tanks, but these plans had been abandoned in 1940, as they possessed no cargo planes large enough to carry them. A naval division and an infantry division were earmarked to depart for Zealand to block the [[Western Scheldt]] against a German crossing. These would send forward forces over the Scheldt estuary into the Isles, supplied by overseas shipping.

French Commander in Chief General Maurice Gamelin feared the Dutch would be tempted into a quick capitulation or even an acceptance of German protection. He therefore reassigned the former French strategic reserve, the 7th Army, to operate in front of Antwerp to cover the river's eastern approaches in order to maintain a connection with the Fortress Holland further to the north and preserve an allied left flank beyond the Rhine. The force assigned to this task consisted of the 16th Army Corps, comprising the 9th Motorised Infantry Division (also possessing some tracked armoured vehicles) and the 4th Infantry Division; and the 1st Army Corps, consisting of the 25th Motorised Infantry Division and the 21st Infantry Division. This army was later reinforced by the 1st Mechanised Light Division, an armoured division of the French Cavalry and a first class powerful unit. Together with the two divisions in Zealand, seven French divisions were dedicated to the operation.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 240">Amersfoort (2005), p. 240</ref>

Although the French troops would have a higher proportion of motorised units than their German adversaries, in view of the respective distances to be covered, they could not hope to reach their assigned sector advancing in battle deployment before the enemy did. Their only prospect of beating the Germans to it lay in employing rail transport. This implied they would be vulnerable in the concentration phase, building up their forces near Breda. They needed the Dutch troops in the Peel-Raam Position to delay the Germans for a few extra days to allow a French deployment and entrenchment, but French rapid forces also would provide a security screen. These consisted of the reconnaissance units of the armoured and motorised divisions, equipped with the relatively well-armed [[Panhard 178]] armoured car. These would be concentrated into two task forces named after their commander: the ''Groupe Beauchesne'' and the ''Groupe Lestoquoi''.

===German strategy and forces===
During the many changes in the operational plans for ''Fall Gelb'' the idea of leaving the Fortress Holland alone, just as the Dutch hoped for, was at times considered.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 128</ref> The first version of 19 October 1939 suggested the possibility of a full occupation if conditions were favourable.<ref>De Jong (1969b), pp. 62–63</ref> In the version of 29 October it was proposed to limit the transgression to a line south of [[Venlo]].<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 65</ref> In the ''Holland-Weisung'' (Holland Directive) of 15 November it was decided to conquer the entire south, but in the north to advance no further than the Grebbe Line, and to occupy the [[Wadden Islands|Frisian Isles]].<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 129">Amersfoort (2005), p. 129</ref> [[Hermann Göring]] insisted on a full conquest as he needed the Dutch airfields against Britain; also he was afraid the Entente might reinforce Fortress Holland after a partial defeat and use the airfields to bomb German cities and troops.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 129"/> Another rationale for complete conquest was that as the fall of France itself could hardly be taken for granted, it was for political reasons seen as desirable to obtain a Dutch capitulation, because a defeat might well bring less hostile governments to power in Britain and France. A swift defeat would also free troops for other front sectors.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 140">Amersfoort (2005), p. 140</ref>

Though it was thus on 17 January 1940<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 283</ref> decided to conquer the whole of the Netherlands, few units could be made available for this task. The main effort of ''Fall Gelb'' would be made in the centre, between [[Namur (city)|Namur]] and [[Sedan, France]]. The attack on central Belgium was only a feint — and the attack on Fortress Holland only a side show of this feint. Although both the [[6th Army (Wehrmacht)|6th]] and [[18th Army (Wehrmacht)|18th Army]] were deployed on the Dutch border, the first, much larger, force would move south of [[Venlo]] to Belgium, leaving just the 18th Army under General [[Georg von Küchler]] to defeat the Dutch main force.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 138</ref> Of all German armies to take part in the operation this was by far the weakest. It contained only four regular infantry divisions (the [[207th Infantry Division (Wehrmacht)|207th]], 227th, 254th and [[256th Infantry Division (Wehrmacht)|256th Infantry]] Division), assisted by three reserve divisions ([[208th Infantry Division (Wehrmacht)|208th]], 225th, and 526th Infantry Division) that would not take part in the fighting. Six of these divisions were "Third Wave" units only raised in August 1939 from territorial ''[[Landwehr]]'' units. They had few professional officers and little fighting experience apart from those who were [[World War I]] veterans. Like the Dutch Army, most soldiers (88%) were insufficiently trained. The seventh division was the 526th Infantry Division, a pure security unit without serious combat training. The German divisions, with a nominal strength of 17,807 men, were fifty percent larger than their Dutch counterparts and possessed twice their effective [[firepower]], but even so the necessary numerical superiority for a successful offensive was simply lacking.

To remedy this, assorted odds and ends were used to reinforce 18th Army. The first of these was the only German cavalry division, aptly named [[1st Cavalry Division (Wehrmacht)|1st ''Kavalleriedivision'']]. The mounted troops of this unit, accompanied by some infantry, were to occupy the weakly defended provinces east of the river IJssel and then try to cross the [[Afsluitdijk]] (Enclosure Dike). A simultaneous landing in Holland near [[Enkhuizen]] was to be attempted, using barges to be captured in the small port of [[Stavoren]].<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 140"/> As both efforts were unlikely to succeed, the mass of regular divisions was reinforced by the ''[[SS-Verfügungstruppe|SS-Verfügungsdivision]]'' (including ''SS-Standarten'' ''Der Führer'', ''Deutschland'' and ''Germania'') and ''[[Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler]]'', which would serve as assault infantry to breach the Dutch fortified positions.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 139">Amersfoort (2005), p. 139</ref> Still this added only 1{{fraction|1|3}} division to the equation.

[[File:SdKfz101.jpg|thumb|[[Panzer I]] tank, now on display in the [[German Tank Museum]], [[Munster, Lower Saxony|Munster]], [[Germany]] (2005).]]
To ensure a victory the Germans resorted to unconventional means. The Germans had trained two airborne/airlanding assault divisions. The first of these, the ''[[German 1st Fallschirmjäger Division|7. Flieger-Division]]'', consisted of paratroopers; the second, the [[22nd Air Landing Division (Wehrmacht)|22nd ''Luftlande-Infanteriedivision'']], of airborne infantry. Initially the plan was that the main German assault was to take place in [[Flanders]], and it was expected these troops would be used for a crossing attempt over the river [[Scheldt]] near [[Ghent]]. This operation was cancelled, so it was decided to use them to obtain an easy victory in the Netherlands.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 142">Amersfoort (2005), p. 142</ref> The airborne troops would on the first day attempt to secure the airfields around the Dutch [[seat of government]], The Hague, and then capture that government, together with the Dutch High Command and Queen Wilhelmina.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 143">Amersfoort (2005), p. 143</ref> German officers actually took lessons on how to address royalty on such occasions. The plan, ''Fall Festung'', had been developed by [[Hitler]] personally, embellishing an earlier idea to let an envoy offer "armed protection of the Dutch neutrality", that is, to become a German [[protectorate]].<ref>De Jong (1969b), pp. 296–297</ref> In the event this did not bring forth the desired immediate collapse, the bridges at [[Rotterdam]], [[Dordrecht]] and [[Moerdijk]] would simultaneously be secured to allow a mechanised force to relieve the airborne troops from the south. This force was to be the [[9th Panzer Division (Wehrmacht)|German 9th Panzer Division]]. This was the only German armoured division having just two tank battalions, one understrength, in its single tank regiment;<ref>Jentz (1998), p. 116</ref> the total number of tanks in the unit was 141.<ref>Jentz (1998), p. 121</ref> The intention was that it should exploit a breach in the Dutch lines created by the 254th and 256th Infantry Division, and join up with them, forming the ''XXVI. Armeekorps'', on the Gennep – [['s-Hertogenbosch]] axis.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 140"/> At the same time an offensive would be staged against the Grebbe Line in the east by the 207th and 227th Infantry Division, united to form ''X. Armeekorps'',<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 139"/> to engage the main bulk of the Dutch Field Army. The expectation was that in spite of the lack of numerical superiority,<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 305</ref> they would force the Dutch back to the east front of the Fortress Holland or beyond. If the Dutch did not capitulate on the first day, the Eighteenth Army expected to enter the Fortress Holland on the third day from the south over the Moerdijk bridges and thereby ensure victory; there was no strict timetable for the total destruction of the Dutch forces.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 142"/> A peculiar aspect of the command structure was that the airborne attack was solely a ''Luftwaffe'' operation; the airborne forces would initially not be under operational command of the German Army. The attack on Rotterdam was ultimately to be an Army operation and considered by it as the ''[[Schwerpunkt]]'' (focal point) of the campaign in the Netherlands;<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 143"/> 18th Army saw the air landings as primarily subservient to the ''XXVI. Armeekorps'' advance.

Of all operations of ''Fall Gelb'' this one most strongly embodied the concept of a ''[[Blitzkrieg]]'' as the term was then understood: a ''Strategischer Überfall'' or strategic assault. Also, like ''Fall Gelb'' as a whole, it involved a high risk strategy.

===The Oster affair===
The German population and troops generally disliked the idea of violating Dutch neutrality. German [[propaganda]] therefore justified the invasion as a reaction to a supposed Entente attempt to occupy the Low Countries, similar to the justification used by the German Empire to invade Belgium in World War I.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 145</ref> Some German officers were averse to the Nazi regime and were also uneasy about the invasion.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 105</ref> One of them, Colonel [[Hans Oster]], an ''[[Abwehr]]'' (German military intelligence) officer, began in March 1939 to pass along information to his friend, the Dutch military attaché in Berlin, Major [[Gijsbertus J. Sas]].<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 106</ref> This information included the attack date of ''Fall Gelb''.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 107</ref> Sas informed the [[Allies of World War II|Allies]] via other military attachés.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 126</ref> However, several postponements while the Germans waited for favourable weather conditions led to a series of false alarms, which left the Dutch government and others somewhat sceptical of the information.<ref>De Jong (1969b), pp. 124–126</ref> Sas' correct prediction of the date of the attack on Denmark and Norway went largely unheeded.<ref>De Jong (1969b), pp. 244–247</ref> Though he indicated a German armoured division would try to attack [[Fortress Holland]] from [[North Brabant]] and that there was a plan to capture the Queen, Dutch defensive strategy was not adapted and it was not understood these were elements of a larger scheme.<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 323</ref> On 4 May Sas again warned that an attack was imminent; this time it coincided with a warning from [[Pope Pius XII]].<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 308</ref> When on the evening of 9 May Oster again phoned his friend saying just "Tomorrow, at dawn", Dutch troops were put on alert.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 103</ref>

Oster was a leading figure of the [[German resistance]] from 1938 to 1943, and was one of those hanged after the [[20 July plot|20 July 1944 bomb plot]] to assassinate Hitler.<ref>Shirer (1960), pp. 1024, 1073</ref>

==Battle==

===10 May===
[[File:Duitse parachutisten landen in Nederland op 10 mei 1940b.jpg|thumb|left|German paratroops dropping into the Netherlands on 10 May 1940]]
[[File:RMSDeltaNorth.jpg|thumb|upright=1.35|right|The geography of the landing areas: at the coast is The Hague; Rotterdam is at ''n'', Waalhaven at ''9'' and Dordrecht at ''7''; ''h'' indicates the Hollands Diep]]
On the morning of 10 May 1940 the Dutch awoke to the sound of [[aircraft engine]]s roaring in the sky. Germany had commenced operation ''Fall Gelb'' and attacked the Netherlands, [[Battle of Belgium|Belgium]], [[Battle of France|France]] and [[German occupation of Luxembourg in World War II#Invasion|Luxembourg]], in the case of the Low Countries without a declaration of war given before hostilities; France was already at war.

In the night the Luftwaffe violated Dutch airspace. One wing, ''[[Kampfgeschwader 4]]'' (KG 4), traversed it and then disappeared to the west, giving the Dutch the illusion that the operation was directed at England. But over the [[North Sea]] it turned to the east again to stage a surprise attack on the Dutch airfields, together with the other wings. Led by ''[[Oberst]]'' (Colonel) [[Martin Fiebig]], KG 4 hit the naval airfield at De Kooy, destroying 35 aircraft, most of them trainers.<ref>Grimm, P. e.a. pp. 21–27</ref> Fiebig himself was shot down and spent five days as a Dutch [[prisoner of war]]. {{Not a typo|KG 4}} also hit Amsterdam-[[Schiphol]], where the Dutch lost a third of their medium bombers, and The Hague airfields where I./KG 4 destroyed half of the 21 defending fighters to assist ''[[Kampfgeschwader 30]]'' (KG 30) and ''[[Kampfgeschwader 54]]'' (KG 54) in attacks upon ports and communications.<ref name="Hooton 1994, p. 241">Hooton 1994, p. 241.</ref> KG 4 lost 11 [[Heinkel He 111]] bombers in total on 10 May and three [[Junkers Ju 88]]s; KG 30 and 54 another nine bombers.<ref>Grimm, P. e.a. pp. 22–27</ref> ''[[Jagdgeschwader 26]]'' (JG 26) and ''[[Zerstörergeschwader 26]]'' (ZG 26) shot down 25 Dutch aircraft in aerial combat for a loss of nine fighters, with [[Albert Kesselring]]'s ''[[Luftflotte 2]]'' in total claiming 41. The Dutch were left with just 70 aircraft by the end of the day. They claimed most of the German aircraft destroyed on 10 May. Spread out over Dutch territory, they continued to engage the ''Luftwaffe'' where possible, claiming 13 victories over German fighter aircraft by 14 May.<ref name="Hooton 1994, p. 241"/>

Immediately after the bombardments, between 04:30 and 05:00 local time, paratroopers were landed near the airfields. Dutch [[anti-aircraft warfare|anti-aircraft batteries]] shot down numerous [[Ju-52|Ju 52]] [[transport plane]]s of the Luftwaffe's ''Transportgruppen''. German Ju 52 losses in the entire battle amounted to about 250, representing 50% of the fleet's strength.{{cn|date=December 2017}}

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 141-0460, Rotterdam, Brennende Ju 52.jpg|left|thumb|Burning German [[Junkers Ju 52]]s at Ypenburg]]
The [[Battle for The Hague|attack on The Hague]] ended in operational failure. The paratroopers were unable to capture the main airfield at [[Leidschenveen-Ypenburg|Ypenburg]] in time for the airborne infantry to land safely in their Junkers. Though one armoured car had been damaged by a bomb, the other five Landsverks, assisted by machine gun emplacements, destroyed the eighteen Junkers of the first two waves, killing many occupants.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 192</ref> When the airstrip was blocked by wrecks the remaining waves aborted the landing and tried to find alternatives, often putting down their teams in meadows or on the beach, thus dispersing the troops. The small auxiliary airfield of [[Ockenburg]] was only lightly defended, and fell at once to German attack. The airfield of [[Valkenburg (South Holland)|Valkenburg]] was likewise quickly occupied, the morale of the defenders shaken by the bombardment. However, the landing strip was still under construction and the ground water level had not yet been lowered: planes landing there sank away in the soft soil. None of the airfields were thus capable of receiving substantial reinforcements. In the end the paratroopers occupied Ypenburg but failed to advance into The Hague, their route blocked by hastily assembled Dutch troops. Early in the afternoon they were dispersed by fire from three Dutch artillery batteries.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 197</ref> Dutch batteries likewise drove away the German occupants from the other two fields, the remnant airborne troops taking refuge in nearby villages and mansions.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 199</ref>
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 141-1308, Flugplatz Waalhaven, zerstörte Ju 52.jpg|right|thumb|German losses on [[Waalhaven]] airfield were limited]]
The [[Battle of Rotterdam|attack on Rotterdam]] was much more successful. Twelve [[Heinkel He 59]] [[seaplane]]s, crowded with two platoons of troops, landed in the heart of the city and unloaded assault teams that captured the [[Willemsbrug]], a [[bridge]] over the [[Nieuwe Maas]], to form a bridgehead.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 341</ref> At the same time the military airfield of [[Waalhaven]], positioned south of the city on the island of [[IJsselmonde (island)|IJsselmonde]], was attacked by airborne forces.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 340</ref> Here an infantry battalion was stationed, but so close to the airfield that the paratroopers landed near its positions. A confused fight followed. The first wave of Junkers suffered no losses and the transports continued to land. In the end the Dutch defenders were overwhelmed. The German troops, steadily growing in numbers, began to move to the east to occupy IJsselmonde and eventually made contact with the paratroopers tasked with occupying the vital bridge at Dordrecht. Although the [[Royal Netherlands Navy]] intervened—the [[torpedo boat]]s ''Z5'' and ''TM 51'' attacked the ''Willemsbrug'' and later the [[destroyer]] [[Admiralen class destroyer|HNLMS ''Van Galen'']] sailed up the [[Nieuwe Waterweg]] to bombard the airfield at short range—this only resulted in the ''Van Galen'' foundering after being bombed. A plan to commit the [[gunboat]]s [[Flores class sloops|HNLMS ''Flores'']] and [[HNLMS Johan Maurits van Nassau|HNLMS ''Johan Maurits van Nassau'']] was therefore abandoned.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 363">Amersfoort (2005), p. 363</ref> At the [[Island of Dordrecht]] the Dordrecht bridge was captured but in the city itself the garrison held out.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 338</ref> The long [[Moerdijk bridges]] over the broad [[Hollands Diep]] estuary connecting the island to North Brabant province were captured and a bridgehead fortified on the southern side.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 336</ref>

[[File:Rotterdam May 1940 1.svg|left|thumb|German landings in Rotterdam]] The Germans, executing a plan approved by Hitler,<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 201</ref> tried to capture the IJssel and Maas bridges intact, using commando teams of ''[[Brandenburgers]]'' that began to infiltrate over the Dutch border ahead of the main advance, with some troops arriving on the evening of 9 May. During the night of 10 May they approached the bridges: several teams had a few men dressed as Dutch military police pretending to bring in a group of German prisoners, to fool the Dutch detonation teams. Some of these "military policemen" were real Dutchmen, members of the ''[[Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging]]'', the Dutch Nazi party.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 214</ref> Most of these attempts failed and the bridges were blown, on two occasions with ''Brandenburgers'' and all. The main exception was the [[Gennep]] railway bridge.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 215</ref> Immediately an [[armoured train]] crossed it followed by a troop train, both driving right through the Peel-Raam Position at [[Mill, Netherlands|Mill]] and unloading an infantry battalion behind the defence line.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 220</ref>

The Dutch released reports of German soldiers in disguise to the international news agencies. This caused a [[fifth column]] scare, especially in Belgium and France. However, unlike the situation later on in those two countries, in the Netherlands there was no mass exodus of civilian refugees, clogging the roads. Generally German soldiers behaved in a civilised manner towards the Dutch population, forming neat queues at the shops to buy goods rationed in Germany, such as [[chocolate]].

After the generally failed assaults on the bridges, the German divisions began crossing attempts over the rivers IJssel and Maas. The first waves typically were destroyed, due to insufficient preparatory fire on the pillboxes.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 218</ref> At most places a secondary bombardment destroyed the pillboxes and the infantry divisions crossed the river after building pontoon bridges; but at some, as Venlo, the attempt was aborted. At [[Arnhem]], ''Leibstandarte Der Fuehrer'' led the assault and that day advanced to the Grebbe Line, followed by ''207. Infanteriedivision''.

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1981-064-18A, Westfeldzug, Übergang über die Maas.jpg|right|thumb|Despite the destruction of the ''Wilhelminabrug'' and the ''Sint Servaasbrug'' (pictured) German troops passed Maastricht, a vital traffic hub, relatively quickly. Photo taken 10 May 1940 in Maastricht]]
Even before the armoured train arrived, 3rd Army Corps had already been planned to be withdrawn from behind the Peel-Raam Position, taking with it all the artillery apart from 36 ''8 Staal'' pieces. Each of its six regiments was to leave a battalion behind to serve as a covering force, together with fourteen "border battalions". The group was called the "Peel Division".<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 213</ref> This withdrawal was originally planned for the first night after the invasion, under cover of darkness, but due to the rapid German advance an immediate retreat was ordered at 06:45, to avoid 3rd Army Corps becoming entangled with enemy troops.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 153</ref> The corps joined "Brigade G",<ref>De Jong (1969b), p. 358</ref> six battalions already occupying the Waal-Linge line, and was thus brought up to strength again. It would see no further fighting.

The Light Division, based at [[Vught]], was the only manoeuvre force the Dutch Army possessed. Its planned withdrawal had been similarly executed a day early. Its regiments had biked over the Maas and Waal bridges and then turned left through the [[Alblasserwaard]] when it was decided in the afternoon to let it counterattack the German airborne landing on IJsselmonde. It reached the [[Noord (river)|Noord]], the river separating the Alblasserwaard from IJsselmonde, in the evening.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 348</ref> There they discovered that the sector near the only bridge, built in 1939, was not strongly occupied by the airborne troops, as the Germans simply had not known of its existence because of outdated maps. It was decided to postpone a crossing until the next day, to gather sufficient forces. No attempt was made to establish a bridgehead.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 349</ref>

Meanwhile, on the evening of the 10th, around 22:00, French reconnaissance elements using [[Panhard 178]] [[Armored car (military)|armoured cars]] had started to arrive at the Dutch border, forming a vanguard for the [[French 1st Light Mechanized Division|French 1st Mechanised Light Division]]. This division operated, with the 25e DIM on its left, on the northern flank of the [[French 7th Army]]; its mission was to ensure contact between the ''Vesting Holland'' and Antwerp.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 230</ref> Attempts to co-ordinate the French advance with Colonel [[Leonard Johannes Schmidt]], the military commander of the Dutch troops on [[Noord-Brabant]], were largely unsuccessful as, apart from the fact he could not be reached that day, Dutch defences there were already collapsing. At Mill, ''256. Infanteriedivision'' at first could not exploit the opportunity offered by having a battalion in the back of the defenders because it failed to locate it. When a first attack by forward elements had been repulsed, a full assault at the Main Defense Line was initially postponed to the next day because most artillery had not yet passed the single pontoon bridge over the Meuse, which had caused a traffic jam after having been damaged by an incident. In the early evening in a sudden change of plans it was decided to attack even though artillery support was absent apart from one 105 mm battery. An unrequested Stuka attack that also happened to hit the Mill sector just prior to the advance routed some Dutch defenders, creating a weak section in the line from which the Dutch troops were dislodged.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 226</ref> Though the Germans were slow to exploit the breakthrough, Colonel Schmidt at 20:30 ordered the Peel-Raam Position to be abandoned and his troops to fall back to the west improvising a new line at the [[Zuid-Willemsvaart]] canal.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 227</ref>

In the North, by the end of the day, ''1. Kavalleriedivision'' had reached the line [[Meppel]]–[[Groningen (city)|Groningen]], delayed by logistical problems and Dutch demolition teams blowing up 236 bridges. Dutch troop strength in that area was weak.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), pp. 316–320</ref>

In the extreme south, the six border battalions in the province of [[Limburg (Netherlands)|Limburg]] only slightly delayed the advance of the German Sixth Army; before noon the area had been overrun and the strategic city of [[Maastricht]] had surrendered, opening the way for the German feint offensive into Central Belgium. The Germans however, failed to capture the main bridge intact, forcing them to delay the crossing by the 4th Panzer Division until the next day.

===11 May===
On 11 May the Dutch commander General Winkelman was faced with two priorities. First of all he wanted to eliminate the German airborne troops. Though the strategic assault had failed, he feared a further enemy build-up via Waalhaven and saw the German possession of the Moerdijk bridges as a serious impediment to the movement of allied reinforcements to the Fortress Holland.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 162</ref> The second priority was closely related to the first: enabling the French army to build up a strong defensive line in North Brabant, to connect the Fortress Holland with the Allied main force in Belgium.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 165</ref> As he had withdrawn most of his troops from the area, Winkelman had only limited means available to influence this process, largely leaving the task to local commanders.

In both respects, little was achieved this day. The planned counterattack by the Light Division against the airborne troops on IJsselmonde failed. In the nick of time the bridge over the river Noord had been prepared for defence by the German paratroopers, and it proved impossible to force it. Several attempts to cross the river by boat managed only to establish a few isolated bridgeheads,<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 350</ref> and at 10:15 the Light Division was given permission to break off the crossing at this point and ordered to shift its axis of attack by reinforcing Dutch troops on the Island of Dordrecht,<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 351</ref> where it arrived that night. After clearing the Island of Dordrecht of enemy troops the division was to advance into IJsselmonde over the Dordrecht bridge in order to reach Rotterdam.

Earlier during the day, two attempts were made by Dutch battalions to carry out an attack against the western flank of the German perimeter. The first battalion, withdrawn from the Belgian border, partly crossed the [[Oude Maas]] at two points ([[Oud-Beijerland]] and [[Puttershoek]]) and tried to storm the bridge at [[Barendrecht]] into IJsselmonde;<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 345</ref> the second battalion, taken from the Fortress Holland forces positioned at the [[Hoekse Waard]], had crossed the [[Dordtse Kil]] to the Island of Dordrecht the previous day, using the ferry at [[Wieldrecht]], and now tried to expand its bridgehead.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 346</ref> Although its crossings were successful, the advance of the first battalion was executed only hesitantly; the troops were surprised by German counterattacks and dispersed. The second battalion was likewise surprised, with many men being taken prisoner.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 347</ref> In the afternoon a French reconnaissance unit, the ''5e Groupe de Reconnaissance de Division d'Infanterie'', with the assistance of another Dutch border battalion attempted an attack on the southern Moerdijk bridgehead, but the armoured cars of ''6e Cuirassiers'' with which it was reinforced were heavily bombed by German Stukas and had to retreat.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 344</ref>

[[File:General der Fallschirmjäger Kurt Student.jpg|thumb|left|General der Fallschirmjäger [[Kurt Student]]]]
In Rotterdam, though reinforced by an infantry regiment, the Dutch failed to completely dislodge the German airborne troops from their bridgehead on the northern bank of the Maas.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 363"/> Despite permission from General [[Kurt Student]], the German commander in Rotterdam refused to evacuate this bridgehead and the few German defenders held fast in a single office building, protected by a canal in front of them and covered by fire from the south bank. The two remaining Dutch bombers failed to destroy the ''Willemsbrug''. The German forces involved in the attack of the previous day on The Hague also held out, none of the attempts to eliminate the isolated groups of in total about 1600 paratroopers and airlanded forces met with success.

In North Brabant, the situation swiftly deteriorated. The French commanders of the 7th Army had expected that Dutch resistance at the Meuse and the Peel-Raam Position, by a force about five divisions strong, would have gained them at least four days to build up a defensive line near Breda. They were unpleasantly surprised to learn that the best three divisions had been moved to the north and that the remaining forces were already in full retreat.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 235">Amersfoort (2005), p. 235</ref> The withdrawal of the Peel Division from the Peel-Raam Position to the [[Zuid-Willemsvaart]], a canal some {{convert|10|to|30|km|mi}} to the west, meant leaving behind their well-entrenched positions and the little artillery available in exchange for a totally unprepared line. Moreover, the eastern bank of the canal was higher than the western bank, providing excellent cover for the attackers. Finally, the order to withdraw never reached the troops at Mill; this caused one sector of the canal, near [[Heeswijk]], to be left undefended;<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 229</ref> as this sector contained a bridge which was not demolished, the Germans were effortlessly able to cross the canal around 13:00. A second crossing at [[Erp, Netherlands|Erp]], against opposition, led to a general collapse of the line.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 231</ref> By the end of the 11th, the Germans had crossed the Zuid-Willemsvaart at most places and the Peel Division had largely disintegrated.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 235"/> Plans by Colonel Schmidt to concentrate his forces on the line [[Tilburg]]-[['s-Hertogenbosch]] thus came to nothing. As the French refused to advance further to the northeast than Tilburg, apart from some reconnoitring armoured cars that went as far as [[Berlicum]], this created a dangerous gap. Winkelman, sensitive to the general Dutch weakness in the region, requested the British government to send an Army Corps to reinforce allied positions in the area and bomb Waalhaven airfield.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 164</ref>

All the efforts in the south were made on the assumption the Grebbe Line would be able to beat off attacks on its own; its reserves had even been partly shifted to the counterattack against the airborne forces. However, there were some indications that a problem was developing in this sector. Motorised elements of ''SS Standarte "Der Fuehrer"'', preceding ''207. Infanteriedivision'', had reached the southernmost part of the Grebbe Line, in front of the ''Grebbeberg'', on the evening of the 10th.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 266</ref> This Main Defense Line sector had no inundations in front of it and had therefore been chosen as the main attack axis of the division. It was protected by a line of outposts (''voorpostenlinie''), manned by two companies of infantry.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 267</ref> At about half past three in the morning of the 11th, German artillery started shelling the outposts, followed at dawn by an attack by two battalions of ''Der Fuehrer''. As the German shelling had cut the telephone lines, no artillery support could be requested by the Dutch defenders. Defence was further hampered by the fact that the terrain had not yet been cleared of vegetation, which offered good cover for the attackers.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 269</ref> At noon a breakthrough was accomplished at the extreme north of the outpost line and the Dutch positions were then slowly rolled up from behind.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 272</ref> The outnumbered and inferiorly armed companies resisted as well as they could, but by evening, all outposts were in German hands.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 275</ref> The commander of 2nd Army Corps, Major-General [[Jacob Harberts]], failed to react adequately. He did not realise that motorised SS troops had been involved in the attack, and thought that the outposts had been surrendered to a small probing German force through the cowardice of the defenders.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 276</ref> He ordered a night counterattack by the single reserve battalion of 4th Division.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 278</ref> This attack was abandoned; on its approach the battalion was fired upon by Dutch troops manning the main line who had not been notified of its approach, leading to much confusion, and an engineer bridge necessary to cross the Grift rivulet was not brought forward in time. However, heavy preparatory Dutch artillery fire had the unintended effect of causing the Germans to abandon their plans for a night attack.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 279</ref>

Meanwhile, in the North, ''1. Kavalleriedivision'' advanced through the province of [[Friesland]] towards the final Dutch fall-back line, the ''Wonsstelling'', reaching [[Sneek]] in the evening. Most Dutch troops had been evacuated from the north over the [[Afsluitdijk]].<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 320">Amersfoort (2005), p. 320</ref>

===12 May===
{{see also|Battle of the Grebbeberg}}
On the morning of 12 May General Winkelman remained moderately optimistic.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 168</ref> He still assumed a firm defence line could eventually be established in North Brabant with the help of the French and expected good progress could be made in eliminating the airborne forces, while not being aware of any special danger to the Grebbe Line. During the day his hopes would be dashed.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), pp. 171–172</ref>

In the two previous days, ''9. Panzerdivision'' had seen little action. It crossed the Meuse early on the morning of 11 May, but that day was unable to advance quickly over roads congested with the supply trains of the infantry divisions. The armoured division was under orders to link up with the airborne troops as soon as the Peel-Raam Position had been breached by the infantry forces. As the entire Dutch front had dissolved, the conditions were favourable for such an attempt. In this it would not be hindered by the French forces. Because the German 6th Army was threatening its right flank and there was no time to prepare a defence line, Gamelin ordered the 7th Army to withdraw its left flank. ''2e Brigade Légère Mécanique'', part of ''[[1st Light Mechanized Division (France)|1e Division Légère Mécanique]]'', which had arrived at Tilburg, retreated to the south. Also, the ''25e Division d'Infanterie Motorisée'' at Breda progressed no further to the north than the river [[Mark (Dintel)|Mark]]. As the initial order to occupy the [[Geertruidenberg]] sector had not been followed upon, the route to the Moerdijk bridges would not be blocked and the German armoured division would not be engaged by its stronger French mechanised counterpart. Reconnaissance elements of the 9th Panzer Division effectively exploited this opportunity: at dawn, north of Tilburg, near [[Loon op Zand]], they surprised Colonel Schmidt and took him prisoner. Dutch troops in the province thereby lost all unified command.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 237</ref> Shortly after noon German armoured cars had penetrated thirty kilometres further to the west and made contact with the southern Moerdijk bridgehead, cutting off Fortress Holland from the Allied main force; at 16:45 they reached the bridges themselves.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 238">Amersfoort (2005), p. 238</ref> The northern part of that force would not long remain in the region: at 13:35 Gamelin ordered a complete withdrawal to Antwerp of all French troops in North-Brabant, who would now limit themselves to rear-guard actions.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 243</ref>

The Light Division tried to systematically reconquer the Island of Dordrecht by advancing on a broad front, using four battalions with little artillery support.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 352</ref> On its left flank, where there was almost no enemy presence, the advance went according to plan. The battalion on the right flank however, ran into an attacking German force of battalion strength that had been ordered by General Student to circle around the outskirts of the city to relieve the pressure being placed on his troops holding the Dort bridges.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 353</ref> In confused street fighting the German troops were successful in blocking the battalion; the other Dutch units then halted their advance around noon. Though higher command soon ordered a better concentration of forces instead of some mopping-up action, due to a lack of clear lines of command, no subsequent attack materialised that day.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 355</ref>

In Rotterdam and around The Hague again little was done against the paratroopers. Most Dutch commanders, still afraid of a presumed Fifth Column, limited themselves to security measures;<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 364">Amersfoort (2005), p. 364</ref> they had been ordered not to stage any attacks above company level.
[[File:Grebbeberg the Netherlands.jpg|right|thumb|upright=1.35| The ''Grebbeberg'' seen from the south; the slopes facing the attackers in the east were more gradual (2005)]]
While the situation in the south was becoming critical, in the east the Germans made a first successful effort in dislodging the Dutch defenders on the ''Grebbeberg''. After preparatory artillery bombardment in the morning, at around noon a battalion of ''Der Fuehrer'' attacked an eight hundred metres wide sector of the main line, occupied by a Dutch company.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 281</ref> Exploiting the many dead angles in the Dutch field of fire, it soon breached the Dutch positions, which had little depth.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 282">Amersfoort (2005), p. 282</ref> A second German battalion then expanded the breach to the north. Dutch artillery, though equal in strength to the German, failed to bring sufficient fire on the enemy concentration of infantry, largely limiting itself to interdiction. Eight hundred metres to the west was a Stop Line, a continuous trench system from which the defenders were supposed to wage an active defence, staging local counterattacks. However, due to a lack of numbers, training, and heavy weapons the attacks failed against the well-trained SS troops. By the evening the Germans had brought the heavily forested area between the two lines under their control.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 284</ref> Spotting a weak point, one of the SS battalion commanders, [[Obersturmbannführer]] [[Hilmar Wäckerle]], suddenly attacked with a hastily assembled force of about company strength. In a, for this battle, rare instance of [[infiltration tactics]] he broke through the Stop Line, quickly advancing {{convert|1|mi|km|order=flip|abbr=on}} to the west until being halted by a fall-back line along the [[Rhenen]] railroad. The breakthrough caused a panic among the defenders, who largely abandoned the Stop Line at this point; but as Wäckerle had had no time to co-ordinate his action with other units, it was not further exploited. Order was restored at the Stop Line and the SS company became isolated and surrounded.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 285</ref> The earlier general German advance later caused the main line to be abandoned for over {{convert|2|mi|km|order=flip|abbr=on}} to the north because the troops there feared an attack from behind.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 282"/>

It had been well understood by the Dutch that the forces occupying the Grebbe Line would not be sufficiently strong to repel all attacks by themselves; they were intended to delay an offensive long enough for reserves to reinforce them. Due to the failure the previous day to understand that the German main assault was imminent, these reserves would not arrive in time to intervene in the fight at the defence zone between the two trench systems. This was all the more serious as the Stop Line had no depth and lacked large shelters to accommodate enough troops to stage a strong frontal counterattack. In the late evening it was decided to execute a flank attack from the north the next day.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 290">Amersfoort (2005), p. 290</ref>

In the North, the Wons Position formed a bridgehead at the eastern end of the Enclosure Dike; it had a long perimeter of about nine kilometres to envelop enough land to receive a large number of retreating troops without making them too vulnerable to air attack.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 320"/> On 12 May units with a combined strength of only two battalions were still present, so the line was weakly held. This was exploited by the first German unit to arrive, the single bicycle battalion of ''1. Kavalleriedivision''. At noon it quickly penetrated the line in a concentrated attack, forcing the defenders to withdraw to the Enclosure Dike. For some the German advance cut off their escape route by land; they sailed away from the small port of [[Makkum, Wûnseradiel|Makkum]], taking the last remaining vessels on the eastern side of Lake IJssel. This denied the Germans any craft for a crossing attempt, which plan was now abandoned.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 324">Amersfoort (2005), p. 324</ref>
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 141-1117, Rotterdam, ausgebrannte Öltanks.jpg|left|thumb|upright=1.35|Burnt-out [[Shell Oil]] reservoirs]]
In the afternoon General Winkelman received information about armoured forces advancing in the [[Langstraat]] region, on the road between 's-Hertogenbosch and the Moerdijk bridges. He still fostered hopes that those forces were French, but the announcement by Radio [[Bremen]] at 23:00 that German tanks had linked up with the paratroopers ended those hopes.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 170</ref> At last he began to understand the essence of the German strategy. He ordered the artillery batteries in the Hoekse Waard to try to destroy the Moerdijk bridges and sent a special engineering team to Rotterdam to blow up the ''Willemsbrug''. Pessimistic about the general situation at this point, he also ordered the vast strategic oil reserves of [[Royal Dutch Shell]] at [[Pernis, Netherlands|Pernis]] to be set on fire.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 172">Amersfoort (2005), p. 172</ref> Having been informed by Winkelman of his concerns earlier in the afternoon, the Dutch government asked [[Winston Churchill]] for three British divisions to turn the tide. The new prime minister answered that he simply did not have any reserves; however, three British torpedo boats were sent to Lake IJssel.<ref>De Jong (1970) p. 272</ref> Also, 2nd Welsh Guard battalion was prepared to be sent to [[Hook of Holland]] though it would not arrive in time.

Contrary to Winkelman, the German command was very satisfied with the day's events. It had been feared that the third day of the operation might become a "crisis day", the XXVI ''Armeekorps'' having to overcome near Breda the resistance of several French divisions. The Germans had also been concerned that they may face some Belgian or even British divisions. Therefore, von Bock had before the invasion requested to be reinforced in this effort by another Army Corps.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 141</ref> When this had been denied by chief of staff [[Franz Halder]], he had arranged the formation of an extra Army Corps headquarters to direct the complex strategic situation of simultaneously fighting the Allies and advancing into the Fortress Holland over the Moerdijk bridges.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 142"/> As on 12 May no actual crisis seemed to materialise, with the French retreating and Belgian and British forces being completely absent, von Bock decided that XXVI ''Armeekorps'' would be responsible for pursuing the French south towards Antwerp, while some forces would be directed by the new headquarters, ''Generalkommando XXXIX'' under command of ''Generalleutnant'' [[Rudolf Schmidt]], to advance north with ''254. Infanteriedivision'', most of ''9. Panzerdivision'', and ''SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler''.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 167</ref>

===13 May===
[[File:HMS Codrington.jpg|thumb|right|HMS ''Codrington'', which evacuated many members of the Dutch Royal family from the Netherlands]]
In the early morning of 13 May General Winkelman advised the Dutch government that he considered the general situation to be critical. On land the Dutch had been cut off from the Allied front and it had become clear no major Allied landings were to be expected to reinforce the Fortress Holland by sea; without such support there was no prospect of a prolonged successful resistance. German tanks might quickly pass through Rotterdam; Winkelman had already ordered all available antitank-guns to be placed in a perimeter around The Hague, to protect the seat of government. However, an immediate collapse of the Dutch defences might still be prevented if the planned counterattacks could seal off the southern front near Dordrecht and restore the eastern line at the Grebbeberg. Therefore, the cabinet decided to continue the fight for the time being,<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 176</ref> giving the general the mandate to surrender the Army when he saw fit and the instruction to avoid unnecessary sacrifices. Nevertheless, it was also deemed essential that Queen Wilhelmina was to be brought to safety; she departed around noon from [[Hoek van Holland]], where a British [[Irish Guards]] battalion was present,<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 225</ref> on [[HMS Hereward|HMS ''Hereward'']], a British destroyer, and when [[sea mine]]s made it too dangerous to try to reach Zealand, she went to England.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 175</ref> The previous evening, the Queen's only child and [[heir presumptive]] [[Juliana of the Netherlands|Princess Juliana]], together with her husband [[Prince Bernhard of Lippe-Biesterfeld]] and their children, had departed from [[IJmuiden]] on [[HMS Codrington|HMS ''Codrington'']] for [[Harwich]]. Arrangements for the departure had already been made before the invasion.<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 264</ref> As the Queen constitutionally was part of the government, her departure confronted the cabinet with the choice whether to follow her or remain. After heated discussions it was decided to leave also: the ministers sailed at 19:20 from Hoek van Holland on [[HMS Windsor|HMS ''Windsor'']] to form a [[government in exile]] in London, having conferred all governmental authority over the homeland to Winkelman.<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 288</ref> Three Dutch merchant ships, escorted by British warships, transferred government [[bullion]] and diamond stocks to the United Kingdom.<ref>[http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pdfs/small/cab-66-7-wp-40-158-38.pdf The National Archives – War Cabinet Weekly Résumé (No. 37) of the Naval, Military and Air Situation]</ref>

While two tank companies of ''9. Panzerdivision'' remained with XXVI ''Armeekorps'' to pursue the withdrawing French, the other four began to cross the Moerdijk traffic bridge at 05:20.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 172"/> Two staff companies with tanks also went to the northern side. The Dutch made some attempts to indirectly block the advance of the German armour. At around 06:00 the last operational medium bomber, a Fokker T. V, dropped two bombs on the bridge; one hit a bridge pillar but failed to explode; the bomber was shot down. Dutch batteries in the [[Hoekse Waard]], despite dive bomber attacks, tried to destroy the bridge by artillery fire, but the massive structure was only slightly damaged.<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 300</ref> Attempts to inundate the Island of Dordrecht failed, as the inlet sluices could not be opened—and were too small anyway.<ref name="De Jong 1970, p. 301">De Jong (1970), p. 301</ref>

The Light Division tried to cut the German corridor by advancing to the west and linking up with a small ferry bridgehead over the [[Dortse Kil]]. However, two of the four battalions available were inefficiently deployed in a failed effort to recapture the suburbs of Dordrecht;<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 358</ref> when the other two battalions approached the main road, they were met head on by a few dozen German tanks. The vanguard of the Dutch troops, not having been informed of their presence, mistook the red air recognition cloths strapped on top of the German armour for orange flags French vehicles might use to indicate their friendly intentions—orange being seen by the Dutch as their national colour—and ran towards the vehicles to welcome them, only understanding their error when they were gunned down. The battalions, subsequently hit by a Stuka bombardment, fled to the east; a catastrophe was prevented by 47mm and 75 mm batteries halting with direct AP fire the assault of the German tanks. The left wing of the Light Division despite the heavy losses then completed an ordered withdrawal to the [[Alblasserwaard]] at around 13:00.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 359</ref> In the early afternoon eight tanks reduced the ferry bridgehead. A tank company also tried to capture the old inner city of Dordrecht without infantry support, audaciously breaching barricades, but was ordered to retreat after heavy street fighting<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 360</ref> in which at least two [[Panzerkampfwagen II]]s were destroyed and three tanks heavily damaged. All Dutch troops were withdrawn from the island in the night.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 361</ref>

German armoured forces advanced north over the Dordrecht bridge to [[IJsselmonde (island)|IJsselmonde]] island. Three tanks, two PzKpfw. IIs and a [[Panzerkampfwagen III]] of the staff platoon of the 1st Tank Battalion, stormed the Barendrecht bridge into the Hoekse Waard, but all of them were lost to a single 47 mm antitank-gun. Though the Germans did not follow up their attack, this area too was abandoned by the Dutch troops.<ref name="De Jong 1970, p. 301"/>

[[File:Willemsbrug 1878.jpg|left|upright=1.35|thumb|The Willemsbrug shortly after its opening in 1878, as seen from Noordereiland. A new bridge was completed nearby in 1981, and this one was demolished.]]
In Rotterdam a last attempt was made to blow up the Willemsbrug. The commander of the 2nd Battalion Irish Guards in Hoek van Holland, {{convert|20|mi|km|order=flip|abbr=on}} to the west, refused to participate in the attempt as being outside the scope of his orders.<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 302</ref> Two Dutch companies, mainly composed of [[Dutch Marine Corps|Dutch marines]], stormed the bridgehead.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 364"/> The bridge was reached and the remaining fifty German defenders in the building in front of it were on the point of surrender when after hours of fighting the attack was abandoned because of heavy flanking fire from the other side of the river.<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 303</ref>

In the North, the commander of ''1. Kavalleriedivision'', Major General [[Kurt Feldt]], faced the unenviable task of having to advance over the Enclosure Dike because of a lack of ships.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 324"/> This dam was blocked by the Kornwerderzand Position, which protected a major sluice complex regulating the water level of Lake IJssel, which had to be sufficiently high to allow many Fortress Holland inundations to be maintained. The main fortifications contained 47 mm antitank-guns. Long channel piers projected in front of and behind the sluices, on both the right and left; on these, pillboxes had been built which could place a heavy enfilading fire on the dam, which did not provide the slightest cover for any attacker.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), pp. 324–325</ref> On 13 May the position was reinforced by a 20 mm anti aircraft battery.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 326">Amersfoort (2005), p. 326</ref> It had been Feldt's intention to first destroy the position by a battery of siege mortars, but the train transporting it had been blocked on 10 May by a blown railway bridge at [[Winschoten]]. Several air attacks on 13 May had little effect;<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 326"/> in the late afternoon five bicycle sections tried to approach the main bunker complex under cover of an artillery bombardment, but soon fled after being fired upon; the first was pinned down and could only retreat under cover of darkness, leaving behind some dead.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 327</ref>

In the East the Germans tried to overcome the resistance in the Grebbe Line by also deploying the other division of X [[Armeekorps]], the ''227. Infanteriedivision''. It was ordered to break through a second attack axis near Scherpenzeel, where a dry approach route had been discovered through the inundations.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 300</ref> The line in this area was defended by the Dutch 2nd Infantry Division. Two German regiments were to attack simultaneously, in adjacent sectors.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 301</ref> However, after the regiment on the right, ''366. Infanterieregiment'', reached the start position for the attack, the regiment on the left, ''412. Infanterieregiment'', became delayed by flanking fire from the Dutch outpost line, the position of which had not been correctly determined. It allowed itself to get involved in fragmented firefights, and although the reserve regiment was also eventually brought forward, little progress was made against the outposts. Meanwhile, the waiting ''366. Infanterieregiment'' was pounded by concentrated Dutch artillery fire and had to withdraw, resulting in a complete failure of the attack by ''227. Infanteriedivision''.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 304</ref>

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-1987-1210-502, Polen, Stukas.jpg|thumb|Junkers Ju 87 Bs.]]
On the extreme south of the Grebbe Line, the Grebbeberg, the Germans were now deploying three SS battalions including support troops and three fresh infantry battalions of IR.322; two of IR.374 laid in immediate reserve. During the evening and night of 12–13 May the Dutch had assembled in this sector about a dozen<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 308</ref> battalions. These forces consisted of the reserve battalions of several army corps, divisions and brigades, and the independent Brigade B, which had been freed when the Main Defence Line in the [[Land van Maas en Waal]] had been abandoned as part of the withdrawal of III Army Corps from North Brabant. However, not all of these units would be concentrated into a single effort for a counterattack to retake the main line. Some battalions had been fed immediately into the battle at the Stop Line and others were kept in reserve, mainly behind the fall-back line near the Rhenen railroad. Furthermore, most battalions were a quarter below strength. Four were to be used, under command of Brigade B, for the flanking attack from the north.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 290"/> This attack was delayed for several hours; when it finally started late in the morning of 13 May, it ran right into a comparable advance by two battalions of ''Der Fuehrer''. This brigade, unaware of Dutch intentions, had shifted its attack axis to the north to roll up the Grebbe Line from behind.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 291</ref> A confused [[meeting engagement|encounter battle]] followed in which the vanguard of the Dutch troops, poorly supported by their artillery, began to give way at around 12:30 to the encroaching SS troops. Soon this resulted in a general withdrawal of the brigade, which turned into a rout when, at about 13:30, the Grebbeberg area was bombed by 27 [[Junkers Ju 87|Ju 87 Stukas]].<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 294</ref>

Meanwhile, ''207. Infanteriedivision'' was for the first time committed to battle at the Grebbeberg itself when two battalions of its ''322. Infanterieregiment'' attacked the Stop Line. The first wave of German attackers was beaten back with serious losses, but a second wave managed to fragment the trench line, which then was taken after heavy fighting.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 295</ref> The regiment subsequently proceeded to mop up the area to the west, delayed by resistance from several Dutch command posts.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 296</ref> It withdrew in the late afternoon, just as the SS battalions further north, to avoid a preparatory artillery bombardment, shifted to a more western position. After redeployment the Germans intended to renew their attack in order to take the Rhenen fall-back line and the village of [[Achterberg]]. However, these preparations would prove to be superfluous: the Dutch had already disappeared.

The same Stuka bombardment that had put Brigade B to rout also broke the morale of the reserves at Rhenen. In the morning these troops had already shown severe discipline problems, with units disintegrating and leaving the battlefield because of German interdiction fire.<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 311</ref> In the late afternoon most of 4th Infantry Division was fleeing westwards.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 299</ref> The Germans had expected that the Dutch would attempt to plug any gaps in the line<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 173</ref> and indeed it had been planned to shift to the north two regiments of the Dutch 3rd Army Corps for this purpose.<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 323</ref> But Dutch command now suffered such a loss of control that any thoughts to re-establish a continuous front had to be abandoned. A {{convert|8|km|abbr=on}} wide gap had appeared in the defences. Fearing that otherwise they would be encircled, at 20:30 Van Voorst tot Voorst ordered the three Army Corps to immediately abandon both the Grebbe Line and the Waal-Linge Position and to retreat during the night to the East Front of Fortress Holland at the New Holland Water Line.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 305</ref> The Germans, however, did not at once exploit their success; only around 21:00 had it become apparent to them that the gap even existed, when the renewed advance had met no enemy resistance.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 307</ref>

===14 May===
[[File:Duitse inval.png|upright=1.35|right|thumb|Dutch situation just before the [[Rotterdam Blitz]].
'''Legend:'''
{{legend|#0000ff|Location of the Dutch defence lines and area within Dutch troops are present}}
{{legend|#f35565|Heavy Dutch defence line against [[armoured vehicle]]s}}
{{legend|#7affff|Dutch defences in [[Zeeland]]}}
{{legend|#ffde01|Belgian defence line}}
{{legend|#2d9b0b|French defences in the Netherlands}}
{{legend|#cf8cd0|Position of German troops as well as areas under German control}}]]

Despite his pessimism expressed to the Dutch government and the mandate he had been given to surrender the Army, General Winkelman awaited the outcome of events, avoiding actually capitulating until it was absolutely necessary. In this he was perhaps motivated by a desire to engage the opposing German troops for as long as possible, to assist the Allied war effort.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 178</ref> In the early morning of 14 May, though the situation remained critical, a certain calm was evident in the Dutch Headquarters.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 180</ref>

In the North, a German artillery bombardment of the Kornwerderzand Position began at 09:00. However, the German batteries were forced to move away after being surprised by [[counterfire]] from the 15 cm. aft cannon of [[HNLMS Johan Maurits van Nassau]], which had sailed into the [[Wadden Sea]].<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 329</ref> Feldt now decided to land on the coast of [[North-Holland]]. A few barges were found; only after the capitulation however, was the crossing actually executed. During this operation one barge foundered and the remainder lost their way. Fears for such a landing had caused Winkelman on 12 May to order the occupation of an improvised "Amsterdam Position" along the [[North Sea Canal]], but only weak forces were available.<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 333</ref>

In the East, under cover of [[ground fog]] the field army successfully withdrew from the Grebbe Line to the East Front without being bombed as had been feared, and disengaged from the gradually pursuing enemy troops. The new position had some severe drawbacks: the inundations were mostly not yet ready and the [[Earthworks (engineering)|earthworks]] and [[berm]]s needed because trenches would be flooded in the [[peat]] soil had not yet been constructed, so defences had to be improvised to accommodate the much larger number of troops.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 306</ref>

On IJsselmonde the German forces prepared to cross the Maas in Rotterdam, which was defended by about eight Dutch battalions. Crossings would be attempted in two sectors. The main attack would take place in the centre of the city, with the German 9th Panzer Division advancing over the ''Willemsbrug''. Then ''SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler'' would cross to operate on its immediate left and east of Rotterdam a battalion of the 16th Infantry Regiment of ''22. Luftlandedivision'' would cross on boats. These auxiliary attacks might prevent a concentration of Dutch forces, blocking the 9th Panzer Division's advance through a densely built up urban area intersected by canals. In view of these conditions and the limited means available, there was a major emphasis on air support. Already on 13 May, von Küchler, fearing that the British might reinforce the Fortress Holland, had instructed Schmidt: "Resistance in Rotterdam should be broken with all means, if necessary threaten with and carry out the annihilation [''Vernichtung''] of the city".<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 335</ref> In this he was to be supported by the highest command level as Hitler would state in ''Führer-Weisung Nr. 11'' (Führer-Directive N°11): "On the northern wing the power of the Army of Holland to resist has proven stronger than had been assumed. Political as well as military grounds demand to quickly break this resistance. (...) Furthermore the speedy conquest of the Fortress Holland is to be facilitated through a deliberate weakening of the [air] power operated by Sixth Army".<ref>Amersfoort (2005), pp. 367–368</ref> ''[[Kampfgeschwader 54]]'', using [[Heinkel He 111]] bombers, was therefore shifted from Sixth to Eighteenth Army.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 368</ref>

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1984-021-17, Rotterdam, Kapitulation.jpg|left|thumb|upright=1.35|Dutch negotiator, carrying white flag, moves toward the German positions on the Noordereiland on 14 May, 1940.]]
Generals Kurt Student and Schmidt desired a limited air attack to temporarily paralyse the defences, allowing the tanks to break out of the bridgehead; severe urban destruction was to be avoided as it would only hamper their advance.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), pp. 366–367</ref> However, ''Luftwaffe'' commander [[Hermann Göring]], worried about the fate of his surrounded airborne troops, hoped to force an immediate Dutch national capitulation by a much more extensive bombardment. His head of operations, General [[Otto Hoffmann von Waldau]], described this option as a "radical solution" (''Radikallösung'').<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 367</ref> Despite misgivings by [[Albert Kesselring]] about its scope and necessity,<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 345</ref> at 11:45 ninety Heinkels took off for a [[carpet bombing]] of the inner city of Rotterdam.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 369</ref>

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1984-021-14, Zerstörtes Rotterdam.jpg|right|thumb|upright=1.35|German troops advance through a destroyed section of Rotterdam]]
At 09:00 a German messenger crossed the ''Willemsbrug'' to bring an ultimatum from Schmidt to Colonel [[Pieter Scharroo]], the Dutch commander of Rotterdam, demanding a capitulation of the city; if a positive answer had not been received within two hours the "severest means of annihilation" would be employed.<ref name="De Jong 1970, p. 348">De Jong (1970), p. 348</ref> However, Scharroo did not receive the message until 10:30. Not feeling inclined to surrender regardless, he asked Winkelman for orders; the latter, hearing that the document had not been signed nor contained the name of the sender, instructed him to send a Dutch envoy to clarify matters and gain time.<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 349</ref> At 12:15 a Dutch captain handed this request to von Choltitz. On the return of the German envoy at 12:00, Schmidt had already sent a radio message that the bombardment had to be postponed because negotiations had started.<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 350</ref> Just after the Dutch envoy had received a second ultimatum, now signed by Schmidt and with a new expiry time of 16:20, around 13:20 two formations of Heinkels arrived,<ref name="De Jong 1970, p. 348"/> not having received any recall orders. This was later explained by the Germans as a result of their having already pulled in their tow aerials.<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 351</ref> Schmidt ordered red flares to be fired to signal that the bombardment was to be broken off, but only the squadron making the bomb run from the southwest abandoned its attack, after their first three planes had dropped their bombs. The other 54 Heinkels, having approached from the east, continued to drop their share of the grand total of 1308 bombs,<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 370</ref> destroying the inner city and killing 814 civilians. The ensuing fires destroyed about 24,000 houses, making almost 80,000 inhabitants homeless.<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 366</ref> At 15:50 Scharroo capitulated to Schmidt in person.<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 368</ref> Meanwhile, Göring had ordered a second bombardment of the city—a group of Heinkels had already left—to be carried out unless a message was received that the whole of Rotterdam was occupied.<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 369</ref> When Schmidt heard of the order, he hastily sent an uncoded message at 17:15 claiming the city was taken, although this had yet to take place. The bombers were recalled just in time.<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 370</ref>

==The surrender of the Dutch Army==
[[File:Battle-of-the-Netherlands-WOII-ani.gif|thumb|right|upright=0.9|The phases of the Dutch occupation]]

Winkelman at first intended to continue the fight, even though Rotterdam had capitulated and German forces from there might now advance into the heart of the Fortress Holland. The possibility of terror bombings was considered before the invasion and had not been seen as grounds for immediate capitulation; provisions had been made for the continuation of effective government even after widespread urban destruction.<ref>De Jong (1969b), pp. 366–367</ref> The perimeter around The Hague might still ward off an armoured attack and the New Holland Water Line had some defensive capability; though it could be attacked from behind, it would take the Germans some time to deploy their forces in the difficult polder landscape.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 181">Amersfoort (2005), p. 181</ref> However, he soon received a message from Colonel [[Cuno Eduard Willem baron van Voorst tot Voorst]], the commander of the city of [[Utrecht (city)|Utrecht]], that the Germans demanded its surrender; leaflets were dropped by propaganda planes announcing that only unconditional surrender could "spare it the fate of Warsaw".<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 182</ref> Winkelman concluded that it apparently had become the German policy to devastate any city offering any resistance; in view of his mandate to avoid unnecessary suffering and the hopelessness of the Dutch military position he decided to surrender.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 183</ref> All higher-level army units were informed at 16:50 by [[Telegraphy#Telex|Telex]] of his decision and ordered to first destroy their weapons and then offer their surrender to the nearest German units. At 17:20 the German envoy in The Hague was informed.<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 375</ref> At around 19:00 Winkelman gave a radio speech informing the Dutch people. This was also how the German command became aware the Dutch had surrendered;<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 179</ref> the Dutch troops had generally disengaged from the enemy and had not yet made contact. The Dutch surrender implied that in principle a cease-fire should be observed by both parties.

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1969-097-17, Kapitulation der Niederlande.jpg|upright|thumb|[[Henri Winkelman|Winkelman]], in the centre, leaves the school building in which the negotiations took place]]
Winkelman acted both in his capacity of commander of the Dutch Army and of highest executive power of the homeland. This created a somewhat ambiguous situation. On the morning of 14 May the commander of the [[Royal Dutch Navy]], Vice-Admiral [[Johannes Furstner]], had left the country to continue the fight;<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 181"/> Dutch naval vessels were generally not included in the surrender. Eight ships and four unfinished hulks had already departed,<ref>De Jong (1970), pp. 385–386</ref> some smaller vessels were sunk off, and nine others sailed for England in the evening of 14 May. The ''Hr. Ms. Johan Maurits van Nassau'' was sunk by German bombers while crossing.<ref>De Jong (1970), pp. 393–397</ref> The commander of the main Dutch naval port of [[Den Helder]], Rear-Admiral [[Hoyte Jolles]], concluded that his base, with a naval garrison of 10,000, its own air service, and extensive land defences, should continue to resist also. Only with some difficulty did Winkelman convince him to obey the surrender order.<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 374</ref> Large parts of the Dutch Army were also reluctant to believe or accept the surrender, especially those units that hardly had seen any fighting, such as 3rd and 4th Army Corps and Brigade A.<ref>De Jong (1970), pp. 376–377</ref>

At 05:00 on 15 May a German messenger reached The Hague, inviting Winkelman to [[Rijsoord]] for a meeting with von Küchler to negotiate the articles of a written capitulation document. Both quickly agreed on most conditions, Winkelman declaring to have surrendered army, naval and air forces. When von Küchler demanded that pilots still fighting for the allies should be treated as [[francs-tireurs]]—seen by the Germans as guerilla fighters outside the laws of war—Winkelman's refusal made it clear to the Germans that only the armed forces in the homeland, with the exception of Zealand, would capitulate, not the country itself.<ref>De Jong (1970), p. 384</ref> On other points a swift agreement was reached and the document was signed at 10:15.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 184</ref>

==The fighting in Zealand==
The province of [[Zeeland|Zealand]] was exempt from the surrender; fighting continued there in a common allied effort with French troops. The Dutch forces in the province comprised eight full battalions of army and naval troops.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 244">Amersfoort (2005), p. 244</ref> They were commanded by Rear-Admiral [[Hendrik Jan van der Stad]], who, being a naval officer, had been directly subordinated to Winkelman.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 238"/> The area was under naval command because of the predominance of the naval port of [[Vlissingen|Flushing]] on the island of [[Walcheren]] which controlled the access to Antwerp via the [[Western Scheldt]]. The northern islands of the province were defended only by a few platoons. The defence of [[Zeelandic Flanders]], the Dutch part of Flanders, was largely left to the Allies. The main Dutch army forces would thus be concentrated in [[Zuid-Beveland]], the peninsula east of Walcheren, to deny the enemy this approach route to Vlissingen. Zuid-Beveland was connected to the coast of North Brabant by an isthmus; at its eastern and most narrow end the Bath Position had been prepared, occupied by an infantry battalion. This was mainly intended as a collecting line for possible Dutch troops retreating from the east. At its western end was the longer Zanddijk Position, occupied by three battalions.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 239</ref>

Three French GRDIs (''Groupes de Reconnaissance de Division d'Infanterie'') had arrived on 10 May; these motorised units subsequently departed for North Brabant, but from 11 May the area was reinforced by two French infantry divisions: the ''60e Division d'Infanterie'',<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 240" /> a B-class division, and the newly formed naval ''68e Division d'Infanterie''. Part of their equipment was brought by ship through Flushing harbour. Most troops of these divisions would remain south of the Western Scheldt in Zeelandic Flanders, where two of the eight Dutch battalions were also present, as were two border companies. Only two French regiments were sent to the northern bank. On 13 May the Dutch troops were placed under French operational command and ''68e Division d'Infanterie'' was transferred to the 7th Army.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 241</ref> Cooperation between the two allies left much to be desired and was plagued by poor communications, misunderstandings and differences regarding strategy. The Dutch considered the Bath and Zanddijk Positions to be very defensible because of the open polder landscape and extensive inundations. However, the French commander, General [[Pierre-Servais Durand]], was not convinced of their value and positioned his troops at more conspicuous obstacles. On the evening of 13 May one regiment, the ''271e'' of ''68e Division d'Infanterie'', occupied the [[Canal through Zuid-Beveland]] and the other, the ''224e'' of ''60 Division d'Infanterie'', took a position at the [[Sloe]] straights separating the island of [[Walcheren]] from Zuid-Beveland, even though there was not sufficient time for adequate entrenchment. This prevented an effective concentration of Allied forces, allowing the Germans, despite a numerical inferiority, to defeat them piecemeal.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 255</ref>

On 14 May the Germans had occupied almost all of North Brabant. ''SS-Standarte Deutschland'', quickly advancing to the Western Scheldt, reached the Bath Position.<ref name="Amersfoort 2005, p. 244"/> This cut off the retreat of ''27e Groupe de Reconnaissance de Division d'Infanterie'', which was subsequently destroyed defending [[Bergen-op-Zoom]]. The morale of the defenders of the Bath Position, already shaken by stories from Dutch troops fleeing to the west, was severely undermined by the news that Winkelman had surrendered; many concluded that it was useless for Zealand to continue resisting as the last remaining province. A first preparatory artillery bombardment on the position in the evening of 14 May caused the commanding officers to desert their troops, who then also fled.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 245</ref>

On the morning of 15 May ''SS-Standarte Deutschland'' approached the Zanddijk Position. A first attack around 08:00 on outposts of the northern sector was easily repulsed, as the Germans had to advance over a narrow dike through the inundations, despite supporting air strikes by dive bombers.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 246</ref> However, the bombardment caused the battalions in the main positions to flee,<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 247</ref> and the entire line had to be abandoned around 14:00 despite the southern part being supported by the French torpedo boat ''L'Incomprise''.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 248</ref>

On 16 May ''SS-Standarte Deutschland'', several kilometres to the west of the Zanddijk Position, approached the Canal through Zuid-Beveland, where the French ''271e Régiment d’Infanterie'' was present, only partly dug in and now reinforced by the three retreated Dutch battalions. An aerial bombardment that morning routed the defenders before the ground attack had even started; the first German crossings around 11:00 led to a complete collapse. An attempt in the evening of the same day to force the eight hundred metres long [[Sloedam]], over which most of the French troops had fled to Walcheren, ended in failure.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 249</ref> On 16 May the island of [[Tholen]] was taken against light opposition; on 17 May [[Schouwen-Duiveland]] fell.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 250</ref>

While the commanders of the remaining Dutch troops on South-Beveland refused direct commands by their superior to threaten the German flank, on 17 May a night attack at 03:00 across the Sloedam failed. The Germans now demanded the capitulation of the island; when this was refused they bombed [[Arnemuiden]] and Flushing. [[Middelburg]], the province's capital city, was heavily shelled by artillery, its inner city partially burning down. The heavy bombardment demoralised the largely French defenders, and the Germans managed to establish a bridgehead around noon.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 251</ref> The few Dutch troops present on Walcheren, about three companies, ceased their resistance. In the evening the encroaching Germans threatened to overrun the French forces that had fled into Flushing, but a gallant delaying action led by brigade-general [[Marcel Deslaurens]] in person, in which he was killed, allowed most troops to be evacuated over the Western Scheldt.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 252</ref>

After [[Noord-Beveland|North-Beveland]] had surrendered on 18 May, Zeelandic Flanders was the last remaining unoccupied Dutch homeland territory. On orders of the French, all Dutch troops were withdrawn on 19 May to [[Ostend]] in Belgium, as their presence would be demoralising and confusing to their own forces. On 27 May all of Zeelandic Flanders had been occupied.<ref>Amersfoort (2005), p. 253</ref>

==Aftermath==
Following the Dutch defeat, Queen Wilhelmina established a [[Dutch government in exile|government-in-exile]] in England.<ref>Shirer (1960), p. 723</ref> The German occupation officially began on 17 May 1940. It would be five years before the entire country was liberated, during which time over 210,000 inhabitants of the Netherlands became victims of war, among them 104,000 Jews and other minorities, victims of genocide. Another 70,000 more may have died from indirect consequences, such as poor nutrition or limited medical services.<ref>Oorlogsverliezen 1940–1945. Maandschrift van het Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, blz. 749. [http://www.cbs.nl/NR/rdonlyres/1FA7DF00-F612-4F46-8539-E04DCFECD7BA/0/2007k4b15p53art.pdf cbs.nl]</ref>

==Notes==
{{reflist|22em}}

==References==
{{refbegin}}
* {{citation|editor1-first=Herman|editor1-last=Amersfoort|editor2-first=Piet|editor2-last=Kamphuis|year=2005|title=Mei 1940 — De Strijd op Nederlands grondgebied|language=Dutch|location=Den Haag|publisher=Sdu Uitgevers|isbn=90-12-08959-X}}
* {{citation|last1=Schulten|first1=C.M.|last2=Theil|first2=J.|year=1979|title=Nederlandse Pantservoertuigen|language=Dutch|location=Bussum|publisher=Unieboek BV|isbn=90-269-4555-8}}
* Star Busmann, C.W. ''Partworks and Encyclopedia of World War II''
* {{citation|first=Louis|last=De Jong|authorlink=Loe de Jong|year=1969|title=Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Deel 1: Voorpel|language=Dutch|location=Amsterdam|publisher=Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie}}
* {{citation|first=Louis|last=De Jong|year=1969|title=Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Deel 2: Neutraal|language=Dutch|location=Amsterdam|publisher=Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie}}
* {{citation|first=Louis|last=De Jong|year=1970|title=Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Deel 3: Mei '40|language=Dutch|location=Amsterdam|publisher=Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie}}
* {{citation|authorlink = E.R. Hooton|first=E.R.|last=Hooton|year=1994|title= Phoenix Triumphant: The Rise and Rise of the Luftwaffe|publisher= Brockhampton Press|isbn=1-86019-964-X}}
* {{citation|first=E.R.|last=Hooton|year=2007|title=Luftwaffe at War, Volume 2; Blitzkrieg in the West 1939–1940|location=London|publisher=Chevron/Ian Allen|isbn=978-1-85780-272-6}}
* {{citation|last=Jentz|first=Thomas L.|year=1998|title=Die deutsche Panzertruppe 1933–1942 — Band 1|language=German|location=Wölfersheim-Berstadt|publisher=Podzun-Pallas-Verlag|isbn=3-7909-0623-9}}
* {{citation|first=Karl-Heinz|last=Frieser|year=2005|title=Blitzkrieg-Legende — Der Westfeldzug 1940|language=German|publisher=R. Oldenbourg Verlag München}}
* {{citation|authorlink=William L. Shirer|last=Shirer|first=William L.|year=1960|title=The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany|location=New York|publisher=Simon & Schuster|isbn= 0-671-62420-2}}
* {{citation|authorlink = Ronald E. Powaski|last=Powaski|first=Ronald E.|title=Lightning War: Blitzkrieg in the West, 1940| publisher=John Wiley|year=2003|isbn=9780471394310}}
* {{citation|last=Powaski|first=Ronald E.|title=Lightning War: Blitzkrieg in the West, 1940| publisher=Book Sales Inc.|year=2008|isbn=9780785820970}}
* Goossens, Allert M.A. (2011), [http://www.waroverholland.com/ History Site "War Over Holland – the Dutch struggle May 1940"]
* {{citation|last=Grimm|first=P. e.a.|title=Verliesregister 1939–1945. Alle militaire vliegtuigverliezen in Nederland tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Verliesregister 1940| publisher=Studiegroep Luchtoorlog 1939–1945, Nederlands Instituut voor Militaire Historie|year=2008}}
{{refend}}
{{World War II}}
{{Subject bar
| portal1=British Army
| portal2=Military history of France
| portal3=Military of Germany
| portal4=Netherlands
| portal5=World War II
| commons=y
| commons-search=Category:Battle of the Netherlands
}}
{{coord missing|Netherlands}}
{{DEFAULTSORT:Netherlands, Battle of}}

[[Category:1940 in the Netherlands]]
[[Category:Battle of France]]
[[Category:Battles and operations of World War II involving the Netherlands]]
[[Category:Battles of World War II involving Germany]]
[[Category:Battles of World War II involving France]]
[[Category:Battles and operations of World War II involving the United Kingdom|B]]
[[Category:Conflicts in 1940]]
[[Category:Invasions by Germany]]
[[Category:Invasions of the Netherlands]]
[[Category:World War II invasions]]
[[Category:Germany–Netherlands military relations]]
[[Category:May 1940 events]]

Unite the Union

2018-05-03T10:21:25Z

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{{About|Unite the Union||Unite (disambiguation)}}
{{Infobox Union|name=Unite theUNION
|country=[[United Kingdom]] & [[Republic of Ireland|Ireland]]
|affiliation= [[Trades Union Congress|TUC]], [[Irish Congress of Trade Unions|ICTU]], [[Alliance for Finance|AfF]], [[Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions|CSEU]], [[Labour Party (UK)|Labour (Britain)]],<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.unionstogether.org.uk/pages/member_unions |title=TULO’s member unions |publisher=Unions Together |date= |accessdate=2012-03-31 |deadurl=yes |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20120311211534/http://www.unionstogether.org.uk/pages/member_unions |archivedate=11 March 2012 }}</ref> [[Labour Party (Ireland)|Labour (Ireland)]]
|image=Unitelogo.png{{!}}Unite logo
|founded=2007
|current=
|people =[[Len McCluskey]] (general secretary), Jackie Pollock (Northern Ireland secretary)
|head=[[Workers Uniting]]
|dissolved_date=
|dissolved_state=
|merged_into=
| members = 1,420,000<ref>http://www.unitetheunion.org/growing-our-union/about-us/</ref>
|office=128 Theobald's Road, [[Holborn]], [[London]]
|website= {{URL|http://www.unitetheunion.org}}
|footnotes=
}}
'''Unite the Union''', commonly known as '''Unite''', is a British and Irish [[trade union]], formed on 1 May 2007, by the merger of [[Amicus]] and the [[Transport and General Workers' Union]]. It is the largest trade union in the UK and Ireland. The General Secretary of Unite is [[Len McCluskey]].<ref name="auto">{{cite news| url=http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11805884 | work=BBC News | title=Len McCluskey chosen as new Unite leader | date=21 November 2010}}</ref>

On 2 July 2008, Unite signed an agreement to merge with the [[United Steelworkers]] to form a new global union entity called [[Workers Uniting]] which represents over 3 million members in the United Kingdom, the [[Republic of Ireland]], [[North America]] and the [[Caribbean]]. Unite retains its separate identity in the United Kingdom.

== Executive Council ==
[[File:Jack Jones House Liverpool.jpg|thumb|right|[[Jack Jones (trade unionist)|Jack Jones]] House, [[Liverpool]]. North West Headquarters]]
[[File:55 Call Lane, Leeds (24th June 2010) 002.jpg|thumb|right|The Yorkshire, North East and Humberside regional headquarters is in [[Leeds]]]]
As part of the merger process, a Joint Executive Council (formed of the executives of both the predecessor unions) took office on the vesting day. In March 2008, a new Executive Council for the expanded Union was elected, taking office on 1 May 2008 and having a three-year term.The Executive Council was tasked with putting a new Unite rulebook to a postal ballot of members during July 2008. The rule book was accepted by a majority of members and will not be subject to amendment until a Rules Conference is held.

The first reduced unified Unite Executive Council was elected in 2011

The first single General secretary of Unite [[Len McCluskey]] was elected in December 2010 on a platform of unification and standing for one term of office only.

The Unite special Rules Conference in 2010 agreed a rule change including a formula for how seats will be allocated on the UNITE Executive Council which takes office in 2011. There are a number of factions within Unite.
* Unite Now, A growing active movement established in 2011 which is "moderate left" It presents itself as an independent movement for lay members, activists and officers. Supported Len McCluskey in his first election but they opposed the calling of an early General secretary election in 2013. Unitenow campaigns for greater transparency in the union and are critical of the unions centralised hierarchical decision making structures. They campaign for greater financial transparency, a move away from the current centralised executive powers with a more independent Executive Council which has set term limits. Not aligned to any political section of the union it has grown in influence within lay activist ranks, officers and key manufacturing sectors of Unite. It is widely accepted that they will challenge the Unite General Secretary election due to be called in 2017.
* United Left, the main left grouping, which includes supporters of the [[Labour Party (UK)|Labour Party]], the [[Socialist Workers Party (UK)|Socialist Workers Party]] and [[Communist Party of Britain|Communist party]]. Supported Len McCluskey in his election.

== Elections ==

=== Joint General Secretary election and merger suspension ===
On the 9 October 2008 the executive council of Unite announced that there would be an election for the General Secretary (Amicus section), with a timetable of January/February 2009 for the election, the results being announced in March 2009. This election was for a fixed term until December 2010.

The Executive council also postponed the adoption of the new rule book and integration until May 2009.

This action was taken in light of the potential success of a legal challenge to Simpson's extension of tenure by a "single member" of the union.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.unitetheunion.org/news__events/2008_archived_press_releases/unite_to_hold_election_for_joi.aspx |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110720142226/http://www.unitetheunion.org/news__events/2008_archived_press_releases/unite_to_hold_election_for_joi.aspx |dead-url=yes |archive-date=2011-07-20 |title=Unite to hold election for Joint General Secretary |publisher=Unitetheunion.org |date= |accessdate=2012-03-31}}</ref> [[Jerry Hicks (trade unionist)|Jerry Hicks]], a former member of the union's Executive and its General Purposes and Finance Committee and unfairly dismissed convenor of Rolls Royce at Bristol, disclosed at the outset that he was the person behind the challenge. He made the same legal challenge that Simpson deployed successfully on his predecessor Ken Jackson.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://jerryhicks.wordpress.com/ |title=Jerry Hicks For General Secretary |publisher=Jerryhicks.wordpress.com |date= |accessdate=2009-12-17}}</ref>{{Citation needed|date=October 2010}}

These candidates seeking nomination for the election, with their main union positions at the beginning of March 2009:
* [[Derek Simpson (trade unionist)|Derek Simpson]] (incumbent)<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.re-electdereksimpson.com/ |title=Archived copy |accessdate=10 November 2008 |deadurl=yes |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20090219213756/http://re-electdereksimpson.com/ |archivedate=19 February 2009 }}</ref>
* [[Jerry Hicks (trade unionist)|Jerry Hicks]] (former convenor, Rolls Royce, Bristol)<ref>http://www.jerry4gs.com/{{Dead link|date=July 2016 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref>
* Laurence Faircloth (Regional Secretary, South West Region)<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.faircloth4gs.com/ |title=www.faircloth4gs.com |publisher=www.faircloth4gs.com |date= |accessdate=2009-12-17}}</ref>
* Kevin Coyne (Regional Secretary, North West Region)<ref>{{cite web|url=http://coyne4gs.net/ |title=coyne4gs.net |publisher=coyne4gs.net |date= |accessdate=2012-03-31}}</ref>
* Paul K. Reuter (National Officer)<ref>{{cite web|url=http://amicusgselection.wordpress.com/ |title=Paul Reuter’s Blog |publisher=Amicusgselection.wordpress.com |date= |accessdate=2009-12-17}}</ref>

All candidates received sufficient nominations, but Laurence Faircloth stood down after nominations closed, recommending that his supporters to support Derek Simpson.<ref>[http://unitygazette.org.uk/2009/02/gazette-statement-on-amicus-section-jgs.html Unity Gazette statement on Laurence Faircloth's withdrawal] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090426064917/http://unitygazette.org.uk/2009/02/gazette-statement-on-amicus-section-jgs.html |date=26 April 2009 }}</ref>

{| border="1" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" style="margin: 1em 1em 1em 0; background: #f9f9f9; border: 1px #aaa solid; border-collapse: collapse; font-size: 95%;"
|- style="background-color:#E9E9E9"
! colspan="2" scope="col" rowspan="2" width="125" | Candidate
! scope="col" colspan="3" width="75"| Votes
|-style="background-color:#E9E9E9; border-bottom: 2px solid gray;"
! scope="col" colspan="2"| Votes
! %
|-align="right"
| style="background-color: {{Labour Party (UK)/meta/color}}" |
| scope="row" align="left" | '''[[Derek Simpson (trade unionist)|Derek Simpson]]''' {{Y}}
| '''60,048'''
| align=center | {{percentage bar|37.7||FF0000}}
| '''37.7%'''
|-align="right"
| style="background-color: {{Labour Party (UK)/meta/color}}" |
| scope="row" align="left"| [[Jerry Hicks (trade unionist)|Jerry Hicks]]
| 39,307
| align=center | {{percentage bar|24.7||FF0000}}
| 24.7%
|-align="right"
| style="background-color: {{Labour Party (UK)/meta/color}}" |
| scope="row" align="left"| Kevin Coyne
| 30,603
| align=center | {{percentage bar|19.2||FF0000}}
| 19.2%
|-align="right"
| style="background-color: {{Labour Party (UK)/meta/color}}" |
| scope="row" align="left"| Paul Reuter
| 28,283
| align=center | {{percentage bar|17.8||FF0000}}
| 17.8%
|- style="background-color:#F6F6F6"
| colspan="2" align="right"|'''Invalid Votes'''
| colspan="2" align="left"| 1,031
| align="right" | 0.6%
|- style="background-color:#F6F6F6"
| colspan="2" align="right"|'''Turnout'''
| colspan="2" align="left"| 159,272
| align="right" | 14.5%
|-
|- style="background-color:#F6F6F6"
| colspan="5" | '''Derek Simpson elected General Secretary''' 
|-
|}

A total of 159,272 voting slips were returned, out of a possible 1,096,511 voters, a turnout of 14.5%. Simpson won the election with 37.7% of the total votes cast,<ref>[http://www.amicustheunion.org/Default.aspx?page=9439 Unite Amicus Section - Election of Joint General Secretary Independent Scrutineers report] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090420072942/http://www.amicustheunion.org/Default.aspx?page=9439 |date=20 April 2009 }}</ref> and remained in the post of Joint General Secretary until December 2010.

===General Secretary election 2010===
Following Derek Simpson & Tony Woodley's announcements that they were to retire, [[Len McCluskey]] announced his intention to seek the position of General Secretary of Unite. He secured 42.4% of the vote with 101,000 votes and was duly elected as General Secretary of Unite for a 5-year term starting 1 January 2011.<ref name="auto"/>

{| border="1" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" style="margin: 1em 1em 1em 0; background: #f9f9f9; border: 1px #aaa solid; border-collapse: collapse; font-size: 95%;"
|- style="background-color:#E9E9E9"
! colspan="2" scope="col" rowspan="2" width="125" | Candidate
! scope="col" colspan="3" width="75"| Votes
|-style="background-color:#E9E9E9; border-bottom: 2px solid gray;"
! scope="col" colspan="2"| Votes
! %
|-align="right"
| style="background-color: {{Labour Party (UK)/meta/color}}" |
| scope="row" align="left" | '''[[Len McCluskey]]''' {{Y}}
| '''101,000'''
| align=center | {{percentage bar|42.4||FF0000}}
| '''42.4%'''
|-align="right"
| style="background-color: {{Labour Party (UK)/meta/color}}" |
| scope="row" align="left"| [[Jerry Hicks (trade unionist)|Jerry Hicks]]
| 53,000
| align=center | {{percentage bar|21.8||FF0000}}
| 21.8%
|-align="right"
| style="background-color: {{Labour Party (UK)/meta/color}}" |
| scope="row" align="left"| Les Bayliss
| 47,000
| align=center | {{percentage bar|19.3||FF0000}}
| 19.3%
|-align="right"
| style="background-color: {{Labour Party (UK)/meta/color}}" |
| scope="row" align="left"| [[Gail Cartmail]]
| 39,000
| align=center | {{percentage bar|16.4||FF0000}}
| 16.4%
|- style="background-color:#F6F6F6"
| colspan="2" align="right"|'''Turnout'''
| colspan="2" align="left"| 240,000
| align="right" | 15.8%
|-
|- style="background-color:#F6F6F6"
| colspan="5" | '''[[Len McCluskey]] elected General Secretary''' Source: [https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/nov/21/mccluskey-leader-unite-union The Guardian]
|-
|}

The overall turnout was 15.8% <ref>{{cite web|url=http://jimjay.blogspot.co.uk/2010/11/unites-union-general-secretary-results.html|title=Unite's union general secretary results|publisher=}}</ref>

===General Secretary election 2013===
[[File:Len McCluskey, 2016 Labour Party Conference 2.jpg|upright|thumb|McCluskey speaking at the 2016 Labour Party Conference]]
In late 2012, Len McCluskey unexpectedly called an early General Secretary election saying that "Our current timescale would mean holding an election for GS just before the next General Election which would not be good for either Unite or the Labour Party, and is liable to cause divisions in the union, sufficiently divisive to, at best, threaten, and at worst, shatter the unity that we are creating".<ref>http://www.powerinaunion.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/Statement-by-the-General-Secretary-to-the-Executive-Council.pdf</ref> On 4 March 2013, it was declared that two candidates had declared themselves to be standing in the election: Len McCluskey, who had won 1089 workplace/branch nominations, and Jerry Hicks, who had won 136 nominations.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.unitetheunion.org/news/twocandidatestostandinunitegeneralsecretaryelection/|title=Two candidates to stand in Unite general secretary election|publisher=}}</ref> This was Jerry Hicks' third successive attempt at becoming Unite's General Secretary. On 14 April 2013 it was announced that Len McCluskey had been successfully re-elected as Unite General Secretary, whose term will now expire in 2018. The full election results were:

{| border="1" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" style="margin: 1em 1em 1em 0; background: #f9f9f9; border: 1px #aaa solid; border-collapse: collapse; font-size: 95%;"
|- style="background-color:#E9E9E9"
! colspan="2" scope="col" rowspan="2" width="125" | Candidate
! scope="col" colspan="3" width="75"| Votes
|-style="background-color:#E9E9E9; border-bottom: 2px solid gray;"
! scope="col" colspan="2"| Votes
! %
|-align="right"
| style="background-color: {{Labour Party (UK)/meta/color}}" |
| scope="row" align="left" | '''[[Len McCluskey]]''' {{Y}}
| '''144,570'''
| align=center | {{percentage bar|64.2||FF0000}}
| '''64.2%'''
|-align="right"
| style="background-color: {{Labour Party (UK)/meta/color}}" |
| scope="row" align="left"| [[Jerry Hicks (trade unionist)|Jerry Hicks]]
| 79,819
| align=center | {{percentage bar|35.5||FF0000}}
| 35.5%
|- style="background-color:#F6F6F6"
| colspan="2" align="right"|'''Invalid Votes'''
| colspan="2" align="left"| 1,412
| align="right" |
|- style="background-color:#F6F6F6"
| colspan="2" align="right"|'''Turnout'''
| colspan="2" align="left"| 225,801
| align="right" | 15.2%
|-
|- style="background-color:#F6F6F6"
| colspan="5" | '''[[Len McCluskey]] re-elected General Secretary''' Source: Unite the Union,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.unitetheunion.org/news/lenmccluskeyreelectedasunitegeneralsecretary/|title=Len McCluskey re-elected as Unite general secretary|publisher=}}</ref> BBC News<ref>{{cite news| url=http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-22141396 | work=BBC News | title=Len McCluskey re-elected as Unite general secretary | date=14 April 2013}}</ref>
|-
|}

===General Secretary election 2017===
In December 2016, incumbent General Secretary [[Len McCluskey]] announced his resignation in order to contest an election for the post, which was held in April 2017. McCluskey was challenged by Unite's West Midlands Regional Secretary Gerard Coyne, who accused him of "putting the Labour leadership before the interests of Unite members". Coyne, a member of the Unite Now faction,{{Citation needed|date=January 2017}} is widely viewed as a centre-left figure within the union, has a close relationship with the [[Labour Party (UK)|Labour Party]] and has the backing of the Deputy Leader [[Tom Watson (Labour politician)|Tom Watson]].<ref name=telegraph-20170331>{{cite news |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/31/labour-wars-unite-election-explodes-civil-war-tom-watson-accused/ |title=Labour wars: Unite election explodes into civil war as Tom Watson accused of 'dirty tricks' to bring down Jeremy Corbyn ally Len McCluskey |first=Christopher |last=Hope |newspaper=Daily Telegraph |date=31 March 2017 |accessdate=2 May 2017}}</ref> Ian Allinson later announced that he would stand as a "grass-roots socialist" candidate.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-38340128|title=Unite: Ian Allinson is third candidate to enter leadership contest|date=16 December 2016|accessdate=3 January 2017|work=BBC News}}</ref> Concerns were expressed about breaches of [[Data Protection Act, 2012|data protection law]] during the campaign, leading to Unite's assistant general secretary for legal affairs producing a report on the allegations.<ref name=telegraph-20170331/><ref name=unite-20170304>{{cite web |url=http://www.unitetheunion.org/news/unite-statement-in-response-to-comments-made-by-gerard-coyne/ |title=Unite statement in response to comments made by Gerard Coyne |publisher=Unite |date=4 March 2017 |accessdate=2 May 2017}}</ref><ref name=unitetheunion-20170327>{{cite web |url=http://www.unitetheunion.org/news/john-spellar-mp-must-explain-how-he-came-to-be-in-receipt-of-unites-member-data/ |title=John Spellar MP must explain how he came to be in receipt of Unite's member data |publisher=Unite |date=27 March 2017 |accessdate=2 May 2017}}</ref>

Coyne was suspended from his position as West Midlands General Secretary by Unite on 20 April, after voting had finished, the day ballot counting began. It was claimed that Coyne had brought the union into disrepute.<ref>{{cite news |last=Eaton |first=George |date=20 April 2017 |title=Len McCluskey's rival for Unite general secretary, Gerard Coyne, suspended |url=http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2017/04/len-mccluskeys-rival-unite-general-secretary-gerard-coyne-suspended |work=New Statesman |location= |access-date= }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last= |first= |date=20 April 2017 |title=Unite suspends Len McCluskey challenger Gerard Coyne |url=http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-39658427 |work=BBC News |location= |access-date= }}</ref> The following day it was announced that Len McCluskey had won the election.<ref>{{cite news |last= |first= |date=21 April 2017 |title=Len McCluskey re-elected as Unite general secretary |url=http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-39670708 |work=BBC News |location= |access-date= }}</ref> However, on 2 June Coyne announced a legal challenge against the result.<ref>{{cite news |title=Unite union faces legal challenge as McCluskey rival calls for poll rerun |url=https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jun/02/unite-legal-challenge-len-mccluskey-gerard-coyne-calls-for-poll-rerun |newspaper=The Guardian |date=2 June 2017}}</ref> In December 2017 it was revealed that Jeffrey Burke, an employment law specialist and a retired [[High Court of Justice|high court]] judge, has been appointed to examine both sides of the case by the [[Trades Union Certification Officer|certification officer]], the trade union watchdog.<ref name="Grauniad">Rajeev Syal, ''[https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/dec/19/unite-to-face-retired-high-court-judge-over-len-mccluskey-election Unite to face retired high court judge over Len McCluskey election]'', [[The Guardian]] December 19, 2017.</ref>

{| border="1" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" style="margin: 1em 1em 1em 0; background: #f9f9f9; border: 1px #aaa solid; border-collapse: collapse; font-size: 95%;"
|- style="background-color:#E9E9E9"
! colspan="2" scope="col" rowspan="2" width="125" | Candidate
! scope="col" colspan="3" width="75"| Votes
|-style="background-color:#E9E9E9; border-bottom: 2px solid gray;"
! scope="col" colspan="2"| Votes
! %
|-align="right"
| style="background-color: {{Labour Party (UK)/meta/color}}" |
| scope="row" align="left" | '''[[Len McCluskey]]''' {{Y}}
| '''59,067'''
| align=center | {{percentage bar|45.5||FF0000}}
| '''45.5%'''
|-align="right"
| style="background-color: {{Labour Party (UK)/meta/color}}" |
| scope="row" align="left"| Gerard Coyne
| 53,544
| align=center | {{percentage bar|41.3||FF0000}}
| 41.3%
|-align="right"
| style="background-color: {{Labour Party (UK)/meta/color}}" |
| scope="row" align="left"| Ian Allinson
| 17,143
| align=center | {{percentage bar|13.2||FF0000}}
| 13.2%
|- style="background-color:#F6F6F6"
| colspan="2" align="right"|'''Invalid Votes'''
| colspan="2" align="left"| 317
| align="right" |
|- style="background-color:#F6F6F6"
| colspan="2" align="right"|'''Turnout'''
| colspan="2" align="left"| 130,071
| align="right" | 12.2%
|-
|- style="background-color:#F6F6F6"
| colspan="5" | '''[[Len McCluskey]] re-elected General Secretary''' Source: [http://www.unitetheunion.org/news/unite-announces-general-secretary-election-result/ Unite the Union] [https://twitter.com/PolhomeEditor/status/857901345805828096 PoliticsHome.com]
|-
|}

== Membership levels ==
{{Image frame
| content = <div style="position:relative; right:30px; font-size:90%;">
{{ #invoke:Chart | bar chart
| width = 450
| height = 200
| group 1 = 1440000:1180000:1500000:1382126:1420000
| units suffix = _members
| group names =
| colors = red
| x legends = 2007:2010:2013:2015:2017
}}
</div>
| caption = <center>'''{{big|Unite membership since 2007}}'''</center>
| pos = top
}}
A private presentation given by Unite's former joint general secretary Tony Woodley showed that membership of the union had stood at 1.44 million in 2007 but declined by 262,740 between 2007 and 2010.<ref>{{Cite news |url=http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2007603/As-Unite-hit-plunging-membership-Tony-Woodley-says-stop-rot.html#ixzz1RNABRtVT |title=As biggest union is hit by plunging membership, outgoing leader says it must 'stop the rot' |publisher=Daily Mail. | location=London |first=Eleanor |last=Harding |date=24 June 2011}}</ref> During 2012, despite wider falling trade union membership and the tough economic climate, Unite increased its membership by more than 50,000 members. The party claimed 1.5 million members in January 2013,<ref>{{cite news |last= |first= |date=30 January 2013 |title=Unite boosted membership by 50,000 in 2012 |url=http://www.unitetheunion.org/news/uniteboostedmembershipby50000in2012/ |work=Unite the Union |location= |access-date= }}</ref> and was claiming 1.42 million by April 2017.<ref>{{cite news |last= |first= |date= |title=About us: Unite is Britain's biggest union with 1.42 million members across every type of workplace |url=http://www.unitetheunion.org/growing-our-union/about-us/ |work=Unite the Union |location= |access-date=21 April 2017 }}</ref>

Unite represents many [[BAE Systems]] employees.<ref name="veconomist" >{{cite news|author=|title=BAE Systems sheds 2,000 jobs in Britain|url=https://www.economist.com/news/britain/21730208-defence-giant-poised-take-advantage-global-rise-military-spending-bae|work=[[The Economist]]|date=12 October 2017}}</ref>

== Controversies ==
===Hunger strike===
There was a 2008 rooftop [[hunger strike]] at Unite's Transport House building in [[Belfast]]. The participants were formerly [[shop steward]]s of the [[Transport and General Workers Union]], now the T&G section of Unite the Union.<ref>{{Cite news
|url=http://libcom.org/news/unite-hunger-striker-gordon-mcneill-bad-shape-19052008
|title=Hunger strikers in bad shape
|work=libcom.org
|publisher=libcom collective of libertarian communists
}}</ref>
The dispute is over legal fees and compensation for an unfair dismissal action against the workers' employer, arising from a 2002 strike at [[Belfast International Airport]], and the related actions of a full-time union official employee.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.socialistparty.org.uk/articles/4127 |title= Belfast airport workers: Union leaders' broken promises |publisher=Socialist Party<! |date=2001-09-11 |accessdate=2009-12-17}}</ref><ref>{{cite web
|url=http://belfastairportworkers.wordpress.com/2008/06/18/sacked-airport-shop-steward-rejects-union-compensation-%E2%80%9Coffer%E2%80%9D/
|title=Press release: Sacked airport shop steward rejects union compensation "offer"
|author=Gordon McNeill
|date=2008-06-18
|accessdate=2008-06-25
}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.tgwu.org.uk/Templates/System/Other.asp?NodeID=94372 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080915103555/http://www.tgwu.org.uk:80/Templates/System/Other.asp?NodeID=94372 |dead-url=yes |archive-date=2008-09-15 |title=Belfast Airport Shop Stewards - The Truth and Nothing but the Truth |accessdate=2008-06-25 |date=2008-06-20 |publisher=[[Transport and General Workers' Union]] }}</ref>

=== Payment to outgoing leader ===
Former leader Derek Simpson received a payment of over £500,000 when he left his post in 2010.<ref>{{Cite news
|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/8646587/Union-boss-Derek-Simpson-received-500000-golden-goodbye.html
|title=Union boss Derek Simpson received £500,000 golden goodbye
|publisher=Daily Telegraph|location=London|date=19 July 2011}}</ref> Due to the controversy this caused within the union, the issue was addressed at Unite's Policy Conference in 2012 and resulted in members voting in favour of new measures designed to limit future payments on departure.<ref>http://www.unitetheunion.org/uploaded/documents/PolicyConf2012Decisions11-6662.pdf - Page 57</ref>

===Selection of Labour candidates===
{{update|date=October 2013}}
{{main|2013 Labour Party Falkirk candidate selection}}
In 2013, leaked documents alleged that Unite was running a covert campaign to ensure its candidates were selected to represent the Labour Party in the [[United Kingdom general election, 2015|2015 general election]]. Steve Hart, the union's political director, stated that Unite was supporting 41 candidates.<ref>{{cite news| url=https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/jul/03/ed-miliband-confront-unite-over-candidates | location=London | work=The Guardian | first=Patrick | last=Wintour | title=Ed Miliband urged to confront Unite over general election candidates | date=3 July 2013}}</ref> There was particular controversy over the [[2013 Labour Party Falkirk candidate selection]]. Unite claimed that it had not broken any Labour Party rules or the law with its selection campaign. [[Ed Miliband]], then Leader of the [[Labour Party (UK)|Labour Party]], referred the matter for police investigation, however Police Scotland found there was 'insufficient evidence' to launch an investigation.<ref>{{cite news| url=http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-23447279 | work=BBC News | title=Police rule out Falkirk vote rigging inquiry | date=25 July 2013}}</ref> An [[Information Commissioner's Office]] investigation took place, as did internal Labour disciplinary proceedings.

== Political Views ==
=== McCluskey Era ===
==== Criticism of UK government austerity measures ====
In June 2011, Unite publicly criticised the serving coalition government for a number of cuts in public services caused a result of the reduction of public funding, in particular cuts to the National Health Service (NHS). Ron Singer, a retired GP of 30 years and Unite member, claimed that there were "serious concerns" over the future of the NHS.<ref>{{Cite news
|url=http://www.smartinjuryassist.co.uk/news/unite-voice-concerns-over-the-future-of-nhs-care.php
|title=Unite voice 'serious concerns' over the future of NHS care
|publisher=Smart Assist.
|date=28 June 2011
}}</ref> However, the union were heavily criticised and accused of scaremongering over similar comments.<ref>{{Cite news
|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/healthnews/8341256/NHS-cuts-TUC-is-scaremongering-over-health-service-cuts.html
|title=NHS cuts: TUC is 'scaremongering' over health service cuts
|publisher=The Telegraph
|date=23 February 2011
|location=London
}}</ref>

In February 2013, Unite was among other organisations and individuals who gave their support to the [[People's Assembly Against Austerity|People's Assembly]] in a letter published by ''The Guardian'' newspaper.<ref>People's Assembly opening letter https://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/feb/05/people-assembly-against-austerity 5 February 2013, The Guardian Newspaper.</ref> Representing Unite, Len McCluskey also gave a speech at the People's Assembly Conference held at [[Westminster Central Hall]] on 22 June 2013, at which many Unite delegates and representatives were in attendance.

====Threat to split from Labour and launch a new workers' party====
In April 2014, McCluskey threatened to disaffiliate Unite from Labour and launch a new workers' party if Labour lost the [[United Kingdom general election, 2015|2015 General Election]].<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/unite-union-boss-len-mccluskey-threatens-to-launch-party-to-rival-labour-9231266.html|title=Unite union boss Len McCluskey threatens to launch party to rival Labour|last=McSmith|first=Andy|date=1 April 2014|work=The Independent|accessdate=2 April 2014|location=London}}</ref> Labour subsequently lost the election.

In July 2015, Unite endorsed [[Jeremy Corbyn]]'s [[Jeremy Corbyn Labour Party leadership campaign, 2015|campaign]] in the [[Labour Party (UK) leadership election, 2015|Labour Party leadership election]].<ref name="theguardian">{{cite news |last=Syal|first=Rajeev|url=https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/jul/05/jeremy-corbyn-backing-unite-labour-leadership-race|title=Jeremy Corbyn gets backing of Unite in Labour leadership race|work= |location= |publisher=''[[The Guardian]]''|date=5 July 2015|accessdate=17 July 2017}}</ref>

====Criticism of Israel====
In July 2014, Unite described [[Israel]] as "an apartheid state" and called for "sanctions against Israel for its continued illegal occupation, flouting of international law, and construction of an apartheid regime."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.unitetheunion.org/news/statement-of-solidarity-with-the-palestinian-people/|title=Statement of solidarity with the Palestinian people|publisher=}}</ref>

====Abortion====
Unite supports [[Abortion Rights (organisation)|Abortion Rights]]<ref>{{cite web|title=Abortion - A trade union issue|url=https://www.tuc.org.uk/sites/default/files/extras/arleaflet.pdf|publisher=Abortion Rights|accessdate=15 December 2014|quote=Unite listed as a supporter}}</ref> which campaigns "to defend and extend women's rights and access to safe, legal abortion"; among its statements it opposes the criminalisaton of [[sex-selective abortion]].<ref>{{cite web|title=Statement on sex-selective abortion |url=http://www.abortionrights.org.uk/index.php/about-us/position-statements/534-statement-on-sex-selective-abortion |publisher=Abortion Rights |accessdate=15 December 2014 |date=18 September 2014 }}{{dead link|date=March 2017}}</ref>

== References ==
{{Reflist|30em}}

== External links ==
{{commonscat|Unite the Union}}
*{{Official website|http://www.unitetheunion.org}}
*[http://www.iansunitesite.org.uk/ Ian's Unite Site] (blog of a UNITE Executive Council member)
*[http://www.dearunite.com/ DearUnite.com: Unofficial members' web site]
*[http://dscalm.warwick.ac.uk/DServe/dserve.exe?dsqIni=DServeadv.ini&dsqApp=Archive&dsqCmd=Show.tcl&dsqDb=Catalog&dsqPos=0&dsqSearch=%28%28Level%3D%27collection%27%29AND%28Reference_Code%3D%27unt%27%29%29 Catalogue of the Unite archives], held at the [[Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick]]

{{Trades Union Congress}}
{{Irish Congress of Trade Unions}}

{{Portal bar|Ireland|Organised labour|United Kingdom}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=October 2010}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Unite The Union}}
[[Category:Unite the Union| ]]
[[Category:Organisations based in the London Borough of Camden]]
[[Category:Trade unions established in 2007]]
[[Category:Trade unions in the Republic of Ireland]]
[[Category:Trade unions in the United Kingdom]]
[[Category:2007 establishments in the United Kingdom]]
[[Category:General unions]]
[[Category:Trade unions affiliated with the Labour Party (UK)]]

Olajumoke Adenowo

2016-05-09T22:19:16Z

129.234.0.27: /* Writing */

{{Infobox artist
| image = File:Olajumoke Adenowo.jpg
| caption = Olajumoke Adenowo
| birth_name =
| birth_date = {{birth date and age|mf=yes|1968|10|16}}
| birth_place = Ibadan, [[Oyo State]], [[Nigeria]]
| death_date =
| death_place =
| nationality = [[Nigeria]]n
| movement =
| spouse = Olukorede Adenowo
| Name = Olajumoke Adenowo
| imagesize =
| children = 2
| religion = [[Christianity]]
| field = [[Architecture]]
| training = BSc Hons Architecture [1988]
| Masters in Architecture [1991] at [[Obafemi Awolowo University]], Chief Executive Programme [CEP] Lagos Business School [2002]
| known for = Nigerian Architecture, Voice of Change, Awesome Treasures Foundation, AD Consulting Limited
| works = AD Consulting Limited
}}
'''Olajumoke Olufunmilola Adenowo''' (born in 1968) is a [[Nigeria]]n architect, Speaker, Radio Host, Philanthropist and Author. CNN described her as "Africa's Starchitect". She has been featured in the World's foremost Architectural Journal; Architectural Record and has spoken on several platforms including the Global Women's Forum and Havard Business School[African Business Club]

She hosts a syndicated radio show on leadership "Voice of Change".

<ref name=tribune>{{cite news|url=http://tribune.com.ng/achievers/item/24034-cnn-celebrates-nigerian-female-architect-olajumoke-adenowo/24034-cnn-celebrates-nigerian-female-architect-olajumoke-adenowo|title=CNN celebrates Nigerian female architect: Olajumoke Adenowo|date=December 13, 2014|publisher=Nigerian Tribune}}</ref> [[The Guardian (Nigeria)|''The Guardian'']] (Nigeria) has described her as "the face of Architecture in Nigeria".<ref name="Branding Nigeria">[http://ngrguardiannews.com/index.php/sunday-magazine/104-sunday-magazine?start=20 "Adenowo: Branding Nigeria Through Architecture"], Sunday Magazine, ''The Guardian'' (Nigeria), 15 December 2013. Accessed 13 January 2013.</ref>

==Education==
Adenowo studied Architecture from the age of 14 at the Obafemi Awolowo University, graduating with a Bsc (Hons) in Architecture and the coveted faculty prize in 1988. She subsequently obtained a distinction in her MSc Architecture degree [an all A Average] in the history of the University.<ref name="Branding Nigeria" /><ref>[http://www.thenationonlineng.net/2011/index.php/sunday-magazine/glamour/40110-i-love-creating-things-not-just-buildings.html "I love creating things, not just buildings"], ''[[The Nation (Nigeria)|The Nation]]'', 18 March 2012. Accessed 24 December 2012.</ref>

==Entrepreneurship and Career==
Adenowo also ran an oil and gas firm, Advantage Energy, and runs a property management firm, Advantage Energy.
She worked with Towry Coker and Associates and with Femi Majekodunmi Associates (where she designed the Federal Ministry of Finance in Abuja at the age of 23).

Adenowo founded her own firm in 1994, AD Consulting, an architecture and interior design firm, which has been involved in the design and construction of over 70 projects for the Nigerian Government and various corporate and financial institutions. AD’s clients include the world’s strongest brands like Coca-Cola and L’oreal.
Adenowo mentors and develops young architectural talents through AD’s internship schemes.

AD Consulting has received several awards for design excellence and is Nigeria’s most internationally awarded firm.{{citation needed|date=November 2015}} In 1991, Adenowo was featured in “Who will be who in the 21st century” (young achievers section) by the International Biographical Centre Cambridge, England and “Those who Inspire Nigeria

Associate Member of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators- 2015 ACIArb (UK)
Member African Leadership Network

==Awards==
Olajumoke Adenowo has received several awards for her Architecture and Philanthropy, including The International Alliance for Women World of Difference 100 Award, the Rare Gems 2007 Award, which is awarded by the Women’s Optimum Development Foundation (WODEF) and the United Nations Information Centre (UNIFEM), for her work with women empowerment and several other awards.

==Awesome Treasures Foundation==
Adenowo founded Awesome Treasures Foundation in 1999 to raise transformational leaders. The NGO has raised hundreds of entrepreneurs with notable success. ATF runs Camp Dawn, an educational camp, to address the education gap for inner-city kids. Mentoring for entrepreneurial and career success is a focus, numeric and literacy skills are developed. ATF runs Awesome Princesses for young girls in the inner city at risk of sexual abuse. Leadership training and training for entrepreneurial and career success is a focus. Coaching, financial, medical and educational intervention is frequently needed. Awesome Treasures runs Synergy groups to closely mentor and groom women for Leadership and entrepreneurship. Awesome Treasures International and national summits attract crowds of up to 5000 and over the years has attracted over 80,000 attendees. Her syndicated radio Show and Podcast, Voice of Change, is heard by millions weekly.

==Writing==
She is a speaker on several leadership and entrepreneurial platforms including the Harvard Business School Africa Business Conference. She also hosts a radio show on syndicated weekly program on Leadership - Voice of Change. In 2013, Adenowo published ''Designed for Marriage'',<ref>[http://www.onobello.com/index.php/component/k2/item/3748-parties "Designed For Marriage", Olajumoke Adenowo Tackles Serious Marriage Issues, Check Out Photos From Book Launch] Onobello.com, 12 July 2013.</ref> a book on advice for marriage from a [[Christian]] perspective.

==Published works==
* Lifespring: The Mother’s Prayer manual (Revised and Updated Edition). AuthorHouse; 5 July 2012. ISBN 978-1-4685-8288-8.
* The Mysterious Seed: Powerful Secrets of Financial Increase. AuthorHouse; January 2013. ISBN 978-1-4685-8285-7.
* Designed for Marriage. Awesome Treasures Foundation; 2013. ISBN 978-978-932-589-4
* Covenant Forces. Sovereign Flame Publishing.
* Child of Destiny. Sovereign Flame Publishing; 1996.

==Personal life==
She is married to Olukorede Adenowo. They have two sons.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.newsfetchers.com/2013/12/i-compete-against-myself-olajumoke.html?m=1#.U4QqJHM1jqA|title=I compete against myself - Olajumoke Adenowo|publisher=NewsFetchers|accessdate=May 2014}}</ref>

== References ==
{{Reflist}}
* "CNN celebrates Nigerian female architect: Olajumoke Adenowo". Nigerian Tribune. December 13, 2014.
* "Adenowo: Branding Nigeria Through Architecture", Sunday Magazine, The Guardian (Nigeria), 15 December 2013. Accessed 13 January 2013.
* "I love creating things, not just buildings", The Nation, 18 March 2012. Accessed 24 December 2012.
* AD Consulting: Principal Partner. Accessed 24 December 2012.
* About Me Adenowo's personal website.
* "Olajumoke Adenowo On The Cover Of TW Magazine’s June Edition", Today's Woman website, 12 June 2013. Accessed 13 January 2013.
* Kemi Adejumobi (February 13, 2015). "Olajumoke Adenowo, Nigeria’s star architect -CNN". Businessday. Retrieved March 9, 2015.
* I Compete Against Myself—Olajumoke Adenowo Sun News Online. 21 December 2013.
* "Designed For Marriage", Olajumoke Adenowo Tackles Serious Marriage Issues, Check Out Photos From Book Launch Onobello.com, 12 July 2013.
* "I compete against myself - Olajumoke Adenowo". NewsFetchers. Retrieved May 2014.
* Those who Inspire Nigeria.
* “Who will be who in the 21st century” (young achievers section) by the International Biographical Centre Cambridge, England
* [http://nawmagazine.com/peek-inside-naw-aprilmay-edition/ Women in Architecture "It is not a man's world" Olajumoke Adenowo covers May 2016 International Edition of New African Woman Magazine]

== External links ==
*{{cite web|url=http://awesometreasuresfoundation.org/meetthefounder.php|title=Awesome Treasures Foundation: Meet the Founder}}
*{{cite web|url=http://vocnigeria.com/index.php|title=VOC}}
*{{cite web|url=http://adconsultinglimited.com/partner.php|title=AD Consulting}}

{{Persondata
| NAME = Adenowo, Olajumoke Olufunmilola
| ALTERNATIVE NAMES =
| SHORT DESCRIPTION = Nigerian architect and author
| DATE OF BIRTH = October 16, 1968
| PLACE OF BIRTH = Lagos, Nigeria
| DATE OF DEATH =
| PLACE OF DEATH =
}}
{{DEFAULTSORT:Adenowo, Olajumoke Olufunmilola}}
[[Category:1968 births]]
[[Category:Living people]]
[[Category:Nigerian women architects]]
[[Category:Nigerian writers]]
[[Category:Nigerian architects]]
[[Category:Yoruba architects]]
[[Category:Obafemi Awolowo University alumni]]
[[Category:Businesspeople from Ibadan]]
[[Category:Nigerian women in business]]
[[Category:21st-century Nigerian businesspeople]]
[[Category:Yoruba businesspeople]]
[[Category:Nigerian Christians]]
[[Category:Women company founders]]
[[Category:Nigerian motivational speakers]]
[[Category:Nigerian businesspeople in the oil industry]]
[[Category:Nigerian real estate businesspeople]]
[[Category:Nigerian Christian writers]]
[[Category:Nigerian interior designers]]